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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis is about how collective action –associative entrepreneurship– can be fostered in 
artisanal and small-scale gold mining. This kind of association is aimed at, among other things, 
allowing small-scale gold miners to gather the financial capital that is required to obtain the type 
of technologies that reduce mercury use in the gold recovery process, and therefore the harmful 
effects of mercury pollution of ecosystems and human health. Given the public-good dilemma 
that is faced by these individuals, I study possible institutional arrangements by which associative 
entrepreneurship may be encouraged. The methods to achieve this include the construction of a 
behavioral simulation model using System Dynamics. As part of both the model building and its 
validation process I make use of the results of economic experiments carried out both in the lab 
and the field. 
 
The results of the economic experiments do not reject the hypothesis which states that sustained 
collective action does not self-emerge as a solution to the public-good dilemma. In this thesis I 
analyze two institutional arrangements: co-management and exclusion from private benefits. Of 
these two, only co-management shows a statistically significant impact on the establishment of a 
permanent collective action. However, in the field experiment this effect of co-management is 
undermined when it is combined with exclusion from the private benefits.  
 
From the behavioral simulation model, it is shown that reciprocity, free-riding and profit 
maximization are the behavioral aspects that mainly drive decision-making when dealing with the 
public-good dilemma. With an external intervention such as co-management, individuals get 
more aware of the social dilemma they face and collective action is sustained over time. 
 
From a policy viewpoint these results suggest the importance of interventions programs such as 
education projects, training in alternative practices and technologies, and campaigns to foster 
social capital. Moreover, the experimental results cast doubt on the effectiveness of economic 
incentives to change some practices in the production process of gold. However, simulation 
results show that the implementation of stricter incentives could make miners to increase their 
commitment to sustain the entrepreneurial organization. 
 
 
Keywords: artisanal and small-scale gold mining; mercury pollution; behavioral simulation 
model; experimental economics; co-management; public-good dilemma; exclusion; collective 
action; common-pool resource.  
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Resumen  
 
 
Esta tesis está relacionada con la manera en que se puede promover la acción colectiva –
asociación empresarial– en la minería aurífera artesanal y de pequeña escala. Bajo este esquema 
de asociación se pretende, entre otros, reunir el capital financiero necesario para obtener el tipo 
de tecnologías que permiten reducir el uso de mercurio en el proceso de recuperación de oro, así 
como los efectos nocivos que la contaminación por mercurio produce en ecosistemas y la salud 
humana. Dado el dilema de tipo bien público que enfrentan estos individuos, se estudian posibles 
arreglos institucionales bajo los cuales se promueva la asociación empresarial. Los métodos 
utilizados incluyen la construcción de un modelo de simulación de comportamiento usando 
Dinámica de Sistemas. Como parte del proceso de construcción del modelo y su validación, se 
hace uso de los resultados de experimentos económicos realizados en el laboratorio y en el 
campo. 
 
Los resultados de los experimentos económicos no rechazan la hipótesis según la cual una acción 
colectiva que se mantenga en el tiempo no surge como una solución al dilema de tipo bien 
público. En la tesis se estudian dos arreglos institucionales: co-manejo y exclusión de los 
beneficios privados. De los dos, solamente co-manejo muestra un impacto estadísticamente 
significativo sobre el establecimiento de una acción colectiva permanente. Sin embargo, en el 
experimento de campo este efecto se debilita al combinar co-manejo con exclusión de los 
beneficios privados. 
 
Del modelo de simulación de comportamiento se observa que reciprocidad, oportunismo y la 
búsqueda de maximización de beneficios son los aspectos conductuales que explican la toma de 
decisiones al afrontar el dilema de tipo bien público. Con una intervención tal como co-manejo, 
los individuos adquieren una mayor percepción del dilema social que enfrentan y la acción 
colectiva se sostiene en el tiempo. 
 
Desde el punto de vista de política, los resultados sugieren la importancia de programas de 
intervención tales como proyectos educativos, entrenamiento en prácticas y tecnologías 
alternativas, y campañas para incrementar el capital social. Además, los resultados 
experimentales ponen en duda la efectividad de incentivos económicos diseñados para cambiar 
algunas prácticas en el proceso de producción de oro. Sin embargo, los resultados de simulación 
muestran que la implementación de un incentivo más estricto podría hacer que los mineros 
incrementen su compromiso con el sostenimiento de la organización empresarial. 
 
Palabras clave: minería aurífera artesanal y de pequeña escala; contaminación por mercurio; 
modelo de simulación de comportamiento; economía experimental; co-manejo; dilema de tipo 
bien público; exclusión; acción colectiva; recurso de uso común.  
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“Y empezamos de nuevo a entrar, tendidos de punta como lombrices. 
Pero alegres, deshojando cachos. Porque el oro emborracha. 
Se sube a la cabeza como el aguardiente.” 
Efe Gómez. “La tragedia del minero” (1940). 
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It’s because of them, I did it myself.”  
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Chapter 1 
-- 
Overview 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Mercury-usage in production processes has become a major challenge due to the harmful side 
effects of this chemical element on ecosystems and human health. Artisanal and small-scale gold 
mining (ASGM) is one of the main global sources of anthropogenic emissions of mercury 
(Pirrone et al., 2009), and solutions to phase it out in this sector are part of the scientific and 
policy agenda. Despite the fact that cleaner and more productive technologies are available to 
artisanal gold miners (Hilson, 2006; Martínez et al., 2007) these are not frequently employed in 
the gold recovery process. Switching to alternative technologies is hampered by factors such as 
lack of funding or financial capital to cover investment costs (Chaparro, 2003), and limited 
awareness of the toxicity of mercury (Jønsson et al., 2013). This situation can be characterized as 
a social dilemma. The dilemma involves a trade-off where miners may tend to maximize short-
run individual profits by choosing the cheapest and easy-to-handle available technique –mercury 
amalgamation–. However, in the long-run, the entire community, which includes him, is worse 
off than with the choice of a cleaner and more productive technology. 
 
A suggested policy to overcome the lack of financial capital has been the creation of associations 
in which miners themselves collect the necessary funds to obtain the cleaner technology 
(Hentschel et al., 2002; Spiegel, 2009). Nonetheless, issues such as lack of trust (Chaparro, 2003; 
Hinton et al., 2003) and low entrepreneurial skills such as teamwork may hinder the 
establishment or permanence of these associations. Bearing this issues in mind, in this 
dissertation I test whether artisanal gold miners can solve their social (public-good) dilemma by 
getting involved in an association with these characteristics. Furthermore, I study possible 
institutional arrangements by which this kind of collective action may be encouraged. The 
methods to achieve this include the construction of a behavioral simulation model using System 
Dynamics. As part of both the model building and its validation process I make use of the results 
of economic experiments carried out both in the lab and the field. 
 
Decision-making processes in economic, social and managerial systems are characterized by 
complexity. The complexity that underlies the dynamics of these systems mainly arise because of 
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the feedbacks that govern the relationship among the elements of the system, and because the 
effects are rarely proportional to the cause(s) (i.e., nonlinearities) and may occur with time delay 
after the initiation of the cause (Sterman, 2000). One approach that takes account of these 
complexities in the analysis of systems is the System Dynamics approach (Sterman, 2000). By 
using a stock-and-flow feedback structure with nonlinear, first-order differential (or integral) 
equations, System Dynamics involves the use of computer simulation for theory building and 
policy analysis (Richardson, 2009). By using these methods I aim to build a model that 
endogenously explains the behavior of ASGM social systems, specifically considering the social 
dilemma that is studied in this research. The construction of this model rests on the circular 
causality of the behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action of Ostrom 
(1998). 
 
In this dissertation, the construction of the behavioral simulation model and the analysis done 
with it is supported and complemented with the conduction of economic experiments. Economic 
experiments are controlled tests of decision making by human subjects in controlled 
environments. These tests are used for developing theories of decision making and modeling 
human behavior (Arango et al., 2012). Because it is hard to collect controlled data in the real 
word, these experiments with economic agents enable the researcher to gather data to test 
hypotheses about human behavior. An economic experiment includes three basic elements 
(Friedman and Cassar, 2004): participant’s objective, the system that describes the environment 
for taking decisions (institutions, behavioral rules), and participant’s decisions. In order to gain 
control of the environment, the factors that may influence the behavior are kept constant, 
changing just one of them: the treatment (Croson and Gätcher, 2010). In this thesis, in the 
conduction of economic experiments, both in the lab and the field, I incorporate some of the 
essential aspects of the social dilemma of small-scale gold mining communities. In particular, I 
use a class of experiment that allows studying the effect of social preferences on both behavior 
and organizational processes that entails dilemmas like environmental protection or team work: 
public-good games (Ledyard, 1995; Camerer and Weber, 2013). 
 
With this work, I contribute to the understanding of social dilemmas faced by users of natural 
resources, in this case of a non-renewable resource. The results of the economic experiments also 
provide insights to the scientific discussion about the external validity of laboratory experiments 
(Guala, 2005). The rest of this introductory chapter is followed by the description of the research 
problem in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 and Section 4 I present the hypotheses and objectives, 
respectively. An outline of Chapters 2-5 is done in Section 5, and finally in Section 6 I further 
discuss the main contributions of this thesis. 
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2. Research Problem 
 
In Colombia, as well as many other developing countries, there are many communities engaged 
in gold mining using artisanal techniques. For example, in the Department of Antioquia, 
Colombia, Giraldo and Muñoz (2012) estimated that approximately 150000 individuals are 
engaged in ASGM. Despite the high increase in the international price of this mineral in the last 
decade, no visible economic progress is seen at those sites. Instead, high levels of unsatisfied 
basic needs (Vergara, 2005) and environmental pollution have been recorded (Cordy et al., 2011). 
Additionally, these social systems are apparently trapped in vicious circles that keep the 
communities in a state of economic stagnation, and far from reaching high standards of economic 
development.    
 
We observe that the salient features that best describe ASGM are low levels of mechanization 
and technology, labor-intensiveness, considerable environmental degradation, poorly trained 
miners, low productivity levels, and lack of financial capital. Moreover, these miners operate 
with little consideration for health or environmental impacts, and have a slight knowledge of 
existing mineral reserves. The way these elements would interact with each other can be 
represented in a causal diagram like the one shown in Figure 1.1. This feedback loop diagram 
shows the causal structure that would explain the vicious circles that cause the poverty-trap in 
ASGM. In general, this poverty-trap is caused by the interaction of self-reinforcing mechanisms 
(Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005) such as a technology trap (Fofack, 2008) and a savings trap 
(Asilis and Ghosh, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Dynamic hypothesis for poverty-trap in ASGM.
1
 
                                                          
1
 This feedback loop represents the cause-effect relationships through arrows. When the arrow is positive (+), it 
means that a change in the variable in which the link starts, generates a change in the same direction in the other 
variable (ceteris paribus). The arrow is negative (–) when both variables change in opposite directions, provided the 
variable in which the link starts, changes first. Small parallel lines denote delays. See Sterman (2000) for a further 
explanation. 
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Several scholars have found out that these elements are among the most relevant to understand 
the dynamics of social systems in ASGM (Hilson and Ack-Baidoo, 2011). Nonetheless, it has 
reiteratively pointed out the importance of a proper understanding of the dynamics of gold 
mining communities, before designing and implementing any policy or support measure 
(Hentschel et al., 2002; Hilson, 2005, 2006; Hilson et al., 2007; Dondeyne et al., 2009). Poor 
performance of many projects aimed at regularizing and providing assistance to ASGM has been 
attributed to an insufficient understanding of: the dynamics of target communities, the 
organization of processing activities, operators’ needs and the geological conditions (Hilson, 
2007).  
 
Therefore, it is still pending to have a deeper and formal knowledge of how the elements that best 
describe ASGM social systems interact with each other, and how these self-reinforcing 
mechanisms work. In an effort to better understand the dynamics underlying ASGM 
communities, I propose the construction of a behavioral simulation model. This model attempts 
to account for the complexity that characterizes this type of social systems. This complexity is 
reflected in a system structure with social, economic, environmental, and institutional aspects that 
entails feedback relationships, nonlinearities, and delays. In particular, in this thesis I focus my 
attention to the social (public-good) dilemma as it relates to the technology trap that causes 
pollution to persist. This simulation approach goes beyond the analysis done so far by other 
authors (Heemskerk, 2001, 2005; Hilson and Pardie, 2006; Spiegel, 2009), in the sense that it 
analyzes the attributes that would prevent the use of cleaner technologies, in a way that allows for 
the making of strategies for overcoming resistance to technological change. 
 
The aim of this model is twofold. The model is expected to explain the endogenous dynamics of 
this technology trap in ASGM. But even more important it is to propose and assess possible 
leverage policies to counteract the current adverse effects of this activity, and promote it as a 
source of economic prosperity and sustainable development. Specifically, this work is intended to 
be an analysis of ASGM in the Department of Antioquia, Colombia. Nonetheless, provided the 
commonalities of this type of socio-ecological system worldwide, some extrapolations may be 
done. 
 
Collective action and cooperation have been seen as a possibility to overcome the social dilemma 
for users of some common-pool resources that involve renewable resources; thus, one question 
that deserves to be answered is to what extent cooperation among artisanal gold miners may also 
work to solve their social dilemma. Specifically, from the behavioral simulation model and 
economic experiments, the questions I want to answer in this research is whether and how it is 
possible for artisanal gold miners to find in cooperation –associative entrepreneurship– a way of 
overcoming the social dilemma they face nowadays. 
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The access to better technology might be thought as a sine qua non condition, which aims to 
improve the levels of productivity and reducing mercury in ASGM operations. However, the lack 
of accessibility to credit markets and low saving rates make it difficult to achieve. Miners 
associations are thus seen as a possibility of increasing their financial capacity, which would 
allow adopting of the technology required to implement better practices (Hinton et al., 2003; 
CDS, 2004; Ghose and Roy, 2007; Hentschel et al., 2002). Nonetheless, to what extent this 
concept of associative entrepreneurship can be applied to ASGM is still unknown and is one 
question I seek to answer in this research. 
 
In this thesis I also study two possible institutional arrangements to foster collective action for the 
improvement of one of the processes associated with the exploitation of this non-renewable 
resource: the gold recovery process. One of these mechanisms is co-management. This 
mechanism is understood as the interaction between internal communication and an external non-
coercive party (Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado, 2010). In the case of ASGM, the task of the 
external party is to provide technical assistance, training and any other kind guidance in the 
process of switching to alternative technologies. In general, according to mining leaders of 
Antioquia, Colombia, there seems to be a good judgment of small gold miners toward the role of 
profit, non-profit and multilateral organizations in the process of switching to cleaner 
technologies.
2
  
 
Another mechanism to be tested is the option that once the technology is acquired and the public 
good is provided (lower mercury emissions), non-contributors may be excluded from the private 
benefits (more productivity) that the technology providing the public good generates. The 
empirical tests of these mechanisms are done via a framed threshold public good game with 
artisanal and small-scale miners. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
One hypothesis of this research is that sustained collective action (associative entrepreneurship) 
would not self-emerge as a solution to the social dilemma faced by households engaged in 
ASGM. This dilemma is supposed to be solved by creating an association of miners to collect 
financial capital in order to acquire alternative technologies and implement better mining and 
recovery practices. 
 
Instead, the intervention of a third non-coercive party (co-management) may be needed to 
promote a larger and well established association of miners that allow them to access to cleaner 
and more productive technologies.  
                                                          
2
 Personal communications that were held in 2011 with the following artisanal miners from Antioquia, Colombia: 
Luis Cardeño, Fernando Gómez, Arturo Rodriguez, and Hernando Henao. 
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Another mechanism that might trigger collective action in ASGM would be the exclusion of 
those miners who do not contribute to the provision of a cleaner and more productive technology, 
from the private benefits (more productivity) derived from the technology that reduces a public 
bad (mercury pollution). 
 
4. Objectives 
 
4.1 General Objective 
 
To explore the effect of different institutional arrangements on collective action of mining 
households involved in artisanal and small-scale gold mining, via simulation and experimental 
economics  
 
4.2 Specific Objectives 
 
a) To identify the most relevant aspects that characterize ASGM, and to select the variables to 
be considered in the simulation model and the design of the economic experiment. 
b) To describe and explain the dynamics underlying ASGM systems through a system dynamics 
model. 
c) To identify the mechanisms by which it might possible to induce a change in production 
behavior of subjects engaged in ASGM. 
d) To test the influence on cooperation, of both co-management and the possibility of exclusion 
of non-contributors from the private benefits derived from the technology providing a public 
good. 
e) To propose and assess policy scenarios targeted to ASGM communities using simulation. 
 
5. Chapters Outline 
 
The development of this thesis is divided into four self-contained but related chapters which are 
described in the following four subsections.  
 
5.1 Chapter 2 
 
Based on a survey of the existing literature, in Chapter 2 I offer a description of the common 
features that define ASGM in the developing world. In this chapter I show that the scheme of 
exploitation underlying ASGM may be corresponded with the scheme of common pool resource. 
However, the main social dilemma that resource users in ASGM face is different to the one 
analyzed in previous literature about common pool resources. Rather than in the extraction or 
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availability of this non-renewable resource, their social dilemma concerns the pollution resulting 
from the gold recovery process; i.e. a public-good dilemma. In this process, the application of 
mercury amalgamation makes ASGM an activity with a high negative environmental impact, 
mainly due to mercury pollution (Hilson and Pardie, 2006; Tomicic et al., 2011). As a result, 
nowadays artisanal gold miners are exposed to increasingly lower levels of environmental quality 
due to mercury pollution. This environmental impact poses a health risks to these communities 
with several type of diseases such as neurological disorders or kidney damages (Tomicic et al., 
2011). 
 
Besides the characteristics of common-pool resource and a public-good dilemma, in Chapter 2 I 
identify some commonalities of ASGM in different countries of the developing world as follows: 
low levels of mechanization and technology, labor intensiveness, low awareness of 
environmental degradation, poor training, high transience among some miners, and lack of 
financial savings. I also identify and discuss some approaches that may help to improve the 
understanding of the societal dynamics underlying ASGM communities. These approaches are 
the multi-tier framework proposed by Ostrom (2007), and the ones that are employed in this 
thesis: behavioral simulation models such as System Dynamic models (Sterman, 2000), and 
experimental economics (Friedman and Cassar, 2004). Moreover, taking into account that this 
sector has been nearly overlooked by resource economists, I present some topics and challenges 
for a research agenda for social scientists and engineers, particularly in the fields of 
environmental, ecological, and development economics. For instance, the analytical 
aforementioned approaches may applied to the analysis of the different components of the 
poverty-trap in ASGM such as technology and savings traps, and  the role of leaders and 
economic incentives in the diffusion and use of alternative technologies. 
 
5.2 Chapter 3 
 
Previous literature has identified different type of mechanisms, policy instruments and 
institutional arrangements for the sustainable management of common-pool resources and public 
goods. Some of them are as follows: pollution charges (Stavins, 2001) or other types of external 
regulation (see, e.g., Cardenas et al., 2000; Dickinson, 2001), face-to-face communication (see, 
e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 2010), and information disclosure (see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Smith, 
2010). By running a framed field experiment with artisanal gold miners from Antioquia 
(Colombia), in Chapter 3 I test the effect of two mechanisms or institutional arrangements on 
associative entrepreneurship in ASGM: (i) the interaction between internal communication 
among community members and an external non-coercive party, namely co-management, and; 
(ii) exclusion from the private benefits that the alternative technology used in the gold recovery 
process may offer to the miner  –i.e., more productivity–. 
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In the context of the research problem, a more productive and cleaner technology for gold 
recovery could be accessed to under an association scheme that involves entrepreneurial 
activities. Under the terms of this association miners should contribute to a common fund to raise 
the financial capital required to buy the technology. Besides these conditions, the field 
experiment considers the conditions of non-exclusion and non-rivalry in the positive externalities 
derived from the cleaner technology. With these conditions in mind, a threshold public good 
game was used in a 2x2 experimental design. The control treatment of this field experiment is a 
standard threshold public good game that was framed according to the aforementioned 
conditions. Treatments 2 and 3 were additionally framed taking into account our two institutions 
of interest, exclusion from private benefits and co-management, respectively. Lastly, in 
Treatment 4 co-management interacts with exclusion from private benefits which allows testing 
whether the effects of co-management are crowded in or crowded out by an economic incentive 
such as exclusion from the private benefits stemming from the cleaner technology. 
 
Non-parametric and parametric methods of data analysis were employed. The latter includes an 
analysis of individual contributions in the game with five set of explanatory variables: 
socioeconomic characteristics, perception variables, attitudinal variables, and dynamic and 
treatment variables. Additionally, given the oscillating pattern of contributions in the TPGG, an 
analysis of the standard deviation of contributions across the game was done. In general, I find 
that miners by themselves cannot permanently sustain collective action, but that it is feasible 
under co-management.  
 
5.3 Chapter 4 
 
One of the assumptions on which the methods of experimental economics rest is the parallelism 
precept (Smith, 1976, 1982). This precept states that the patterns of behavior observed in 
laboratory experiments are very likely of being observed in the field, as long as certain conditions 
hold. This precept, however, has been subject of debate since the early stages of experimental 
economics. On the one hand, experimental economics has proven to be useful in the analysis of 
markets (Guala, 2005; Fehr and Gächter, 2008). On the other hand, in the analysis of social 
preferences, the correspondence between the behavior of students and non-students (Carlsson et 
al., 2012), as well as of the behavior of non-students in a field experiment and in a natural 
situation (Voors et al., 2012), does not appear to hold. 
 
With the aim of contributing to this debate, Chapter 4 of this dissertation discusses and analyzes 
the issue of external validity of economic experiments. By using the same experimental design of 
Chapter 3, with just slight differences in the experimental procedures, I analyze whether the 
decisions university students make in the context-enriched situation of the experimental game 
converge to what miners do in the same framed experiment. The differences in the experimental 
procedures concern aspects such as the recruiting system and the facilities where the experiments 
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were run. This work contrasts with previous literature in which the comparison between lab and 
field has considered context-free situations (see, e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005; Laury and Holt, 
2008; Carlsson et al., 2012).  
 
In general, the behavior of both subject pools is similar to that reported in other multi-period 
context-free threshold public good games made in the lab (Croson and Marks, 2000; Cadsby and 
Maynes, 1999; Cadsby et al. 2008). Non-parametric and parametric analyses of the experimental 
data show behavioral convergences and divergences between students and miners. Although 
students perform better than miners in the game, some degree of convergence is observed not 
only the control treatment or base case, but also in the co-management and exclusion treatments. 
However, when these two institutional arrangements are combined the effects differ between 
these subject pools. Similarly to previous literature (see, e.g., Laury and Holt, 2008; Carlsson et 
al., 2012), a conclusion from these results is that in experimental economics the extrapolation of 
lab results should be taken cautiously.  
 
5.4 Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 presents the building process of the behavioral simulation model that is aimed to 
investigate the feasibility of collective action in the context of the public-good dilemma I study in 
this dissertation. Heemskerk (2001, 2005), Hilson and Pardie (2006) and Spiegel (2009) have 
represented the core interrelationships that drive poverty-traps in ASGM. From their visual 
models, however, it is not clear what prevents the use of cleaner technologies in ASGM, or how 
its use can be encouraged.  
 
The construction of the model takes into account the theory of collective action in social 
dilemmas proposed by Ostrom (1998), is based on the methods of System Dynamics (Sterman, 
2000), and is supported with results obtained in the economic experiments of Chapters 3 and 4. 
The dynamic hypothesis consists of three reinforcing feedback loops (reciprocity, profit 
maximization and awareness of the dilemma) and one balancing group (free-riding). Some of the 
nonlinearities of the system dynamics model are represented in four graph functions as follows: 
willingness to cooperate, temptation to free-ride, profit maximization and social dilemma 
awareness. Moreover, the model contains time delays that are referred to players’ knowledge 
formation in variables such as group’s reputation and relative payoff. The validation of the model 
is based on the standard procedures of System Dynamics which implies the application of tests of 
model structure and behavior (Barlas, 1996). 
 
With this model is possible to discern what personality traits prevent the successful establishment 
of associations that lead to solving the social dilemma of ASGM communities. Simulations thus 
reveal that features such as reciprocity and temptation to free ride partially explain why the self-
establishment of this kind of association is troublesome. These simulations also show that a 
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sustained collective action is feasible when miners completely understand the social dilemma 
they face. A policy implication of this result is the importance of external interventions in the 
form of programs that make artisanal gold mining communities recognize and understand this 
social dilemma. An intervention of this kind, like co-management in the context of the economic 
experiment, leads to better outcomes in terms of the collective action subjects can achieve. The 
simulation model also shows a positive effect on the provision of the technology of an economic 
incentive that tends to completely exclude free-riders from certain benefits of the alternative 
technology. 
 
The paper thus illustrates the usefulness of simulation methods in the design and support of 
policies targeted at natural resource-based communities such as ASGM. Further applications of 
these methods could be directed toward the study of other social and economic components of the 
ASGM’s poverty-trap and mechanisms to overcome it. 
 
6. Main Contributions and Conclusions 
 
A premise used in this thesis is that in order to design policies focused on ASGM communities a 
better understanding of their societal dynamics is required. One first step on this regard is the 
identification of the main characteristics of ASGM, which are also the aspects that explain 
poverty-traps in this sector. After a comprehensive review and analysis, I found that the main 
aspects are the use of rudimentary techniques, and low levels of both education and awareness of 
environmental degradation. Thus, such problems are identified as the main drivers of the public-
dilemma that these communities face: mercury pollution.  
 
Some analytical approaches are identified to understand the dynamics underlying ASGM 
communities: behavioral simulation models, the multi-tier framework proposed by Ostrom 
(2007), and experimental economics. These methods can, for instance, be applied to study some 
cultural patterns such as conspicuous consumption and its relationship with poverty traps in 
ASGM, and to the analysis and assessment of mechanisms to break out these cycles of poverty. 
In this thesis, by using two of these approaches, experimental economics and a behavioral 
simulation model, from chapters 3 to 5 we assess the feasibility of associative entrepreneurship to 
address mercury pollution in ASGM, including mechanisms by which this type of collective 
action can be encouraged. 
 
The application of modeling by simulation and experimental economics to the study of ASGM 
issues is innovative for two reasons. Firstly, the understanding of the societal dynamics of ASGM 
communities so far has been based on mental models of scientist, researchers and practitioners 
who after being in the field have written down and published their perceptions. Some of these 
perceptions have been translated into visual models which illustrate the poverty-trap in ASGM. 
By using simulations methods, I go further and formalize the technology trap which is a part of 
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the feedback processes that explain how artisanal miners turn out to be trapped in vicious cycles 
of poverty.  
 
Secondly, besides top-down approaches such as simulations models, it is also important to have 
first-hand or primary information that provide insights concerning the decisions miners make and 
the “why” behind these decisions. Conducting field economic experiments and the measurement 
of micro-situational variables are approaches that go in this direction (Anderies et al., 2011). For 
example, Heemskerk (2001, 2002, 2003), one of the few examples in the literature, collected and 
used microdata to analyze social issues of ASGM in Suriname.  
 
Field economic experiments have proven to be a useful tool to test hypotheses about human 
behavior and management of natural resources (Anderies et al., 2011). Despite the extensive 
evidence of this usefulness, experimental economics had not been employed before to investigate 
many of the problems that characterize ASGM worldwide. In this thesis, by testing behavioral 
hypothesis in controlled environments, I show how experimental methods can help to enhance 
our understanding of the dynamics of ASGM communities, as well as to support the design of 
policies aimed at increasing the well-being of these communities.  
 
The results of the economic experiments that were run in the field with artisanal gold miners do 
not reject the hypothesis which states that sustained collective action would not self-emerge as a 
solution to the social dilemma faced by households engaged in ASGM. Two mechanisms or 
institutional arrangements were analyzed in this dissertation: co-management and exclusion from 
private benefits. Of these two, only co-management shows a statistically significant impact on the 
establishment of a permanent collective action. However, this effect of co-management is 
undermined when it is combined with exclusion from the private benefits.  
 
I also constructed a behavioral simulation model based on the methods of system dynamics, with 
the aim to understand the experimental results. This model considers a causal structure with four 
loops as follows: reciprocity, free-riding, profit maximization and awareness of the social 
dilemma. After calibrating the model with the results of the field economic experiments, I can 
show that reciprocity, free-riding and profit maximization are the behavioral aspects that mainly 
drive decision-making when dealing with the public-good dilemma. However, after an external 
intervention such as co-management, individuals get more aware of the social dilemma they face 
and thus contributions are such that the provision of the public good is sustained over time 
 
I run experiments with miners and students, with the same treatments. Comparison of 
performance of miners and university students in the framed economic experiment shows that the 
extrapolation of experiments run in the lab with university students to a different pool of subjects, 
should be taken cautiously. On the one hand, in this comparison I find that three treatments had 
the same kind of effect. In the co-management treatment players from both subject pools tried to 
coordinate their actions in order to achieve efficient and equitable outcomes. Moreover, there 
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were no clear effect of exclusion, and in the base case contributions have a tendency to be 
decreasing and oscillating around the efficient outcome. On the other hand, in the treatment 
where co-management and exclusion are combined the effects differed between the subject pools: 
meanwhile students could agree on contributing a number tokens that generate Pareto-efficient 
and equitable outcomes, miners could not. In regards to the achievement of efficient outcomes, 
university students performed better than miners and got more efficient outcomes. 
 
From a policy viewpoint these results suggest the importance of interventions programs such as 
education projects, training in alternative practices and technologies, and campaigns to foster 
social capital. Moreover, these experimental results cast doubt on the effectiveness of economic 
incentives to change some practices in the production process of gold in ASGM. However, 
simulation results show that the implementation of stricter incentives could make miners to 
increase their commitment to sustain the association. 
 
In general, it can be argued that more education and training would make individuals to better the 
understanding of the system and estimate the consequences of their actions considering also 
others’ actions. This understanding does not only generate better outcomes to the individual but 
also to his social group. However, to what extent the degree of education is an important driver of 
these differences in performance is an unanswered question for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
-- 
The public good dilemma of a non-renewable 
common resource: a look at the facts of artisanal 
gold mining
1
 
 
 
Abstract 
Millions of people worldwide are involved in artisanal and small-scale gold mining. Many of them live in 
conditions of poverty and insalubrities due to the mercury amalgamation of gold and the application of 
other rudimentary techniques. In spite of this, the sector has been nearly overlooked by resource 
economists. In this paper we analyze the sector based on a survey of the existing literature. We find some 
commonalities of artisanal and small-scale gold mining in different countries of the developing world as 
follows: low levels of mechanization and technology, labor intensiveness, low awareness of 
environmental degradation, poor training, high transience among some miners, and lack of financial 
savings. Moreover, with these commonalities in mind, we present some topics and challenges for a 
research agenda in the field of environmental, ecological, and development economics.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The extraction of minerals has been the material basis of many economies (Tilton, 1992). The 
extraction of hydrocarbons or non-fossil minerals and their industrial uses have expanded the 
wealth of many nations in recent centuries. However, non-renewable resources continue to 
represent the most elemental mean of livelihood for some of the poorest populations in the world 
(Swain et al., 2007). The extraction of minerals all over the world has been studied by both 
natural and social scientists.  Economists are not the exception and over the years have developed 
theoretical and empirical models studying the optimal rate of extraction of non-renewables (see 
for instance Hotelling, 1931; Pindyck, 1981; and Managi et al., 2004).   
 
Yet, there are other dimensions of the non-renewable extraction that deserve some attention: the 
externalities generated from it, and also the dependence of such extractions of millions of people 
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in the world using artisanal techniques. A clear example of it is the artisanal and small-scale gold 
mining (ASGM) in which miners who want to maximize private profits employ the cheapest 
technological alternative for the recovery process: mercury amalgamation. This technique leads 
to environmental and health problems in the long run due to the mercury pollution it generates. 
 
With the end of solving the pollution problem generated by the recovery process better 
production technologies, which are generally more expensive for acquiring and harder to operate, 
must be employed. Therefore, miners face the dilemma related to the pollution resulting from the 
gold recovery process; i.e., a public-good dilemma in which private benefits are apparently 
higher when using mercury amalgamation and social welfare is improved by using a cleaner 
technology. 
 
In addition to environmental pollution, ASGM faces several social, political and economic 
difficulties that deserve some attention. With these facts in mind, many scholars have stressed the 
importance of a good understanding of the dynamics of ASGM communities before designing 
and implementing any policy (Hentschel et al., 2002; Hilson, 2005, 2006; Hilson et al., 2007; 
Spiegel, 2009; Dondeyne et al., 2009). Nonetheless, in spite of the known conditions of ASGM, 
this subject has been overlooked in the environmental, ecological, and development economics 
literatures. 
 
This paper does not present the results of any empirical research conducted by the authors. 
Instead, we survey the literature related to ASGM with the objective of gaining a broad picture of 
ASGM that would foster the understanding of the main conditions characterizing this activity in 
the developing world.  Such an understanding is the first necessary step for the design of policies 
to overcome the social dilemma; i.e., to regulate both extraction and pollution from the resource 
exploitation. With this description in mind, we aim to discuss a research agenda for this fairly 
unexplored topic in the resource, environmental, ecological and development economics 
literatures. Specifically, we discuss feasible theoretical approaches and methods to analyze 
behavioral patterns and for policy assessment in ASGM. Within this discussion, our main focus is 
the social dilemma associated with the use of mercury amalgamation in the recovery process and 
the social factors that impede the resolution of such dilemma. 
 
In the next section, we provide a general overview of the common features characterizing ASGM 
worldwide. Furthermore, we identify the major challenges for the sector, and for scholars and 
policy makers working with these communities.  Then, in section 3 we present a brief discussion 
of the reviewed works and a possible future research agenda for social scientists, particularly for 
natural resource, environmental, ecological and development economists. In section 4 we 
conclude. 
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2. Commonalities of Artisanal Gold Mining Worldwide  
 
Since the pre-colonial period, ASGM has contributed to the economic development of many 
countries (CDS, 2004). Currently, approximately 25% of the world’s gold production is 
generated by ASGM (Chouinard and Veiga, 2008). For several millions of people involved in 
this economic sector, gold extraction is the most attractive activity in terms of income generation. 
However, the application of conventional practices, mercury amalgamation being the most 
representative, makes ASGM an activity with a high negative environmental impact, primarily 
due to mercury pollution (Hilson and Pardie, 2006; Swain et al., 2007; Tomicic et al., 2011). This 
environmental impact returns to the community itself, neglecting the possibility of developing 
other economic activities, as well as posing a health risk.  
 
Previous studies have identified what has been named a “poverty trap” for some communities 
involved in labor-intensive extractive jobs such as artisanal gold-miners (Spiegel, 2009; Hilson 
and Ack-Baidoo, 2011). According to Azariadis and Stachurski (2005, p. 326), a poverty trap is 
“any self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist.” These mechanisms may be 
determined by cultural, institutional or structural conditions that put these communities into 
vicious cycles from which it is difficult to escape and that may influence the rate of depletion of 
the resource (Hilson and Pardie, 2006). In the following, we describe the conditions that may 
drive these mechanisms in ASGM. 
 
2.1 Legal and Institutional Aspects 
 
Gold mining using either artisanal methods or methods with a low degree of mechanization and 
low productivity is practiced by over 10 million people in the developing world (Spiegel and 
Veiga, 2005). In countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe and other territories of sub-Saharan 
Africa as well as some Latin American countries, such as Colombia and Peru, ASGM is essential 
for many communities that find in the extraction of gold a complementary source of income 
(Kitula, 2006; Maponga and Ngorima, 2003; Spiegel, 2009; GEMMA, 2007). In other cases, in 
countries such as Colombia or Ghana, geographical or climate (drought) conditions or the low 
productivity of soil make ASGM almost the only possible source of livelihood for many villagers 
(Hilson and Potter, 2005; Hilson and Pardie, 2006; PEA, 2010).  
  
These circumstances, however, are not the only factors encouraging the practice of ASGM. In 
addition, some specific economic reforms promoted by the World Bank or the IMF in developing 
countries may have created another set of conditions for the emergence and rise of poverty. The 
implementation of these reforms may cause public sector employees to lose their jobs due to the 
privatization of selected stated-owned enterprises and then to move to other economic sectors 
with job opportunities such as ASGM (Hilson and Potter, 2005; Banchirigah, 2006). Likewise, 
reforms to the mining sector in some African and Latin American countries, intended to promote 
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foreign investment in large-scale projects, have caused the displacement of rural communities 
that have no option other than moving on to ASGM (Banchirigah, 2008; Molano, 2011).  
 
Legalization, formalization and enforcement are regarded as another challenge to ASGM in some 
countries analyzed in the literature. There is consensus that governments should legalize small-
scale mining and implement sector-specific legislation before considering any effort to address 
any problems related to ASGM (Veiga, 1997; Hilson, 2002a; Chaparro, 2004; Ali, 2009; Giraldo 
and Muñoz, 2012). With regard to legislation, it is clear that an illegal mining activity is referred 
to that undertaken without a mining license (Fisher, 2008; Hilson and Maponga, 2004; Enriquez, 
nd). In many countries, however, legalization of the mining sector has left out ASGM. Sector-
specific reforms designed to stimulate foreign investments in large-scale projects (Banchirigah, 
2008; Molano, 2011), bureaucratic licensing schemes (Hilson and Potter, 2005; Fisher, 2007; 
Elejalde, 2012), and lack of enforcement (Teschner, 2012) have excluded small-miners from 
access to and rights over mineral resources.  
 
Nevertheless, in their struggle for survival, many miners continue to extract the mineral either 
from areas without any assigned entitlement or from properties of large-scale mines (Ali, 2009). 
In the latter case, unauthorized miners may operate for several days inside mines owned by large-
scale companies, under serious hazardous conditions. The regulation of these miners, who are 
referred to as ninjas in Mongolia (Ali, 2009), and machuqueros in Colombia (Navia, 2005), may 
be a tough problem to solve. On one side, large-scale companies are interested in wiping out 
transgressors, and on the other side, regulators should consider fostering conditions for 
alternative livelihood programs targeting these groups of miners. Finally, another ingredient of 
illegality in ASGM is the participation of illegal armed groups that have turned to gold mining to 
finance their activities or for money laundering (Vergara, 2005; Grätz, 2009; Maconachie, 2009; 
Romero, 2011). 
 
Some other features can also help to understand that in addition to being poverty-driven, ASGM 
involves self-reinforcing mechanisms that trap artisanal miners in a cycle of poverty. It is 
observed that these mechanisms embrace not only the legal and economic context surrounding 
the activity but also socio-economic and cultural aspects that shape miners’ behavior in issues 
such as the management of natural resources as well as the miners’ own economic decisions. 
These mechanisms are explained below. 
 
2.2 Mining Techniques and Ecosystem Degradation  
 
One particular feature found in ASGM is the application of conventional practices. These 
techniques make ASGM an activity with a high negative environmental impact, namely mercury 
pollution and land degradation (Lin et al., 1997; Hilson, 2002b, 2002c; Mol and Ouboter, 2004; 
Betancourt et al., 2005; Hilson and Pardie, 2006; Swain et al., 2007; Tomicic et al., 2011). 
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Specifically, because of its relatively low cost, mercury is employed to amalgamate free gold 
during the process of grinding the whole gold ore in, for instance, ball mills. Additionally, the 
mercury of the amalgam is burned off into the atmosphere to recover gold (Cordy et al., 2011).  
 
In addition to the low recovery of gold, the outcome of the entire process is the high loss of 
mercury, which is deposited in the rivers and the air, which in turn are bioaccumulated in soils, 
water, plants and animals (Prieto and Gonzalez, 1998; Prieto, 2010). More than a few effects on 
human well-being attributable to mercury pollution have been documented: neurological 
disorders ranging from loss of eyesight to tremors and paralysis, kidney and lung damages, and 
effects on the reproductive system (Tirado et al., 2000; Hilson and Pardie, 2006; Tomicic et al., 
2011). 
 
In addition to its low cost, two main factors may explain the massive consumption of mercury in 
ASGM. First, a widespread characteristic of artisanal gold miners is their low degree of education 
(Hentschel et al., 2002; Heemskerk, 2005). In some cases, low education levels may actually be 
explained or exacerbated by the participation of children in mining activities. Many of these 
children, instead of attending school, start their participation in ASGM at a very young age 
(Keita, 2001; Jaques et al., 2006). Widely accepted consequences of miners’ low education are 
twofold: the disregard miners have for environmental and health-related issues (Spiegel and 
Veiga, 2005; Hilson, 2006; Imparato, 2010), and the lack of the skills necessary to operate better 
technologies (Kazilimani et al., 2003; Shoko, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, the lack of credit facilities, combined with the slight savings of mining households 
and distrustful attitudes toward alternative technologies, become a barrier to having enough 
working capital and adopting cleaner, more productive technologies (Amankwah and Anim-
Sackey, 2003; Enriquez, nd; PEA, 2010; Hentschel et al., 2002; Seeling, 2003; Heemskerk, 
2005).  
 
At the aggregate level, China is considered the largest source of environmental mercury derived 
from ASGM. On the other side of the world, Colombia is the world’s third-largest source of 
mercury from ASGM (Cordy et al., 2011). Moreover, in Antioquia, Colombia, Cordy et al. 
(2011) estimated mercury emissions to the environment that makes this region the world’s 
highest per capita emitter of mercury from gold mining. Low-productive techniques such as 
sluice boxes and gold panning (Escalante, 1971; West, 1972) as well as mercury amalgamation 
were introduced in the colonial period by Spaniards to this and other regions of America 
(Martínez et al., 2007). These continue to be massively popular techniques despite the fact that 
cleaner, more productive, and financially viable technologies are available to miners (Veiga, 
1997; Pinzón et al., 2003; Pantoja et al., 2005; Hilson, 2006; Martínez et al., 2007). The situation 
described above parallels the artisanal gold mining sector in Ghana (Hilson, 2002a).  
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2.3 Cultural Patterns  
 
In the cases described above, we observe that most of the people who currently engage in ASGM 
may do so because of a tradition that has been passed down the generations. However, the desire 
to preserve ancestral practices has not always led to unhealthy results in this sector. For example, 
in Chocó, Colombia, a Fair Trade gold initiative (Childs, 2008) has offered to Afro-Colombian 
communities the possibility of gold panning in rivers or streams without the need to use mercury 
or cyanide in the alluvial mining process. The so-called Oro Verde program, which operates 
within common property areas governed by these communities, has allowed these communities 
not only to rescue and employ ancestral practices of gold recovery but also to set a minimum 
price and receive a premium price for their gold (Vera, 2010). 
 
Another part of the cultural portrayal is the conspicuous consumption usually seen in many 
villages or towns with ASGM (Hinton et al., 2003; CDS, 2004; GEMMA, 2007; Grätz, 2009; 
Bryceson and Jønsson, 2010). The peculiar manner in which artisanal gold miners spend their 
income has contributed to the formation of the stereotype of the artisanal gold miner. Among 
these spending habits, excessive drinking, prostitution, and gambling are among the services an 
artisanal miner often pays for every time he receives earnings from mining gold (GEMMA, 2007; 
Grätz, 2009; Bryceson and Jønsson, 2010). We interpret this typical type of behavior as 
something that undoubtedly prevents any sort of productive investments in either economic 
activity or the local economy. Various cultural features with historical roots could help us to 
explain the behavior that artisanal miners exhibit in different locations of the world.  
 
For example, since the 18th century, mining communities from some regions in Colombia 
(Nordeste and Bajo-Cauca regions in the Department of Antioquia), have been recognized for 
certain behavioral patterns that Lenis (2007) has classified as “unrestrained.”  With regard to 
culture and customs, miners’ local folklore states that “gold and money are spent on aguardiente, 
rum, and women” and that when getting back to the mine there will always be gold available (del 
Valle, 2007). Such unrestrained behavior, still seen in the 21st century, leads to wasteful 
expenditures, excessive alcohol consumption, the unwillingness to save money, and damage to 
the ecosystem due to inappropriate waste disposal. Consequently, these behavioral patterns, 
following the perception of gold as a non-scarce resource, result in obstacles to economic 
development. This lack of economic progress is evident, for instance, in the high index of 
unsatisfied basic needs of gold mining zones in Colombia (Vergara, 2005), and of other countries 
like Bolivia, Tanzania, or China (Enriquez, nd; Bryceson and Jønsson, 2010; Shen and Gunson, 
2006). 
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2.4 Gold as a Common Resource in Artisanal Mining 
 
The analysis of some of the characteristics underlying ASGM enables us to classify this 
extraction process as a common pool resource (CPR). Generally speaking, a CPR is defined as a 
system where the extraction of resource units by one user subtracts from the quantity of the 
resource potentially available to others (Janssen et al., 2010). Regarding rivalry in ASGM, it is 
obvious that any gram of gold extracted by one miner or group of miners is not available to 
others. Nonetheless, the issue of exclusion is not definite. In this survey, we provide some 
insights into why this mineral resource is not subject to a complete system of exclusion and thus 
why ASGM could also be studied as a CPR. 
 
As mentioned above, the extraction of gold may or may not be subject to a legal license issued by 
a government. When the extraction is illegal, the resource is under “open access,” and almost 
anybody can dig up gold. When the activity is legal, the mere fact that a miner holds a license to 
exploit the resource does not necessarily imply a complete exclusion of other potential miners. 
With regard to large-scale mining, companies established in developing countries have been in a 
permanent state of conflict with villagers, who are in principle excluded from gold exploitation 
(CDS, 2004; Aubynn, 2009). In some cases, miners often encroach upon mines of large-scale 
companies (Amankwah and Anim-Sackey, 2003; PEA, 2010). In others, small-scale miners do 
extract gold close to or in zones licensed to but not exploited by those companies (Beltrán, 2004).  
 
Common to ASGM are also the low barriers to entry in terms of capital needs and required skills 
(Heemskerk, 2002; Amankwah and Anim-Sackey, 2003; Siegel and Veiga, 2010). In addition, in 
this open-entry occupation, people with high mobility between different mining sites are usually 
engaged (Bryceson and Jønsson, 2010). Provided that many of these transient miners do not hold 
an entitlement to extract gold, they can access the mineral resource either as employees in a 
small-scale mine or by obtaining a lease agreement. Under the terms of such an informal 
arrangement, the miner or a group of them must share the benefits of the extraction with the title 
holder. Payment to the title holder can take various forms; some examples include, in Ghana, the 
distribution of one third of all profits to the concessionaire (Hilson and Potter, 2003), in 
Suriname, a fee consisting of 5-10% of gold production (Heemskerk and Oliviera, 2004), and in 
Colombia, 30-40% of the ore that is mined (personal communication with Jesús Rua in 2011).  
 
In many cases, the transience of some artisanal gold miners is linked to the availability of the 
resource, and information of it (Chaparro, 2003). A notorious example is the case of Serra Pelada 
in the Brazilian Amazon. After a solitary gold panner found gold in 1980, the government 
encouraged people to move there by creating the first artisanal mining reserve. Over eighty 
thousand people from different parts of the world had arrived there by 1983 (Veiga, 1997). A 
similar case occurred in 2004 in Tanzania, where a villager, having discovered a gold deposit, did 
not manage to develop a claim. News of the discovery spread rapidly, and soon people were 
flocking to the area seeking to mine gold (Fisher, 2008). The same perception appears to prevail 
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among small-scale miners in Antioquia, Colombia. In this region, informal miners appear to live 
in a constant state of expectancy of who is doing well, with the purpose of tracking winners’ 
movements and competing for resources.  
 
2.5 The Tragedy of this Non-renewable Common 
 
With these facts in mind, we then argue that the socio-ecological systems involved in ASGM can 
fit the definition of CPR. However, what exactly is the tragedy of this non-renewable common? 
In 1968, Garret Hardin presented “The Tragedy of the Commons,” portraying a common pasture 
opened to a set of herdsmen. Assuming rational self-interested pastoralists, Hardin concluded that 
each pastoralist would add as many animals as possible to his herd, with the inevitable result of 
the overharvesting and destruction of the common, unless an external authority imposed 
corrective rules. In such a setting, each resource user must cope with a social dilemma in which 
the attainable short-run private benefits from harvesting are at odds with long-term collective 
interests (Ostrom, 1998). 
 
With regard to exhaustible resources, there is an obvious and inevitable result: their depletion. In 
spite of this, economic theory suggests that non-renewable resource producers may exploit the 
resource at a socially optimal rate (Hotelling, 1931). However, with price trends for non-
renewable resources that do not support the so-called Hotelling rule, in recent decades several 
scholars have used formal and experimental methods in an attempt to explain the failure of this 
rule.  Rather than the exhaustibility issue, other decision factors could come into play when 
producers determine how much mineral to extract, such as uncertainty, myopic behavior, or 
strategic behavior (Pindyck, 1981; Veldhuizen and Sonnemans, 2011). Indeed, in some regions 
with ASGM gold has been exploited for centuries, and there is as yet no concern about its 
depletion (del Valle, 2007). 
 
Survey evidence shows that in ASMG, the question that miners face is not whether to extract the 
resource or what the optimal rate is but how to extract and recover the resource. ASMG is a 
unique livelihood activity, in which the earnings miners receive from gold are relatively 
significant (Siegel and Veiga, 2010), and the ignorance of existing mineral reserves is salient 
(Lahiri-Dutt; 2004). Unlike users of replenishable CPR, one social dilemma additionally faced by 
resource users in ASGM can be found in the way in which gold is recovered. In the gold recovery 
(ore beneficiation) process, every miner tends to employ the cheapest available technique –
mercury amalgamation– apparently to gain the maximum short-run benefit for himself. However, 
the entire community, which includes him, is worse off than if a cleaner and more productive 
technology were used. Therefore, unlike the social dilemma analyzed in the previous literature on 
renewable CPR, the dilemma that ASGM faces is not only found in the extraction and availability 
of this non-renewable resource or in its depletion. An additional dilemma concerns the reduction 
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of pollution resulting from the gold recovery process; i.e., a public-good dilemma (Ostrom, 
1998). 
 
In addition to the social dilemma, every miner faces an individual dilemma. This situation can be 
viewed as involving a within-person externality, or “internality.” In the field of behavioral 
economics, internality refers to situations in which a person ignores a consequence of his own 
behavior for himself. According to Herrnstein et al. (1993) this phenomenon can occur for 
reasons such as lack of awareness of the consequence, or a motivational downgrading of 
otherwise obscure consequences of action. In the context of ASGM, we argue that the internality 
occurs when the decision made by a miner in the present on how to recover gold imposes health 
costs in the long-run to the miner himself (internal costs) in addition to the community to which 
he belongs (external costs). These costs, both internal and external, are simply not considered at 
the moment of making the decision of how to recover gold. 
 
In many field settings, with evidence gathered for renewable resources, such as forests or 
fisheries, it has been shown the possibility of stimulating collective action or self-organization as 
an alternative to solve the social dilemma associated with the use of CPRs (Ostrom, 2010). A 
wide range of scholars around the world have noted that a set of conditions would enable users of 
CPRs to overcome the tragedy of the commons. Mechanisms such as communication, 
reciprocity, learning, and the development of a set of norms and rules may trigger this possibility 
(Basurto and Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 2010). The existence of these mechanisms would avoid the 
intervention of an external authority.  
 
 In ASGM, there are small associations of miners created with the aim of reducing costs and 
increasing productivity, but these associations are mostly formed for the process of mining gold 
from vein or placer deposits (Echeverry and Jaime, 1988; Chaparro, 2003; Bryceson and Jønsson, 
2010; GEMMA, 2007; PEA, 2010). We note that these associations would be of special 
importance for underground gold mining, where initial and exploration costs are greater. 
Additionally, there are occasions where miners may get together to address legal issues such as 
the procurement of explosives or obtaining mining entitlements.  
 
However, it seems like, contrary to experimental and field evidence for renewable resources 
(Ostrom, 2010), these associations have seldom been effective in resolving the social dilemma 
these communities deal with. The existence of different objectives or interests, disputes 
concerning the administration, a lack of a long-term vision, or a lack of trust may be some of the 
barriers hindering either the establishment or longevity of these cooperatives (Chaparro, 2003; 
Hinton et al., 2003; miner’s personal communication).   
 
In sum, ASGM is a labor intensive activity that employs low technology, and has a high negative 
impact on environmental quality, which represents a public-good dilemma. Furthermore, we 
observe that, contrary to some CPR systems in which self-organization may emerge as an 
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opportunity to overcome the social dilemma, in ASGM the intervention of an external authority 
or third party may be needed to promote better practices and technologies (CDS, 2004; Chaparro, 
2003; Amankwah and Anim-Sackey, 2003; Shen and Gunson, 2006). 
 
2.6 Intervention Programs 
 
Launched by the United Nations in 2002, the Global Mercury Project is an important capacity-
building initiative, created with the aim of “removing barriers to the adoption of cleaner practices 
of small-scale gold mining” (Spiegel and Veiga, 2005, p. 362). Experiences with this sort of 
intervention show varying results. For instance, a number of assistance projects aimed to create 
enterprises in Mali failed due to several reasons such as considering only technical aspects, and 
ignoring important socioeconomic issues (Keita, 2001). On the other hand, some interventions in 
Bolivia and Colombia, as well as Mali, have reported positive results (Bocangel, 2001; García 
and Molina, 2011; Keita, 2001). In these countries, persistent training campaigns encouraged 
some miners to use retorts during the mercury burn-off stage. 
 
However, as Jennings (2003) notes, interventions must go beyond the presentation of technical 
solutions to the problems of mining and processing; attention to economic and social issues 
should also be paid. For instance, an interesting form of intervention is the promotion or 
strengthening of cooperatives of miners. Given the lack of communication and collective action 
among miners (Hinton et al., 2003), the role of a third party could go in the direction of fostering 
organization within the sector (Kazilimani et al., 2003).  
 
The promotion of associative entrepreneurship has been on the policy agenda of some 
governments and independent bodies. In addition to improving the relationship with the state, this 
type of association would enable miners to accumulate the financial capital required to obtain 
cleaner and more productive technologies that are beyond the budget of most miner families 
(Hinton et al., 2003; Hilson and Potter, 2003; Heemskerk and Oliviera, 2004; CDS, 2004; Ghose 
and Roy, 2007; Spiegel, 2009; Hentschel et al., 2002). This capital is difficult to obtain from the 
financial system, which perceives small-scale mining as a risky financial activity (Chaparro, 
2003). This fact, added to the low tendency of miners to save money for investing (see section 
2.3), make us think of associative entrepreneurship an option for small-scale miners to increase 
their financial capital.  
 
However, given the low predisposition of miners to engage in long-lasting cooperative efforts, is 
it truly possible for artisanal gold miners to find in cooperation a mean for overcoming their 
social dilemma? Among the few examples is “La Llanada,” in the Department of Nariño, 
Colombia, where there exists an association in which each community member must contribute a 
determined amount of money. This association has enabled its members to create an enterprise 
for both exploitation and recovery, eradicating the consumption of mercury (Franco, 1998; León, 
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2011). Similarly, in Mali and Mozambique small-scale miners united their efforts and capital to 
improve mine efficiency, whereas technical assistance enabled them to have some control over 
mercury pollution (Keita, 2001; Dondeyne et al., 2009). However, in the case of Mozambique, 
technical support from the government has only succeeded when miners extract gold encased in 
rocks. When gold is found in alluvial deposits, the mining activity may not be long-lasting, which 
may discourage the formation of an association (Dondeyne et al., 2009).  
 
To what extent this concept of associative entrepreneurship can be applied to other sites with 
ASGM is still unknown from this literature review, particularly in sites with severe negative 
environmental impacts due to mercury pollution, such as the region of Antioquia in Colombia 
(Cordy et al., 2011). In recent years, the government of Antioquia, jointly with UNIDO’s Global 
Mercury Project, has encouraged the use of technologies to reduce mercury discharges. A feature 
of the campaign has been the encouragement of miners to associate among themselves for 
entrepreneurial purposes. In our opinion, although reductions in mercury utilization and pollution 
have been reported (García and Molina, 2011), artisanal miners and external organizations have 
much difficult work to do to accomplish the goal of phasing out the utilization of mercury. A 
question worth asking is whether each artisanal gold miner has the capabilities required to 
organize with other miners to create an enterprise in an attempt to improve their production 
processes. If these miners do not, another question to answer is how collective action may be 
encouraged. This point is further discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Discussion 
 
ASGM is the main source of subsistence for millions of people living in developing countries and 
perhaps is the only livelihood alternative for those communities. Therefore, we can say that for 
these communities, the question to ask is not whether to extract gold but how to do it. In addition 
to offering technical alternatives, as a first step in the design of policies to solve the sort of 
problems previously discussed, several authors have called attention to the importance of first 
understanding the societal dynamics of communities involved in ASGM (Hentschel et al., 2002; 
Hilson, 2005, 2006; Hilson et al., 2007; Spiegel, 2009; Dondeyne et al., 2009). The poor 
performance of many projects aimed at regularizing and providing assistance to ASGM has been 
said to be due to an insufficient understanding of the dynamics of target communities, the 
organization of processing activities, operators’ needs and geological conditions (Hilson, 2007). 
 
In this attempt, with a survey of the literature we have described the commonalities of ASGM 
systems located in developing countries: low levels of mechanization and technology, labor-
intensiveness, considerable environmental degradation, low productivity levels, and lack of 
capital. Additionally, in view of the findings of this survey, it may be said that poverty is both a 
cause and an effect of ASGM. In all, we can observe that several social, economic and cultural 
factors are traversal to the commonalities already described in section 2, and which are important 
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elements of the dynamics that underlies ASGM. This set of factors includes: low education levels 
and poor training of miners; conspicuous consumption; lack of trust in others and towards 
alternative technologies; insufficient communication, and; unusual collective action to cope with 
the social dilemma they face. 
 
In an effort to improve the understanding of the dynamics underlying ASGM communities, there 
are approaches that might go beyond the analysis conducted thus far. Examples of those 
analytical approaches are behavioral simulation models (Sterman, 2000) and the multi-tier 
framework proposed by Ostrom (2007), which are briefly discussed in this section. 
 
3.1 Some Analytical Approaches  
 
Simulation has become an important methodology for theory development in the literature on 
organizations (Davis et al., 2007) and the understanding of the dynamics governing a social 
system (Bowles, 2004). For instance, Andriamasinoro and Angel (2012) discuss the advantages 
that simulation methods could provide to the design of policies focused on ASGM. Also in other 
contexts, simulation has proved to be a useful tool in the analysis of global markets for 
exhaustible resources such as helium (Cai et al., 2010) or metals (van Vuuren et al., 1999). 
 
Hence, we think that simulation methods can help to explain the endogenous dynamics 
underlying social systems involved in ASGM and leverage policies can be proposed and 
assessed. These policies should be aimed at counteracting the current harmful effects observed in 
ASGM. With these methods we can model the complexity of socio-economic systems involved 
in the management of natural resources (see for instance Castillo and Saysel, 2005). This 
complexity is reflected in a structure with social, economic, environmental, and institutional 
aspects that incorporates feedback relationships, nonlinearities, and delays. In the case of ASGM, 
it would be possible to consider issues such as investment decisions or the perception of the 
unhealthy effects of pollution. In both cases the temporal difference between cause and effect can 
be substantial (Hilson, 2006).  
 
An approach to complement simulation methods is the multi-tier framework proposed by Ostrom 
(2007). Ostrom (2007) and Ostrom et al. (2007) pointed out the necessity of moving beyond the 
panaceas proposed to solve complex problems and instead to create an accurate diagnosis of 
every socio-ecological system. In other words, the authors suggest that there cannot be a single 
solution for all CPR systems and that it is better to consider every socio-ecological system in its 
general context. For instance, Basurto and Ostrom (2009) explained why some fisheries may self-
organize and solve the underlying CPR dilemma using such approach. 
 
To begin moving toward a diagnostic theory of ASGM, one should identify the tiers and linkages 
among the variables, including their subcategories, that constitute the structure of a socio-
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ecological system. Under the multi-tier framework of Ostrom (2007), a set of highest-tier and 
second-tier variables are identified and analyzed. At the broadest conceptual level, the 
interactions among a set of attributes are analyzed: the resource system, the resource units 
generated by the system, the users of the system, and the governance system (Basurto and 
Ostrom, 2009). In the case of ASGM, we may say that these attributes are gold mines, gold, 
small-scale gold miners, local and regional governments, researchers, nongovernmental 
organizations, local and nonlocal miners, and companies interested in the mineral resource. An 
additional stage of this multi-tier approach is to create a theoretical integration that helps to 
understand how these variables interact to produce the observed outcomes of the complex socio-
ecological system.  
 
3.2 Approach for Understanding Economic Behavior 
 
Both the social dilemma involved in the exploitation of a CPR and the study of different 
mechanisms to overcome it have received increasing attention from scholars in the lasts two 
decades (Ostrom, 2010).  This growing literature has studied different types of resources mainly 
renewable resources such as fisheries and forest exploitation.  Most of these studies have focused 
on analyzing the social dilemma related to the extraction and availability of the resource and on 
identifying mechanisms that could prevent users from behaving as rational economic agents.  
However, these studies have not taken into consideration another social dilemma that may arise 
in the process of exploiting a CPR and that could potentially interact with the CPR dilemma and 
be overcome with the same mechanisms. A clear example of a CPR in which there are additional 
social dilemmas that follow the extraction process is the case of ASGM.  Although ASGM has 
the characteristics of non-excludability and rivalry proper of a CPR, users in this sector face the 
dilemma related to the reduction of the pollution resulting from the gold recovery process; i.e., a 
public-good dilemma. 
 
In this sense, we think that there is room for resource economists and political scientists to 
engage in future research that includes the sort of analysis conducted for other types of socio-
ecological systems. The conducting of field economic experiments (Harrison and List, 2004) 
could be considered in this future research, together with the measurement of micro-situational 
variables. Research of this sort would provide some insight concerning the decisions miners take 
and the “why” behind these decisions (Anderies et al., 2011).  
 
For the particular case of ASGM, there is a class of economic experiments that may be suitable to 
analyze organizational structures and economic performance. One class of such experiments 
comprises experiments using simple interaction among agents to study the effect of social 
preferences on behavior (Camerer and Weber, 2013). For example, public good games are a 
useful tool for the analysis of organizational processes that entails dilemmas such as 
environmental protection or teamwork (Ledyard, 1995). In an extension of this game, a public 
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bad game, Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003) showed that the actions of a leader may induce 
other members of the group to desist from making investments in a public bad. This type of result 
may represent an interesting issue to analyze in field experiments with artisanal gold miners. For 
instance, García and Molina (2011) reported that in Antioquia, Colombia, motivation by a local 
leader for the application of an improved retort encouraged some other miners to take advantage 
of this improvement.  
 
With very few exceptions, we observe that self-organization does not appear to be a solution to 
the social dilemma faced by ASGM communities. Instead, authors such as CDS (2004) and 
Chaparro (2003) point out that the intervention of external parties might be needed for miners to 
organize. A key role of the third party would be to foster associative entrepreneurship. 
Conceptually, we think that this type of cooperation may allow artisanal miners to raise the 
financial capital necessary to acquire better technologies and overcome the lack of access to 
credit markets. This is another hypothesis that could be tested in field economic experiments with 
artisanal gold miners. For another kind of CPR, for instance, Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado 
(2010) experimentally showed a good performance of a mechanism in which the interaction 
between internal communication of community members and an external non-coercive party 
takes place. In all, field experiments could serve to test this and other mechanisms triggering this 
type of collective action in ASGM. 
 
 In addition, with field work, economic field experiments included, issues from behavioral 
economics such as internalities (Herrnstein et al., 1993), self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), 
or Veblen’s ideas on conspicuous consumption might be studied. For instance, Kocher et al. 
(2012) have theoretically and experimentally shown that self-control is positively correlated to 
contributions in linear public good games, and Moav and Neeman (2012) have theoretically 
shown a relationship between conspicuous consumption, income, human capital, and poverty 
traps. To what extent economic inequality affect decisions in public-good dilemmas (Cardenas et 
al., 2002) situations is an issue that might also be studied with the kind of economic experiments 
already mentioned. 
 
Sometimes members of organizations can only achieve mutual gains if they make mutually 
consistent decisions. However, the uncertainty on other members’ decisions is likely to 
discourage a member from making the best decision. These situations can be studied with the 
application of coordination games. For example, in the minimum effort coordination game 
proposed by van Huyck et al. (1990), the payment received by each member of a specific group 
depends on the minimum effort made by any of the members. In addition to this setting, for any 
level of effort, there is a cost. In the context of ASGM, if miners simply continue operating with 
the technology that generates the lowest cost in the short run and evade their social responsibility 
to use cleaner technologies (with higher costs), the higher private and social benefits of 
alternative technologies will be unattainable.  
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Pollution charges are environmental policy instruments whereby the producer of the pollution is 
charged a fee on the amount of the pollution he generates (Stavins, 2001). The application of this 
instrument has been suggested to manage mercury pollution in Colombia (von Humboldt 
Institute, 1999). Although the application of these instruments has been effective in dealing with 
certain pollutants in the developing world (Sterner, 2003), it is not clear how their 
implementation in the case of ASGM will be effective. Among other issues, widespread 
illegality, the low technological level involved, social conflict, or simply the lack of operational 
resources to enforce such a policy could make this implementation unfeasible. However, the 
implementation of environmental policy instruments in ASGM is another interesting topic for 
future research. 
 
Lastly, to propose mechanisms or approaches by which scholars can convince policy makers of 
the feasibility of implementing the solutions resulting from future researches remains a challenge.  
Andriamasinoro and Angel (2012) offer some guidance on this regard. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
ASGM is the main source of subsistence for millions of people living in developing countries and 
perhaps is the only livelihood alternative for those communities. In an effort to better understand 
the dynamics underlying ASGM communities, we presented a survey analysis to describe the 
commonalities of ASGM systems located in developing countries. These commonalities are as 
follows: low levels of mechanization and technology, labor-intensiveness, considerable 
environmental degradation, low educated and poorly trained miners, low productivity levels, lack 
of capital, and high transience among miners. Additionally, addressing the call made by Spiegel 
(2009), we have provided potential directions of ecological/environmental and development 
economics research efforts. This research agenda and its intended efforts are just first steps to 
move forward and find solutions to the problems we see in ASGM; solutions that can then be 
implemented successfully.  
 
We identified possible analytical approaches in order to get better insights to address the 
problems found in ASGM. Such approaches consider the development of behavioral simulation 
models (Sterman, 2000) and analysis via the multi-tier framework proposed by Ostrom (2007). 
Moreover, experimental economics could enhance the knowledge that about the behavioral 
patterns of these communities we have and complement the analysis. Some of these issues are, 
for instance, self-control, conspicuous consumption, and the role of leaders and external parties, 
or any other mechanisms, in solving the social dilemmas of these communities. 
 
There are certainly other avenues of research, such as the role that microfinance could have in 
improving the economic conditions of people in ASGM (Hilson and Ack-Baidoo, 2011) or the 
effects that common property versus open access may have on the management of resources. In 
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summary, the primary goal is the reversion of the negative environmental and social impacts of 
ASGM and to convert this activity into a source of not only livelihood but also of well-being for 
a growing number of people in Africa, America and Asia. 
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Chapter 3 
-- 
Phasing out mercury through collective  
action in artisanal gold mining:  
Evidence from a framed field experiment 
 
 
Abstract 
Several millions of people in the world are engaged in the extraction of gold with artisanal mining 
methods. However, the application of conventional practices such as mercury amalgamation makes this an 
economic activity with a high negative impact on health and the environment. Associative 
entrepreneurship has been proposed as a scheme that would bring cleaner technologies to miners, in order 
to phase out the use mercury in the gold recovery process and reduce the harmful environmental and 
health effects of using of this element. In this paper we investigate to what extent miners can establish and 
sustain an association of these characteristics. This is done by conducting a framed threshold public good 
experiment with miners. We test the effect of two different institutional arrangements on associative 
entrepreneurship: (i) exclusion, and; (ii) the interaction between internal communication and the 
intervention of a non-coercive authority –co-management–. Our subjects consist of artisanal and small-
scale gold miners in Antioquia, Colombia. We found that miners made contributions that allowed the 
acquisition of the technology. However, this provision was not sustained and exhibited an oscillating 
pattern. We found that co-management led to high provision rates and players could achieve a long-lasting 
efficient level of individual contributions; but, on the contrary, exclusion did not trigger this kind of 
collective action. Policy implications of our results and avenues for further experimental research are 
discussed.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Several millions of people in the world are engaged in the extraction of gold with artisanal 
mining methods (Spiegel and Veiga, 2005).
1
 For most of them gold extraction is the most 
attractive or the unique livelihood activity (Siegel and Veiga, 2010). However, the application of 
conventional practices, mercury amalgamation being the most representative, makes artisanal and 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, the terms “artisanal mining” and “small-scale mining” are used interchangeably.  
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small-scale gold mining (ASGM) an activity with a high negative impact on health and the 
environment.
2
 Even though cleaner, more productive, and financially viable technologies are 
available to miners (Pantoja et al., 2005; Hilson, 2006), mercury amalgamation and other 
rudimentary techniques continue to be massively used techniques for gold recovery in ASGM. 
 
Technology choice for the gold recovery process in ASGM can be characterized as a social 
dilemma. The dilemma involves a trade-off where miners may tend to maximize short-run 
individual profits by choosing the cheapest and easy-to-handle available technique –mercury 
amalgamation–. However, in the long-run, the entire community, which includes him, is worse 
off than with the choice of a cleaner and more productive technology. In this context, the 
dilemma that artisanal gold miners face is not found in the extraction and availability of this non-
renewable resource or in its depletion. Instead, the dilemma concerns the pollution resulting from 
the gold recovery process; i.e., a public-good dilemma.
3
 
 
In order to tackle mercury pollution, there have been interventions in the form of training 
programs or environmental campaigns. Incentives to access alternative technologies have been 
also proposed or undertaken in different places. In fact, United Nations in 2002 launched the 
Global Mercury Project which is a capacity-building initiative, created with aim of “removing 
barriers to the adoption of cleaner practices of small-scale gold mining” (Spiegel and Veiga, 
2005, p. 362). However, interventions must go beyond the presentation of technical solutions to 
the problems of mining and processing, and attention to economic and social issues should also 
be paid (Jennings, 2003). For instance, a complementary form of intervention would be in the 
promotion or strengthening of collective action through miners associations (Kazilimani et al., 
2003). 
 
By either collective action or associative entrepreneurship, in this paper we mean the creation of 
associations between small-scale gold miners to get more environmental-friendly technologies, in 
order to overcome the social dilemma that is present in the gold recovery process. The promotion 
of associative entrepreneurship has been on the policy agenda of governments and independent 
agencies working to improve the quality of life of ASGM communities (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 
2013). This type of association allows not only to improve the relationship with the state, but also 
it would enable miners to accumulate the financial capital required to obtain cleaner and more 
productive technologies that are beyond the budget of most miner families (Hentschel et al., 
2002; Hinton et al., 2003; Hilson and Potter, 2003; Heemskerk and Oliviera, 2004; CDS, 2004; 
Ghose and Roy, 2007; Spiegel, 2009). This financial capital is difficult to obtain from the 
                                                          
2
 More than a few effects on human well-being attributable to mercury pollution have been actually documented: 
neurological disorders ranging from loss of eyesight to tremors and paralysis, kidney damage and lung damages, and 
effects on the reproductive system (Tirado et al., 2000; Hilson and Pardie, 2006; Tomicic et al., 2011). 
3
 In a public-good dilemma –pollution control in this case– people find it costly to contribute to the provision of the 
public good and prefer others to pay for its provision instead. If everybody follows this (equilibrium) strategy, the 
public good is underprovided or not provided, and pollution persists. However, the entire community may be better 
off if everyone contributes (Ostrom, 1998). 
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financial system, which perceives small-scale mining as a risky activity (Chaparro, 2003). This 
fact, added to the low tendency of miners to save money for investing (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 
2013) would partially explain the low rate of adoption of cleaner technologies. Thus, associative 
entrepreneurship is therefore an option for small-scale miners to increase their financial capital.  
 
In addition to the environmental benefits, alternative technologies would bring more productivity 
to miners that employ them in the gold recovery process. Hereinafter these additional profits will 
be referred to as private benefits in order to differentiate them from the public good benefits 
associated with the use of the cleaner technology. Despite of the advantages of associative 
entrepreneurship, aspects such as lack of communication and organization would hinder miners 
to reach those gains (Hinton et al., 2003). In this sense, it is then necessary to explore the 
effectiveness of institutions in fostering collective action that promote the adoption of cleaner 
technologies. Some of the main institutions that have been proven to have effects on collective 
action for the sustainable management of common-pool resources and public goods are as follow: 
external regulation (e.g., Cardenas et al., 2000; Dickinson, 2001); face-to-face communication 
(e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 2010), and; information disclosure (e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Smith, 
2010).  
 
In this paper we analyze the effect of two different institutional arrangements on associative 
entrepreneurship in ASGM using a framed field experiment. One of the institutions that we 
investigate is co-management. This institution is understood as the interaction between internal 
communication among community members and an external non-coercive party (Moreno-
Sánchez and Maldonado, 2010). Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado (2010) showed in a field 
experiment with fishermen of a marine protected area in Colombia, that co-management may 
perform better than other institutions such as only using internal communication among 
community members or only having an external (coercive) regulation.  
 
External coercive regulation in ASGM may be unfeasible, due to widespread illegality and lack 
of operational resources for enforcement (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013). Thus, considering the 
difficulties of carrying out external coercive regulation, and the current policy context in which 
some external organizations are trying to encourage better practices in ASGM, we test the effect 
that co-management may have on associative entrepreneurship in ASGM and whether the effects 
of co-management found by Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado hold in the case of ASGM. 
 
Another institution we are interested in testing is the option that once a better technology is 
acquired and the public good is provided (lower mercury emissions), non-contributors are 
excluded from the private benefits that the technology providing the public good also generates. 
An institutional arrangement such as the exclusion from the benefits of a public good of those 
individuals who fail to meet a predetermined minimum contribution requirement, may lead to 
increases in contributions to the public good (Swope, 2002; Kocher et al., 2005; Croson et al., 
2007; Bchir and Willinger, 2008). In general, the exclusion from the benefits of a public good 
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reduces the individual incentives to free-ride, and generates Pareto-efficient outcomes. However, 
Swope (2002) argued that in environments in which individuals fail to coordinate their 
contributions, exclusion can decrease both contributions and welfare. Czap et al. (2010), for 
instance, found that subjects contributed more to the non-excludable compared to the excludable 
public good arguing therefore that in their case exclusion of non-contributors crowded out other-
oriented preferences. 
 
There are examples of goods that can be non-rival but somehow excludable in their consumption 
(Swope, 2002; Kocher et al., 2005): public facilities with controlled access such as parks and 
museums; or television broadcasts. In our case, we are not interested on the exclusion from the 
positive externalities stemming from the utilization of a cleaner technology. In ASGM this kind 
of exclusion may actually be unfeasible or costly. Instead, we focus on the exclusion from the 
private benefits an artisanal gold miner might obtain from the alternative technology: more 
productivity in the gold recovery process. The cleaner and more productive technology could be 
used in a centralized processing facility (Hilson, 2006), or done in a community-based 
development project. The exclusion of non-contributors would avoid this group of miners to 
benefit of recovering more gold in the ore beneficiation process. However, the exclusion would 
not avoid that these miners enjoy the benefits stemming from an improved environmental quality.  
 
With the alternative technology, a subject might be tempted to free-ride; i.e., not to contribute but 
to enjoy the benefits of both a better environmental quality given by the lower mercury levels and 
higher profits given by the higher efficiency of the new technology in the recovery process. 
Assuming that those who do not contribute may be excluded from the benefits of getting higher 
profits, the incentives to free-ride would be only linked to the enjoyment of the benefits of a 
better environmental health. We would therefore expect the free-riding rate to decline under a 
scheme where it is possible to exclude free-riders from the enjoyment of the private benefits of a 
more efficient technology.  
 
In order to get the more productive and cleaner technology for gold recovery, miners should 
contribute to a common fund to raise the minimum financial capital required to buy such 
technology. Given that there is neither exclusion nor rivalry in the positive externalities derived 
from the adopted technology for recovery of this mineral, we propose to carry out a framed 
threshold public good game (TPGG). In general, public good games are a useful tool for the 
analysis of organizational processes that entails dilemmas such as environmental protection or 
teamwork (Ledyard, 1995; Camerer and Weber, 2013). Participants in our experiments are 
artisanal and small-scale miners from the Northeastern region of the Department of Antioquia, 
Colombia. This is a region of particular interest. The mercury emissions to the environment 
registered there makes of this region the world’s highest per capita emitter of mercury from gold 
mining (Cordy et al., 2011).  
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the hypotheses we want to test and 
the economic experiment. Then, in Section 3 we describe the experimental protocol and the study 
site. In Section 4, we present our main findings and results which mainly suggest that under co-
management miners can achieve an efficient level of contributions that holds up until the end of 
the game. However, in the framework of our experiment, we do not find evidence that the 
exclusion may foster collective action in ASGM. Our conclusions as well as policy 
recommendations and avenues for further research are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Threshold Public Good Games: An Economic Experiment for ASGM 
 
We run a framed field experiment in which artisanal gold miners must decide whether to 
contribute to the acquisition of cleaner and more productive equipment. In section 3 we offer a 
brief description of the equipment that was mentioned in the experiment.  
 
In a TPGG, a minimum amount of money must be raised (provision point or threshold) for 
provision of the public good to occur (van de Kragt et al., 1983). Examples of threshold public 
goods are dikes and bridges, at a large scale; and at the organizational level some kind of initial 
investments in organizing the fundraising have to be made before any voluntary provision of a 
public good is possible (Schram et al., 2008). In the field, TPPGs has been used before to analyze 
contributions for the construction of a bridge in a Vietnamese village (Pham, 2011). 
 
We have found two main approaches in the TPGG literature. There are games that restrict 
participants to binary (all-or-nothing) contributions (van de Kragt et al., 1983), and in others 
participants can contribute any desired amount of their endowment (Marks and Croson, 1998, 
1999; Cadsby and Maynes, 1999). For the latter case, Cadsby and Maynes (1999) showed that 
permitting continuous contributions tends to increase the contributions to and facilitates provision 
of the public good.  
 
For our experiment, we consider the results of Cadsby and Maynes (1999) and Cadsby et al. 
(2008) who consider a continuous TPGG with two institutional factors: a money-back guarantee 
(refund) and a no rebate rule if the level of contributions exceeds the threshold (T). On the one 
hand, if someone contributes but T is not reached, his contribution is refunded. According to 
Cadsby and Maynes (1999), this guarantee of getting money back may encourage contributions 
to and provision of the public. On the other hand, if the total amount of tokens contributed 
exceeds T, no one is paid back the exceeded amount. Marks and Croson (1998) found that no 
rebate and proportional rebate rules generate similar contributions, which are not statistically 
different from the Nash equilibrium level that is Pareto-efficient. However, Marks and Croson 
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(1998) also showed that the no rebate rule may be preferable to a proportional rebate rule in terms 
of equity and variability of contributions.
4
  
 
In a TPGG there is not dominant strategy for any participant (Ledyard, 1995), but multiple 
efficient Nash equilibria in which the public good is provided, and inefficient equilibria in which 
it is not (Cadsby et al., 2008). Among the set of Nash equilibria there are two that are symmetric. 
One of these is a free-riding equilibrium (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999) in which everybody 
contributes nothing. Moreover, there is an equitable Pareto-efficient equilibrium, in which every 
one of the n participants contributes T/n such that the public good is provided. Both the free-
riding equilibrium and the cost-sharing equilibrium may be focal points (Schelling, 1960) around 
which participants might tacitly coordinate and make their decisions of how much to contribute. 
Additionally, within the set of efficient Nash equilibria and under a no rebate rule, excess 
contributions are welfare reducing; i.e., group earnings are decreasing for group contributions 
beyond the provision point (Marks and Croson, 1998). 
 
In order to test the effect of our two institutions of interest: (i) co-management and (ii) exclusion 
from private benefits derived from technology adoption, we use a 2x2 experimental design as 
presented in Table 3.1.   
 
Table 3.1. Summary of Experimental Design. 
  Exclusion from the benefits of more productivity  
  No Yes 
Co-management 
No Treatment 1 [T1]  Treatment 2 [T2] 
Yes Treatment 3 [T3] Treatment 4 [T4] 
 
 
Our control treatment, Treatment 1 (T1), is a standard TPGG with continuous contributions. In 
this treatment there is money-back guarantee if T is not reached and a no rebate if the level of 
contributions exceeds the threshold. Taking into consideration the fact that in the gold recovery 
process it is unlikely to see associations of miners (Hinton et al., 2003; Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 
2013), with this base case we can test our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Sustained collective action does not emerge as a solution to the social dilemma faced by 
households engaged in ASGM. 
 
                                                          
4
 There are several rules that can be used in a TPGG. Utilization rebate, proportional rebate, and no rebate rules are 
some of them (Marks and Croson, 1998). Spencer et al. (2009) discuss other different rules and found that in the 
provision of a threshold public good, a proportional rebate rule may be more useful among a set of rebate rules. 
However, in their analysis they do not consider the no rebate rule case. 
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In T1 each of the n members of a group has an initial endowment (E) of which he chooses to 
contribute ci[0,E] to the group account. If the sum of contributions is lower than T, the 
contribution is paid back to participants, the public good is not provided and hence the public and 
private benefits from the new equipment are not delivered. In this case each participant’s payoff 
(Ui) equals the initial endowment: 
 
1
If  ,  then  
n
i i
i
c T U E

         (3.1) 
 
If the sum of contributions is higher than or equal to T, the technology is acquired with the 
consequent provision of the public and private benefits from the technology adoption. In this case 
the individual’s payoff is composed by three factors: (i) the individual’s earning from the private 
account that represents his private consumption in the experimental environment, which is given 
by E – ci; (ii) the reward R, which represents the benefits of an improved environmental quality, 
and; (iii) ρ that represents the private profits from technology adoption. Both R and ρ are not 
excludable. In this case each participant’s payoff is represented as follows: 
 
1
If  ,  then  
n
i i i
i
c T U E c R 

           (3.2) 
 
Provided that this game is representing a public-good dilemma, we must assume that E<T<n.E. 
Also, to be incentive compatible and socially efficient, it is necessary that n.(R+ρ)>T (Cadsby et 
al., 2008). In our experiment we chose the following parameterization: E=25, T=60, n=5, R=16, 
=8. This choice of the parameters is in line with previous TPPG experiments like Cadsby et al.’s 
(2008), in which the base step return, n.(R+ρ)/T in this case, has been usually set at 2.5  
 
Our second hypothesis is about excluding non-contributors from the private benefits of the 
alternative technology; thus, we design and implement treatment 2 (T2) for testing it. Our second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: The exclusion of those miners who do not contribute to the provision of a cleaner and more 
productive technology from the private benefits (more productivity) derived from the technology 
that reduces a public bad (mercury pollution), triggers collective action. 
 
In T2, an individual may obtain the productivity return () only if he contributes to the project 
and the project is actually carried out. Those who do not invest in the project are excluded from 
                                                          
5
 According to Cadsby et al. (2008), the base step return is the best predictor of contributions in threshold public 
good games. 
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these profits, but still they receive the benefit of the positive externality (R). In this treatment the 
subject receives the payoff:  
 
1
If  ,  then  
n
i i
i
c T U E

                   (3.3) 
1
If  ,  then  
n
i i i
i
c T U E c R 

    
   
 
 
where =8 only if ci > 0, and  = 0 otherwise; i. e. the parameters are the same as in T1. With this 
change in the conditions of the experiment, the free-riding equilibrium should change from 
contributing nothing to contributing one token.
6
 With this treatment we can also know whether 
miner’s preference for the technology is more due to its private benefits or it is social preferences 
that lead him to contribute to the amelioration of the public good. 
 
In order to test the effect of co-management, we expand T1 to consider another mechanism for 
the management of this nonrenewable resource. Both the current policy context in which some 
external organizations are trying to encourage better practices in ASGM, and Moreno-Sánchez 
and Maldonado’s (2010) results, lead us to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: The intervention of a third party (co-management) is needed to promote a larger and well 
established association of miners that allows them to access to cleaner and more productive 
technologies. 
 
In our co-management treatment (T3) every group had the opportunity to talk up to five minutes 
with an external advisor, following Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado (2010). The task of the 
advisor was to persuade miners to invest in the new technology, with the aim of reducing the 
emissions of mercury and avoiding the harmful effects of mercury pollution. More about the 
protocol of this treatment is presented in the next section.  
 
Finally in our Treatment 4 we explore the interaction between the two institutional settings 
described and implemented in T2 and T3. Bowles and Polanía-Reyes’s (2012) survey of 
behavioral experiments shows that interventions aimed at influencing behavior by altering the 
economic costs or benefits of some targeted activity –i.e., economic incentives– may undermine 
or trigger social preferences. Therefore, with T4 we want to test whether the effects of co-
management are crowded in or crowded out by exclusion from the private benefits stemming 
from the cleaner technology.  
 
                                                          
6
 The level of minimum contribution in T2 was chosen to be simply above zero. Czap et al. (2010) pointed out that 
this condition removes strategic considerations in the game. Thus, even if a risk averse subject attaches a low 
probability of success for reaching the provision point, he would rationally contribute one token.  
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We implement both within and between subjects design. The within subjects design is 
implemented to analyze the effect of the institutional settings, in which every subject played the 
game for 17 periods: 8 initial periods of the base case (stage 1), and 9 periods in which subjects 
played one of 4 treatments as follows: 
 
- T1: players continued playing the base case. 
- T2: Exclusion treatment. 
- T3: Co-management. 
- T4: Exclusion and co-management. 
 
This means that participants can be classified in four groups as follows: those who played the 
baseline and treatment with exclusion of the private benefits from technology adoption (T1-T2), 
those who played the baseline and the treatment with co-management (T1-T3) and those who 
played the baseline and the treatment with both co-management and exclusion of private benefits 
from technology adoption (T1-T4). Additionally, there were players who played T1 over all 
periods.  
 
3. Experimental Procedure 
 
All subjects recruited for this experiment were from the same subject pool: artisanal gold miners 
from the municipalities of Segovia and Remedios, in the Northeastern region of the Department 
of Antioquia, Colombia. This is the region with more production of gold in Colombia (UPME, 
2012), and the largest world’s mercury polluter per capita from artisanal gold mining according 
to Cordy et al. (2011).
7
  
 
The experiment was a multi-period game but the number of periods was not indicated to 
participants in order to avoid end-of-game effects.
8
 At the end of each period, using a piece of 
paper each participant was privately informed about total group contributions and of his payoff 
according to those contributions. This was done to avoid any bias that might arise from several 
groups in the same session being able to compare their contributions. The length of the 
experiment was about 2 hours. 
                                                          
7
 Remedios’ total population is estimated at 23500, and total population in Segovia amounted to about 37500 
inhabitants in 2012. The economy and culture of both towns revolve around gold mining at different scales of 
production. People directly engaged in ASGM in this zone are estimated in 13000 miners (UPME, 2006).  
8
 Whilst one-shot games may eliminate the possibility of reputation effects and the strategic behavior that can exist in 
repeated-play experiments (Spencer et al., 2009), repeated games offer the possibility of learning. Despite of the 
examples included and training periods, the repetition of the game offer to players the possibility of getting 
familiarized with the game, including what the other subjects are like and their strategies (Ledyard, 1995; Cadsby 
and Maynes, 1999). Additionally, although with a threshold there are multiple equilibria, so the convergence 
question is fuzzy (Ledyard, 1995), repetition may allow the experimenter to see if players converge to certain type of 
equilibria (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999). Lastly, in the framework of our experiment, the acquisition of the technology 
may imply not only to contribute just once for buying it, but also several other times for its maintenance.  
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With the same population, the experiment was run using a classroom and in-situ in the mines. For 
the classroom experiments, players were recruited through a public call with the help of mining 
leaders and existing miners associations, flyers distributed in mines and processing plants, and 
messages that were transmitted from a local radio station. The total number of miners that 
attended this call was 35. The experimental sessions with these participants were run in 
classrooms of an education center in Segovia, the 23
rd
 and 24
th
 of November of 2012. 
 
One week later, in order to increase the sample size of our experiment we also run sessions 
directly in some of the mines; which is the in-situ experiment. Due to security reasons, in this 
opportunity we just got 4 out of 25 phone calls to mine managers answered. By the time the 
experiment was run, illegal armed groups were extorting mine managers by making phone calls. 
Fifty miners could additionally be recruited with this strategy, totalizing eighty-five subjects for 
the complete experiment. In the parametric analysis we included a dummy variable to identify the 
possible effect of this procedure. Table 3.2 reports the number of players by treatment. 
 
Table 3.2. Number of players by treatment. 
 
 
In each session we randomly formed up to four groups of five members each. In each five-person 
group every member knew both the size of the group and who the other members were, and made 
individual decisions of how much of his endowment, expressed in tokens, would allocate to a 
private account and a group account. Instructions were read aloud by the experimenter in all 
experimental sessions. All the individual decisions were private and confidential, and were made 
anonymously. In the initial sessions, to guarantee the confidentiality of their decisions players 
were seated back-to-back.  To facilitate and ensure understanding of the game, three hypothetical 
examples were provided. Also, there were three training periods in which participants made 
decisions that did not affect their final payment. 
 
The instructions of our framed experiment adhered to the basic language of the instructions 
developed by Isaac et al. (1984) (see instructions in Appendix A). These instructions have been 
commonly utilized in several other experiments about public good games with provision point 
(Croson and Marks, 2000, 2001; Marks and Croson, 1998, 1999; Cadsby et al., 2008). As part of 
the framework of these instructions, we introduced a statement that described the kind of 
equipment that has been promoted among miners and processing facilities to phase-out mercury: 
continuous mills and methods of gravimetric concentration. These specific technologies are 
Treatment No. 
Baseline 10 
Exclusion 30 
Co-management 20 
Exclusion & Co-management 25 
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recognized for being cleaner than mercury amalgamation, and more productive than the 
traditional ball mills currently employed in the gold recovery process (García and Molina, 2011). 
 
The protocol of the co-management treatment (T3) adhered to the instructions of Moreno-
Sánchez and Maldonado (2010). In this treatment, the conversation with the external advisor is 
based on a predesigned guideline, but not a script that the advisor must always read (see the 
guideline provided to the advisor in Appendix B).
9
 The advisor, a representative of the Global 
Mercury Project, was asked to persuade miners to invest in the new technology, with the aim of 
reducing the emissions of mercury and avoiding the harmful effects of mercury pollution. After 
this discussion, the group had five minutes to converse among themselves. The advisor was not 
allowed to listen to this conversation. After this, group members made their final decisions in 
private and under strict confidentiality for the first period of the second stage of the game. 
Additionally, based on Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado (2010), the external advisor was given 
one minute to talk with the group for each successive period of the game, thereafter, the group 
members had one minute to talk.  
 
Payments to participants in the experiment were done individual and privately. Every participant 
was identified with a number that was provided in a slip of paper at the beginning of the 
experiment. To collect his payment, the player should give back this slip of paper individually at 
the end of the session, receiving in exchange a sealed envelope with his payment. In the game, 
each token gained by a miner was converted into 72 Colombian pesos. This value was computed 
bearing in mind participants’ average opportunity cost of time and the maximum and minimum 
amount of tokens each participant could gain in the game. The total payment to each individual 
could vary between COP$35000 and COP$60000.
10
 
 
At the end of each session, and before the payment was done, we asked every player to fill out a 
survey. The answers to these questions were meant for interpretation of the results of the 
experiment. Besides some specific socioeconomic and demographic information such as 
education and income levels, we also asked questions about perceptions miners have about the 
gold recovery process.
11
 Additionally, attitudes towards risk, trust and two personality traits 
(empathy and self-control) were measured in this survey. Previous literature suggests that these 
four attributes may affect contributions to public goods (Kocher et al., 2011, 2012; Czap and 
Czap, 2010; Czap et al., 2010). The attributes were measured as follows: 
 
                                                          
9
 According to Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado (2010), this way of communication allows the advisor to express his 
ideas about what kind of strategy is better for the group. These authors argue that such as source of variance may be 
relevant when thinking about the policy implications of the implementation of co-management. 
10
 The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was approximately 1US$ equals 1815 Colombian pesos. 
11
 Anderies et al. (2011) suggest that the best time to gather debriefing data that help to interpret individuals’ 
decisions during the experiment is right after decisions have been made but before their consequences are known to 
the participants. 
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- Risk: Dohmen et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2010) have found that a simple risk question may 
predict results of risk measures obtained in economic experiments.
12
 We followed Dohmen et 
al. (2011) and asked participants in our experiment to indicate their willingness to take risks 
on an eleven point scale, with zero indicating complete unwillingness to take risks, and ten 
indicating complete willingness to take risks. The question was as follows: “How do you see 
yourself: ‘Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks?’.” 
 
- Trust: Naef and Schupp (2009) and Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) argue that survey 
measures of trust are significantly correlated with the measure of trust obtained in a trust 
game. Considering these results, we asked subjects to answer to the statement for measuring 
trust found in surveys like the General Social Survey: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can ‘be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’.” 
 
- Self-control and empathy: In the questionnaire, each subject specified his level of agreement to 
several statements taken from the International Personality Item Pool inventory (Goldberg et 
al., 2006), using a 5-item Likert scale, ranging from the highest of “Completely Agree” to the 
lowest of “Completely Disagree”. The scores for each personality trait are calculated as the 
mean of these answers. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 General description 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics 
of participants in the game. Perceptional characteristics and attitudinal variables are included. In 
general, there are not differences between subjects who participated in the experiments.
13
 These 
participants were adults with low education, earnings between 1 and 2 local minimum wages, 
most of them living in either Segovia or Remedios for more than two decades. Despite the fact 
that a big proportion of miners know methods for gold recovery different to mercury 
amalgamation, few of them employ such methods. Those who stated a reason for not employing 
those alternative methods said that it is because they cannot afford that kind of equipment. 
Furthermore, even though most of the participants stated that training programs for better 
practices in mining are useful, few of them have taken part in those sessions. 
 
                                                          
12
 See, for example, Holt and Laury (2002) for an economic experiment in which risk is measured. 
13
 In our comparisons we follow the standard procedure of testing the null hypothesis of equality versus a hypothesis 
of strict inequality.  We performed a t-test of difference in means and the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) Z-test. 
Both tests coincided with each other in their results. In this paper we only present the results for the MWW test. 
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Figure 3.1 shows average group contributions across treatments. Consistent with previous 
TPGGs (Croson and Marks, 2000), the oscillating pattern around the efficient Nash equilibrium 
outcome (60 tokens) is observed in the baseline (see T1 and periods 1 to 8 in T2, T3 and T4). 
This pattern is less evident when co-management is applied (T3); in fact, from periods 9 to 17 in 
T3 players try to coordinate their actions on the efficient contribution level of 60 tokens. 
Regarding exclusion (T2), the oscillating pattern observed in the baseline remains, even when it 
is combined with co-management (see periods 9 to 17 in Figure 3.1). We can also discern the 
differences between these treatments in Figure 3.2. This figure shows an example of individual 
contributions in a chosen group of miners that played T3 and another group that played T4.  
 
In order to gain more insights from these results, in the next two subsections we provide tests of 
the hypotheses above. Firstly, we discuss the provision of the public good in the game and the 
effect of the mechanisms on contributions. In the analysis of contribution decisions we then do a 
multivariate analysis in order to understand the decisions of players in this type of game. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Average group contributions in treatments. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Example of individual contributions in treatments T3 and T4. 
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Table 3.3. Description and test of differences between treatments of socioeconomic and perception variables. 
 Pooled data Mean  Differences 
Variable Mean Min Max T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1- 
T2 
T1-
T3 
T1-
T4 
T2-
T3 
T2-
T4 
T3-
T4 
Socioeconomic Variables              
Age (years) 
32.39 
(10.6) 
16 58 
30.6 
(11.2) 
31.4 
(8.5) 
37.6 
(12.7) 
28.4 
(8.5) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. * n.s. *** 
Education
a 3.59 
(3.6) 
1 7 
4.4 
(1.8) 
2.8 
(1.5) 
3.92 
(1.9) 
4 
(1.7) 
** n.s. n.s. ** ** n.s. 
Income
b 3.42 
(3.4) 
1 8 
3 
(2.91) 
3.1 
(1.38) 
3.28 
(2) 
4 
(1.1) 
n.s. n.s. * n.s. ** ** 
Residence Time in Town (years) 
22.6 
(13.1) 
1 57 
23.4 
(9.2) 
25.7 
(11.9) 
21.5 
(14.7) 
19.8 
(13.1) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. * n.s. 
Perception Variables               
Knowledge of alternative methods for gold 
recovery? (1 yes 0 no) (Know_new_tech) 
0.76 
(0.47) 
0 1 
0.8 
(0.45) 
0.73 
(0.45) 
0.72 
(0.46) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Limitations in access to better equipment? 
(1 yes 0 no) (Limitation_in_access) 
0.52 
(0.5) 
0 1 
0.6 
(0.55) 
0.6 
(0.49) 
0.52 
(0.5) 
0.4 
(0.5) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Have you operated alternative methods for 
gold recovery? (1 yes 0 no) (Have_used_ 
tech) 
0.4 
(0.49) 
0 1 
0.6 
(0.55) 
0.4 
(0.49) 
0.4 
(0.5) 
0.36 
(0.49) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Have you participated in any training 
session for better practices in ASGM (1 
yes 0 no) (Participation_in_training) 
0.44 
(0.5) 
0 1 
0.4 
(0.24) 
0.3 
(0.09) 
0.48 
(0.5) 
0.52 
(0.5) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Is this training useful? (1 yes 0 no) 
(Participation_is_useful) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
0 1 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
0.92 
(0.28) 
1 
(0) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Have you or anyone you know suffered any 
mercury-related disease? (Health_effects) 
0.53 
(0.5) 
0 1 
0.2 
(0.45) 
0.63  
0.49) 
0.52 
(0.51) 
0.48 
(0.51) 
* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Attitudinal variables          
Risk 
6.58 
(2.72) 
0 10 
8.8 
(1.3) 
5.9 
(2.36) 
6.63 
(3.21) 
6.88 
(2.65) 
** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Can people be trusted? (1 yes 0 no) (Trust) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0 1 
0.2 
(0.45) 
0.37 
(0.49) 
0.5 
(0.51) 
0.36 
(0.49) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Empathy 
3.45 
(1.15) 
1 5 
4.4 
(0.5) 
3.2 
(1.36) 
3.99 
(0.66) 
3.13 
(1.1) 
** n.s. *** ** n.s. *** 
Self-control 
2.6 
(0.9) 
1 5 
3.5 
(0.97) 
2.5 
(1.1) 
2.67 
(0.55) 
2.48 
(0.8) 
* * * n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a
 Education is measured in levels depending whether primary, secondary, technical or college education had been completed or not.  
b 
Income is measured in levels ranging from half a minimum wage to six minimum wages.  
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,  
n.s.
 non-significant. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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4.2 Successful provisions and treatment effects 
 
Table 3.4 summarizes the proportions of successful provisions and percentage of efficient Nash 
equilibrium outcomes in the four treatments. In all treatments, and consistent with results of other 
TPGGs made in the lab (Croson and Marks, 2000), the provision occurs frequently. In the stage 
1, more than 80% of the times the threshold is reached, except in the baseline where the provision 
rate is 57%. In stage 2, the provision rate falls to about 70% which can be explained by 
decreasing contributions, and the Nash equilibrium of 60 tokens is barely reached by groups. In 
contrast, under the co-management treatment (T3) the public good is provided most of the time 
and players try to coordinate their actions in order to reach the efficient outcome. 
 
Table 3.4. Proportion of successful provisions by stage. 
Stage Treatment 
 Baseline T2 T3 T4 
Stage 1 57.14% 85% 82.1% 86.7% 
Stage 2 75% 78.9% 92.5% 69% 
Difference 17.85% -6.1% 10.36% -17.7% 
MWW test 0.45
 
0.314  1.1 1.08 
% of Efficient 
Nash Equilibria 
2.9 3.3 52.5 0 
 
In all treatments, the difference in the provision rates between stages 1 and 2 is not statistically 
significant. Individual contributions are always close to or around 12; therefore, a test of means 
may not show the whole effect that each treatment has on the decisions taken by players in the 
experiment. To complement this analysis, in this section we also present an analysis of the 
standard deviations of contributions. In Tables 3.5 and 3.6 we present the results of these 
analyses, respectively. 
 
In general, there is a difference of the contributions done by players in T3 with those done in 
other treatments. Table 3.5 shows that average contributions in T3 tend to be more closely to the 
cost-sharing equilibrium (12 tokens), while  average contributions in the other treatments are 
greater than 12. Contrary to linear public good games in which monotonically increasing 
contributions are preferred over low contributions levels, the goal in a threshold public good is to 
reach the provision point. Contributions beyond the provision point are not efficient and welfare 
decreasing for the group (Marks and Croson, 1998). Therefore, for the case of ASGM, we can 
argue that efforts to achieve associative entrepreneurship with long-term perspective can be more 
efficient with an institutional arrangement such as co-management. Moreover, the effect that 
exclusion has on individual contributions appears to be worthless and not different from the 
baseline. In the latter case, players fail to achieve a long-lasting collective action. 
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     Table 3.5. Average contributions for each treatment and non-parametric test for differences in means. 
Treatment Mean 
P-value of the MWW test 
T1 – T2 T1 – T3 T1 – T4 T2– T4 T3– T4 
Baseline (T1) 13.34 
0.7173 0.0038
*** 
0.6008
 
   0.4707 0.0735
*
 
Exclusion (T2) 13.52 
Co-management (T3) 12.67 
T2 & T3 (T4) 13.04 
 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 3.6 shows that the average standard deviation of the contributions per period is 
significantly lower when co-management occurs, even lower than the case in which exclusion is 
applied (p-value<0.001). Nonetheless, when exclusion and co-management are combined (T4), 
the standard deviation is much higher than in treatments T2 and T3 (p-value<0.001). In fact, 
results from Tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that when players can communicate with each other in the 
group and can count on the support of a third party, decisions are much closer of being optimal: 
everyone chooses a fair contribution, including original free-riders, and the public good is 
regularly provided. This result might be partially explained by members of the group who played 
the role of leaders. In co-management we could observe that one or two individuals in the group 
tried to point out the features of the social dilemma and suggested the way of better dealing with 
it: to make fair contributions to buy the technology. Our finding is comparable to Moxnes and 
van der Heijden’s (2003) who showed that the actions of a leader may persuade other members of 
the group to desist from making investments in a public bad. 
 
We also observe that the aforementioned effect of co-management is undermined when combined 
with exclusion. This finding is consistent with other studies of behavior in common-pool 
resources dilemmas. Ostrom (2006), for instance, provides an overview of this literature and 
shows the critical importance of communication and endogenous rule formation on the 
sustainable management of these resources, and the adverse effect that coercive rules may have 
on such management. Moreover, we find that although the threat of being excluded from the total 
benefits of the alternative technology does increase mean contributions, such a raise is not 
significant either from a statistical viewpoint or for the provision of the technology.  
 
 
Table 3.6. Average standard deviations of individual contributions per period for each treatment 
and non-parametric test for differences in standard deviations. 
Treatment 
Mean 
of s.d. 
P-value of the MWW test 
T1 – T2 T1 – T3 T1– T4 T2– T4 T3– T4 
Baseline (T1) 2.69 
0.0000
***
 0.0000
*** 
0.2776 0.0000
***
 0.0000
***
 
Exclusion (T2) 2.04 
Co-management (T3) 1.42 
T2 & T3 (T4) 3.2 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Our results thus indicate that under co-management subjects can engage in a well-established 
association that remains during periods. Under this association not only the technology is 
acquired and the public good provided, but also each player supports this provision on equal 
terms. The independent effects that communication among members and the intervention of an 
external party have on individual contributions cannot be disentangled from these results. 
Nonetheless, considering Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado’s (2010) result and ours, co-
management can be thought as a suitable rule to achieve sustained and successful provision of 
threshold public goods. 
 
With respect to the exclusion treatment, results from our paper would not support previous 
findings from other experiments (Swope, 2002; Kocher et al., 2005; Croson et al., 2007; Bchir 
and Willinger, 2008). Even though the threat of exclusion may initially trigger individual 
contributions (see Figure 3.1), such a rise is not sustained and the oscillating pattern observed in 
the baseline carries on. This effect is observed even when this mechanism is combined with co-
management. In other words, although co-management alone lead the miners to better manage 
the production process and their resources, the pressure generated in the exclusion case, would 
make it difficult to subjects to reach the coordination needed to achieve a sustained efficient 
outcome. 
 
4.3 Individual contributions 
 
We performed a parametric analysis by modeling individual contribution for each period. Given 
that there are observations of individual contributions for several periods, data are treated as a 
panel. The estimated model considers the fact that the dependent variable only takes discrete 
values, and that the individual specific constant terms of the model are randomly distributed 
across the cross-sectional units, where the sample units are drawn from a population (Greene, 
2000).
14
 Hence, we use the Poisson regression with random-effects. The Poisson regression 
assumes that the mean and the variance of the count variable are the same. Alternatively, the 
negative binomial model allows for over-dispersion. We estimated both type of models and we 
observed that the results coincided with each other, what suggest that there is no problem of over-
dispersion. Of these two only the estimations of the Poisson model are reported. Additionally, we 
ran an OLS random effects regression.  
                                                          
14
 In other public good experiments authors such as Carpenter (2007) and Spencer et al. (2009) have estimated two-
limit Tobit models because the individual contributions have been assumed as a variable that is double-censored 
(from above and below). To consider individual contributions as a censored variable means, for instance, that a 
player would be willing to make contributions greater than which is allowed, and that those censored values are not 
observed. However, the conditions of the game actually limit the range of values that this variable can take. 
Therefore, the censoring assumption does not seem to be plausible inasmuch as the values that the level of individual 
contributions can take are perfectly observable in the experiment. We also ran a two-limit Tobit model and got 
results that mismatch results from Poisson and OLS models. For instance, significant parameter estimates for 
treatment effects are negative, meanwhile for trend is positive. 
 
57 
 
 
The explanatory variables are socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, perception 
variables, and attitudinal variables. Dynamic and treatment variables are also included in the 
behavioral model. The dynamic variables include the total contributions of the other four 
members of the group in the previous period (Σj≠i, t-1), the difference between group contribution 
and the threshold also in the previous period (Differencet-1), interactions among these two 
variables, and a variable that captures the time trend (Trend). The inclusion of the dynamic 
variables is mainly intended to capture how individual behavior may depend upon past group 
behavior; i.e., to evaluate whether subjects show reciprocity or altruism across the game (Croson, 
2006). Moreover, to test the impact of the different rules on individual contributions we introduce 
three categorical variables (T2, T3, T4), which take binary values; one if the player was exposed 
to the treatment, and zero otherwise. The estimations results, which were estimated in STATA
TM
, 
are presented in Table 3.7.  
 
From the estimations, Poisson and OLS specifications generate similar results. Consistent to 
results of section 4.2, T3 and T4 do not have a statistically significant effect on the level of 
contributions. Conversely, the threat of exclusion (T2) can raise contributions somewhat, but as 
we mentioned above, such a rise is not long-lasting. Nonetheless, the main effect of the 
treatments can be seen in the variability of contributions overtime. In Table 3.8 we present the 
results of an OLS model with the standard deviations of individual contributions as dependent 
variable. In this case, all institutional arrangements, except T4, are statistically significant in 
downgrading the variability of contributions, that is, in putting players to agree each other on 
what the best level of contributions is. Such effect is stronger with co-management (T3). 
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Table 3.7. Results of specifications of random effects models. 
Variable Poisson panel model OLS panel model 
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Trend -0.009
**
 -2.43 -0.131
***
 -2.77 
T2 0.069 1.62 1.411
***
 2.85 
T3 0.019 0.44 0.355 0.71 
T4 0.033 0.77 0.719 1.41 
Σj≠i, t-1 -0.019
***
 -5.72 -0.515
***
 -11.2 
Differencet-1 0.0001 0.03 0.196
***
 2.89 
Σj≠i, t-1 * 
Differencet-1 
0.0003
***
 3.82 0.004
***
 3.55 
Residence Time 0.002 0.9 0.012 1.01 
Age 0.001 0.61 0.023 1.3 
Income 0.02 1.37 0.199
**
 2.37 
Education -0.012 -0.78 -0.049 -0.49 
Know new tech. 0.106
**
 2.01 0.92
**
 2.41 
Limitation in 
access 
0.018 0.4 0.393 1.34 
Have used tech. -0.108
**
 -2.15 -1.064
***
 -2.93 
Participation in 
training 
0.016 0.33 0.22 0.74 
Participation is 
useful 
-0.046 -0.25 -0.924 -0.83 
Health effects -0.137
***
 -3.12 -1.716
***
 -6.02 
Risk 0.012 1.4 0.113
**
 2.16 
Trust 0.054
*
 1.69 0.715
**
 2.5 
Empathy -0.006 -0.23 -0.085 -0.51 
Self-control 0.025 0.67 0.387 1.48 
Mine 0.015 0.26 0.008 0.02 
Constant 3.356
***
 12.01 36.343
***
 13.78 
Observations 85 85 
Wald chi2(k) 88.58
***
 356.34
***
 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 3.8. OLS model of treatment effects on standard deviation of ci. 
Variable Coef. t-value 
T2 -0.327
*
 -1.83 
T3 -1.697
***
 -7.86 
T4 0.106 0.51 
Trend 0.084
***
 5.18 
Constant 3.117
***
 14.63 
Wald chi2(k) 93.95
***
 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
With respect to the dynamic variables, the negative sign of Trend denotes that individual 
contributions are decreasing over time, which is consistent with other linear and threshold public 
good games (Ledyard, 1995; Croson and Marks, 2000). Moreover, we found that the previous 
tokens contributed by the other members of the group have an effect on the individual decisions. 
In linear public good games, the positive sign of the coefficient of contribution of others has been 
59 
 
interpreted as reciprocity, whereas the negative sign as altruism (Croson, 2006). Thus, the 
negative sign of the coefficient of this variable (Σj≠i,t-1) in our experiment would indicate altruism 
instead of reciprocity. However, in this case we must bear in mind that each subject also has the 
goal of reaching the threshold so that the technology can be bought and the public good provided. 
Hence, the positive sign of the interaction term of others’ previous contributions (Σj≠i,t-1) and the 
difference between past total contributions and T (Differencet-1) suggests that given a difference 
between Σt-1 and T, higher contributions of other players trigger higher allocations of tokens to the 
group account. In other words, in this game players reciprocate.    
 
This notion of reciprocity can be supported with the following statement that one of the 
participants wrote down in a section for observations in the final questionnaire: 
 
“Initially I decided to allocate cost-sharing contributions and see what the other partners did. 
There were always partners who contributed few, but I kept trying contributing more tokens so 
the technology could be provided and obtain its benefits. However, later on I decided to reduce 
my contributions in order to send the message that everybody should make similar contributions, 
and that reducing contributions is not profitable for the group.” (Player 3, Session 6, T2). 
 
Econometric analysis is also consistent with literature according to which the level of trust in 
others someone has positively determine social capital and cooperation, and therefore  subject’s 
concern for the provision of the public good (Czap and Czap, 2010; Czap et al., 2010; Kocher et 
al., 2011). 
 
Some studies have shown that risk-averse individuals might make lower contributions to the 
public good if they anticipate others’ contributions as low. A decision of this kind would 
compensate for the risk of others not contributing (Kocher et al., 2011). Evidence of this 
relationship can be found, for instance, in the study by Charness and Villeval (2009). These 
authors showed that subjects who invest more in a risky asset are more willing to cooperate in a 
public good game. Similarly, Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) and Kocher et al. (2012) 
found that risk-aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes in social 
dilemma situations. This positive correlation between risk-love and cooperation is, however, 
unclear from our parametric analysis. The coefficient of this variable is significant in the OLS 
model (p-value<0.005), whereas in the Poisson model is not significant at all. Our result are 
consistent with Kocher et al.’s (2011), who did not get any significant effect of their measure of 
risk on contributions in a one-shot public good game. 
 
Czap and Czap (2010, p. 2035) suggest that the subject’s decision to contribute to the provision 
of a public good would depend on his “ability to walk in the shoes of those who suffer from the 
problem, i.e. on empathy.” In addition to this personality trait, self-control would also be related 
to contributions to public goods (Czap and Czap, 2010; Czap et al., 2010; Kocher et al., 2012). 
According to this literature, more impatient subjects may exhibit less levels of cooperation in the 
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presence of a social dilemma. In our experiment, however, personality traits such as empathy and 
self-control did not have any effect on the contributions miners made. 
 
Finally, our results suggest that knowledge of alternative technologies a priori (Know_new_tech) 
has positive implications for the contributions to the common fund. However, the negative sign 
of Have_used_tech suggest that lack of operation of or familiarity with any of this equipment (see 
Table 3.3) make less likely that miners contribute to the acquisition of the technology. Lastly, a 
counterintuitive result that we got from these estimations is that when someone has or knows 
someone else has suffered mercury-related diseases (Health_effects), his contributions marginally 
decreases. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we explored the role of two institutional arrangements on associative 
entrepreneurship in order to phase out mercury in ASGM, via a framed experiment with miners 
from Colombia. In this experiment, we have found empirical support for our first hypothesis, 
which states that sustained collective action does not emerge as a solution to the social dilemma 
faced by households engaged in ASGM. In the baseline, we obtained that total contributions 
exceeded the provision point, but this provision was not sustained and exhibited an oscillating 
pattern.  
 
In contrast, co-management effected collective action in the experiment. We combined 
communication among members and the intervention of an external party; such combination led 
to a rise in the provision rate and a better coordination of players that allows them to attain an 
efficient level of individual contributions. This finding supports hypothesis H3: co-management 
encourages a larger and well established association of miners that allow them to access to 
cleaner and more productive technologies.  
 
We also tested the effect of exclusion from private benefits of the alternative technology on 
fostering a well-established collective action (H2); experimental results did not support this 
hypothesis. Despite the fact this arrangement led to an initial increase in contributions, they 
rapidly fell followed-up by the oscillating pattern observed in the baseline. The extent to which 
the size of the private benefits affects the impact of this institutional arrangement on associative 
entrepreneurship is a question that is left for future research. 
 
To some extent miners are aware of the harmful effects of employing mercury in the gold 
recovery process. Switching to cleaner technologies can be, however, hampered if miners do not 
develop trust by, for instance, communication among them. Communication and the support from 
external parties could help to break out the vicious cycle miners are trapped due to, among other 
things, mercury utilization. Thus, the external intervention can take several forms: training in the 
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operation of new equipment, education programs, and other policies that focus on the access and 
switch to better practices, and campaigns to foster social capital. 
 
In this study we tested alternative rules in a TPGG. To our knowledge, in the literature this is the 
first economic experiment that is done with communities involved in ASGM, and one of the few 
TPPGs done in the field. This study opens the door for further field research with a topic that has 
received little research in the economic literature; but very important for the economic activity of 
many miners. This is particularly relevant nowadays when efforts to phase-out mercury from 
ASGM and other sources of mercury pollution worldwide are taking place (Qiu, 2013). Rather 
than thinking on coercive policies such as ban on the mercury trade, other policies could be 
implemented or at least assessed using, for instance, the methods that experimental economics 
offers. 
 
Further research is needed to test other mechanisms and institutions that help these mining 
communities to improve their production process and alleviate poverty. For instance, the role of 
leaders might be essential in persuading other subjects to change behavior in the context of the 
public-good dilemma (Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003). Leaders’ tendencies to adopt better 
practices might encourage fellows of his social network to do the same. Such tests might be done 
by using experimental economics.  
 
Other real life components that could drive decision-making in a public-good dilemma are access 
to credit, and norms such as how others would treat people who do not contribute, how 
individuals care about other’s income, and the armed conflict that surround these communities. 
Alpizar et al. (2005), for instance, show evidence that the income of others affects one’s own 
subjective well-being and then human decision making. There is also experimental evidence that 
shows that inequality affect decisions in public-good dilemmas (see, e.g., Cárdenas et al., 2002). 
In general, there are many other factors that drive behavior in common-pool resources 
experiments (see, e.g., Ostrom, 2010). In this sense, there is broad space for future research not 
only in the analysis of decision-making in artisanal gold mining but also in the assessment of 
institutions to improve the well-being of these communities.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Instructions Used in the Economic Experiment 
 
 
The following instructions correspond to the baseline (T1) of our experiment. These instructions are based on the instructions 
used in the experiments of Marks and Croson (1998, 1999).  
  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
  
 
 WELCOME!  The following activity (that we call experiment) is a different and fun way of participating in a 
study about people’s decision making. Various agencies have provided funds for this research.  The amount of money 
you earn during this session will depend on the decisions you make and on the decisions made by the other participants; 
that is why it is important you pay attention to these instructions.  At the end of today’s session, you will be paid in cash 
privately. This experiment is different to what other individuals in this community have played. Therefore, the 
comments that you have heard from other people do not necessarily apply to this activity. 
 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work.  If you have any questions or need 
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an assistant will come to you.  If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, 
etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.  We expect and appreciate your cooperation. It is expected that 
this session last for about 2 hours. 
 
In this experiment we will use “tokens” that will be converted to money at the end of the experiment. Every token that 
you have at the end of the experiment will be converted to $72 Colombian Pesos. You will make your choices 
individually, and no one will be told what your choices are. To ensure the confidentiality of your decisions, at the 
beginning when you entered to the room you received as slip of paper with a number. This number will be your 
identification during the experiment. At the end of the activity when you are being paid, you must give this slip of paper 
back and in exchange you will be given a sealed envelope with your number. This envelope will contain the money you 
win. 
 
 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION  
 
 This experiment recreates a situation in which a group of people must make decisions on how to manage their 
natural resources. For this group we are referring to gold management in Northeastern Antioquia. 
 
In this area, some institutions have been promoting alternative techniques and technologies that reduce the use mercury 
and the effects this element has on the environment and human health, and that improve the profits that can be obtained 
in the gold recovery process.  
 
In this activity you are assigned to a decision group that consists of five (5) people. This experiment consists of several 
periods.  In every period, everyone in the group will be given a balance of tokens.  All participants receive the same 
initial balance of tokens every period. 
 
Each period, you and the other group members will be asked to allocate your tokens between two types of accounts.  
The first type of account is a Private Account.  Every individual has his own Private Account.  Any token you allocate 
to your Private Account will give you a guaranteed earning of exactly one token; that is, if you allocate one token to the 
Private Account your earning of this account is the same token.  The second type of account is a Group Account.  
There is only one Group Account for the entire group.  Your earnings from the Group Account depend on the total 
number of tokens that the group allocates to the Group Account according to the Payoff Table. Both accounts are 
explained below.  
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You have a Payoff Table. With this table you can calculate the tokens you will receive every period as total earnings, 
assuming the decisions made by you and of the other members of the group. The way you can use this table is explained 
later. 
 
Finally, we want you to know we do not pretend to evaluate if your decisions are correct or wrong; therefore, in this 
experiment there are not good or bad decisions. 
 
 
YOUR BEGINNING BALANCE OF TOKENS 
 
 Each period, you and every other member of the group will be assigned a balance of 25 tokens.  Thus, the 
group will have a total of 125 tokens.    
 
 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT 
 
 Every period in this experiment you will be asked to make simultaneous decisions about how many tokens to 
allocate to your Private Account and how many tokens to allocate to the Group Account.  Your allocations must add up 
to 25 tokens.  Every group member has his own Private Account.  Your Private Account guarantees you earnings of $72 
per token.  The other members of the group receive the same earnings from their Private Accounts.   
 
If you chose to allocate all of your 25 tokens to the Private Account and 0 tokens to the Group Account, your period 
earnings from your Private Account would be 25 tokens   
 
If you chose to allocate 9 tokens to your Private Account and 16 tokens to the Group Account, your preliminary 
earnings from your Private Account would be 9 tokens.  The Group Account is discussed below. 
 
 
GROUP ACCOUNT  
 
 Every group of 5 people has one Group Account for the entire group. Every member of the group can allocate 
tokens to the group account. What are the tokens collected in the Group Account going to be used for? This account will 
be used to collect the necessary funds to obtain the alternative technology for the gold recovery process. With this 
technology lower levels of mercury pollution can be achieved, as well as increasing the recovery of gold in this process.   
 
In each period, each group member will decide how many tokens to allocate to the group account. In this exercise, each 
person can decide to assign zero tokens to the group account, allocate part of the 25 tokens that were assigned initially 
or allocate all. In this common fund we will collect the necessary funds to buy a technology that allows reducing 
mercury pollution of the gold recovery process, and increase the recovery of this process. In this experiment this 
technology is referred to continuous mills and methods of gravimetric concentration. 
 
And is it always possible to buy the technology from the Group Account? No, it is only possible to have the technology 
if the five members of the group are able to raise a total of 60 tokens in the Group Account, in that period. This required 
number of tokens is called the Group Account Requirement.  It represents the minimum level of collection of tokens 
in the group account to cover the cost to acquire the alternative technology. If the Group Account Requirement is 
achieved and the technology acquired, the earnings from the Group Account will be divided equally among the five 
group members.  These earnings represent the improved environmental quality and the higher profits due to more 
recovery of gold. Because in the real life these benefits could be enjoyed by everyone, no matter who allocates the 
tokens to the group account, in this game every player will receive tokens from the Group Account even if he decided to 
allocate nothing to this account.  
 
What happens if the group does not meet the 60 tokens that are the group account requirement? If group’s total 
allocation to the Group Account is less than the Group Account Requirement of 60 tokens, then the group will not earn 
anything from the Group Account.  The tokens that you had allocated to the Group Account will be returned to you and 
will be automatically put into your Private Account.   
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What happens if the group does exactly meet the 60 tokens? If the total number of tokens allocated to the Group 
Account is equal to or greater than 60, then the group receives 120 tokens from the Group Account for the first 60 
tokens allocated. This means that you will receive 24 tokens from the Group Account what represents your benefits 
from the purchase of the new technology in that period and only for that period. 
 
What happens if the group managed to gather more than 60 tokens? If your group’s total allocation to the Group 
Account is greater than the 60 token Group Account Requirement, the extra tokens are not returned to the members of 
the group in any way.  Thus, the group receives no benefit from allocating more than a total of 60 tokens to the Group 
Account.  
 
It is not compulsory for you to spend any amount of tokens to the acquisition of the alternative technology. The money 
allocated to you (represented by the number of tokens) is yours and you are completely free to decide what to do with 
these tokens during this exercise. In this experiment, even if you do not want contribute or want to do it in a small 
amount, if the alternative technology is purchased (that is, the Group Account Requirement is reached), you will enjoy 
the benefits of the Group Account during that period of the game. The enjoyment of the benefits of purchasing the 
alternative technology applies only for the period during which the technology is acquired. 
 
  
CALCULATING YOUR PERIOD EARNINGS 
 
 Your "period earnings" are the sum of your earnings from your Private Account and your earnings from the 
Group Account.  Each period, your earnings for the period are added to your previous earnings to keep a running total 
of your cumulative earnings.  Thus, your earnings for the experiment are the sum of all of your period earnings. Recall 
that every token you have at the end of the experiment will be converted to $72 Colombian pesos. To make these things 
clearer, below we show you some examples. 
 
 
THE RECORD SHEET 
     
 The Record Sheet gives you a place to record certain pieces of information.  It is here that your period 
earnings will be recorded.  You have been also provided a sample Record Sheet which is green.  Please make sure you 
can find where the following pieces of information are recorded on your sample Record Sheet.  The numbers below 
correspond to the column of the Record Sheet where this information can be found: 
 
 (1)  Period Number 
 (2)  Group Account Requirement  
 (3)  Your Allocation Choices: Group Account 
 (4)  Your Allocation Choices: Private Account 
 (5)  Total Group Account allocation 
 (6)  The Fraction You Allocated to the Group Account 
 (7)  Extra Tokens 
 (8)  Your Earnings: Group Account 
 (9) Your Earnings: Private Account 
 (10) Total Period Earnings  
 (11) Cumulative earnings   
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You have been given a stack of blue Reporting Sheets that will be used during the experiment.  Each one looks like the 
example below.  Please make sure you can locate the Reporting Sheets.  
 
 
    REPORTING SHEET           
 
  Player No.: ________   Room No.:  ________ 
 
      Period No.:  ________ 
 
   
 
 
  Your Allocation Choices 
 
  number of   number of 
  tokens to ________ + tokens to ________    =  25 tokens 
  Group   Private 
  Account   Account 
 
 
 
Each period, you will denote your allocations on the portion of the sheet entitled Your Allocation Choices.  You need to 
make sure that your allocations add to 25 tokens.  After finishing, you will turn the Reporting Sheet over and put it in 
the corner of your desk.  The Reporting Sheets will be collected by an assistant.  An assistant will add up the allocations 
to the Group Account.  Items (3) - (9) on the Record Sheet will be reported to you on a slip of paper. 
 
We will use the sample Record Sheet you have been given (the green one) to go through three examples of how to 
calculate your period earnings.  The information you will receive for the first two examples (periods) is reported to you 
on a sample Reporting Sheet, similar to the one above and the ones you will use in the decision-making periods.  This 
information for the first two examples is recorded on your sample Record Sheet.  For example 3, you will be asked to 
fill out the sheets yourself, and an assistant will also be filling out the entries on the whiteboard.  Please follow along on 
your sample Record Sheet as we go through the three hypothetical periods.   
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Hypothetical Example 1:   
 
 
    REPORTING SHEET           
 
  Subject No.:            Room No.:           
 
      Period No.:      1     
 
 
 
 
  Your Allocation Choices 
 
  number of   number of 
  tokens to    13     + tokens to    12       =  25 tokens 
  Group   Private 
  Account   Account 
 
 
 
Assume you allocate 13 tokens to the Group Account and 12 tokens to your Private Account.  This is recorded on the 
Reporting Sheet above and columns (3) and (4) of the sample Record Sheet.  Assume that the group’s total allocation to 
the Group Account is 40 tokens.  This implies that the other four group members allocated a total of 27 tokens to the 
Group Account.  You now have enough information to fill out columns (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) on the sample Record 
Sheet.  In Column (5) it is noted that the total Group Account Allocation is 40 tokens.  The group did not meet the 
Group Account Requirement of 60 tokens. Therefore, there are no extra tokens allocated to the Group Account.  This is 
noted in column (6).  
 
Columns (7) and (8) record your period earnings.  Since the group did not reach the Group Account Requirement, the 
13 tokens you allocated to the Group Account are returned to you and are automatically allocated to your Private 
Account.  This means that all 25 of your tokens are now allocated to your Private Account and your earnings from the 
Group Account are 0 tokens. The earning of 0 tokens from the Group Account is placed in column (7). The 25 tokens 
you earn from your Private Account are placed in column (8) of the sample Record Sheet.   
 
Your total earnings for period 1 are determined by adding together the entries in (7) and (8).  Thus, 25 is placed in 
column (9). You can verify this in the Payoff Table:  
 
 
 
 My allocation to the 
Group Account 
  13 
T
H
E
IR
 
A
L
L
O
C
A
T
IO
N
 
T
O
 T
H
E
 
G
R
O
U
P
 
A
C
C
O
U
N
T
 
…
 
…
 
27 25 
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Hypothetical Example 2:   
 
 
    REPORTING SHEET           
 
  Subject No:            Room No.:           
 
      Period No.:     2      
  
 
 
 
  Your Allocation Choices 
 
  number of   number of 
  tokens to    10     + tokens to    15       =  25 tokens 
  Group   Private 
  Account   Account 
 
 
 
Assume you allocate 10 tokens to the Group Account and 15 tokens to your Private Account.  These numbers are 
entered in the Reporting Sheet above and in columns (3) and (4) of the sample Record Sheet.  Assume the group’s total 
allocation to the Group Account is exactly 60 tokens, implying that the other four group members allocated a total of 50 
tokens.  The total Group Account allocation is noted in column (5) of the sample Record Sheet. Since the group exactly 
reached the Group Account Requirement, there are no extra tokens as noted in column (6). 
 
Your earnings are determined as follows:  You receive 24 tokens from the Group Account because the technology could 
be acquired. This number is placed in column (7) of the sample Record Sheet.  You earn 15 tokens from your Private 
Account which is noted in column (8). Adding together your earnings from the Group Account and your Private 
Account gives you a total period earning of 39 tokens. You can verify this in the Payoff Table:  
 
 
 
 My allocation to the 
Group Account 
  10 
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…
 
50 39 
 
 
This is noted in column (9) of the sample Record Sheet.   
 
Hypothetical Example 3 has not been recorded on the Reporting Sheets in the Instructions or the sample Record Sheet.  
Please fill in the relevant information as we work through Hypothetical Example 3.  The information will also be filled 
in on the whiteboard. 
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Hypothetical Example 3:   
 
    REPORTING SHEET           
  
  Subject No:            Room No.:           
 
      Period No.:      3     
 
  
 
 
  Your Allocation Choices 
 
  number of   number of 
  tokens to           + tokens to             =  55 tokens 
  Group   Private 
  Account   Account 
 
 
A new period begins. Assume you allocate 17 tokens to the Group Account and 8 tokens to your Private Account.  
Please record this information on the Reporting Sheet above and on the sample Record Sheet in columns (3) and (4).  
Assume your group’s total allocation to the Group Account is 69 tokens. The Group Account total of 69 should be 
recorded on the Record Sheet in column (5). Since the group exceeded the Group Account Requirement of 60 tokens, 
there are 9 extra tokens. This is recorded in column (6). Your earnings are calculated as follows: You receive 24 tokens 
from the Group Account. This should be recorded in column (7).  You also earn 8 tokens from your Private Account.  
This should be recorded in column (8).  Your total period earnings add up 32 tokens: 
 
 
 
 
 My allocation to the 
Group Account 
  17 
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52 32 
 
 
 
Please record this in column (9) of the sample Record Sheet.   
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 At this point, each of you will fill out a short questionnaire to ensure that everyone knows how to calculate his 
or her period earnings.  Upon completion, the questionnaires will be collected and checked.  Please put your subject 
number (not your name) on your questionnaire.  The questionnaire looks like the sample Record Sheet you have been 
working with.  There are six sample periods for which you are given a hypothetical choice of Group Account allocation 
and Private Account allocation.  You will also be given a Total Group Account Allocation.  You will be asked to fill in 
the empty entries on the Record Sheet and answer several questions. 
 
If you have any questions while working through the questionnaire, please raise your hand and an assistant will come to 
you.  When you finish, please turn the questionnaire over and place it in the corner of your desk.  An assistant will 
collect the questionnaire and will bring it to the front of the room for checking.  If there are any questions at this time, 
please raise your hand.  If there are no questions, you may begin the questionnaire.   
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INFORMED CONSENT SHEET  
 
 Everyone in this session has received an Informed Consent Sheet. This sheet is a requirement for the 
universities that undertake studies with the participation of people. In this format we inform to you about confidentiality 
and handling of the information we collect in these activities, you sign if you agree to participate, certifying that they 
were informed of the project and the handling of the information. Please read this sheet before signing. The information 
on this form is confidential and no one will have access to this but the researcher of this study. Your participation is 
completely voluntary. You can leave the activity at any time. However, if you leave you will not receive any payment. 
 
If you agree to participate, please complete and sign the Informed Consent Sheet.  
 
 
PERIOD INFORMATION 
 
 You have been given an Information Sheet that summarizes what you have been told above. The 
Information Sheet informs you of all of the relevant information for the periods of the experiment.  Please make sure 
you can find where the following pieces of information are listed on the Information Sheet:  
    
 1) Group Account Requirement  
 2) Your Balance of tokens  
 3) Every other Group Member’s Balance of Tokens 
 4) Total Number of Tokens Belonging to Group  
 5) Your Share of the Group Account Earnings  
 6) Every Other Group Members’ Share of the Group Account Earnings 
 7) What Tokens in the Group Account earn: 
 8) What Tokens in Your Private Account earn: 
 
 
SUMMARY OF A SINGLE PERIOD 
 
A single period proceeds as follows:   
 
 You have been given a set of blue Reporting Sheets, one for each period.   
 
 You will tear off the Reporting Sheet for the relevant period and you will indicate your choice of allocations to the 
Group Account and your Private Account.  Please make sure your allocations add to 25 tokens. These decisions 
effect only on the ongoing period.  
 
 You will also denote your choices on your Record Sheet.  
 
 When you are done filling out your Reporting Sheet, you will turn it over and place it in the corner of your desk. 
The Reporting Sheets will then be collected by one of the assistants.   
 
 The Group’s total allocation to the Group Account will be determined and the information on the Record Sheet will 
be calculated for you. This information will be returned to you on a slip of paper.  You may choose to perform your 
own calculations on the Record Sheet using the Payoff Table. Or, you may choose to copy the information that you 
have received onto the Record Sheet.  
 
 An experimenter will collect the slips of paper before you receive the one for the next period. At this point the 
period is over and a new period will begin. 
 
 Note that you will never be told the allocation choices made by other group members, and they will not be told 
anything about your choices.   
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SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 You are assigned to a decision group that consists of five people.   
 
 This session will consist of several decision-making periods. 
 
 Each period, you and every other member of your group will be assigned a balance of 25 tokens.  Thus, the group 
will have a total of 125 tokens. 
 
 You will be asked to make simultaneous decisions about how many tokens to allocate to your Private Account and 
how many tokens to allocate to the Group Account. The Group Account will be used to collect the tokens needed 
to buy a technology that reduces the use of mercury and increases the recovery of gold. 
 
 Your decisions and those of each of the members of the group will be completely anonymous. All information you 
provide is confidential and no one will have access to it, except the researcher of this study. 
 
 Your allocations must add up to 25 tokens. 
 
 Your Private Account guarantees you that each token put there is yours. 
 
 There is one Group Account for your entire decision group.  The earnings from the Group Account will be 
divided equally among the five group members.    
 
 Every period the group only benefits from the Group Account if at least 60 tokens are allocated to the Group 
Account. 
 
 If the group’s total allocation to the Group Account is less than the Group Account Requirement of 60 tokens, then 
the group will not earn anything from the Group Account. The tokens that you had allocated to the Group Account 
will be returned to you and will be automatically put into your Private Account.    
 
 If the total number of tokens allocated to the Group Account is equal to or greater than 60, then the group 
receives 120 tokens from the Group Account for the first 60 tokens allocated.  Tokens allocated in excess 
of 60 are addressed below. The 120 tokens will be divided equally between the 5 members in the group.  
Thus, your share would be 24 tokens.   
 
 If your group’s total allocation to the Group Account is greater than the requirement of 60 tokens, the extra tokens 
are not returned to the members of the group in any way.      
 
 Your "period earnings" are the sum of your earnings from your Private Account and your earnings from the Group 
Account. 
 
 At the end of this session you will be paid in cash, depending on the number of tokens you have at the end of the 
game. Each token you have at the end of the experiment will be converted into 72 Colombian pesos. 
 
During the experiment, you may want to keep the Instructions open to this Summary page.  This will allow you to refer 
to it quickly and easily if you need. 
 
This ends the instructions.  If you still have any questions at this time, please raise your hand.  One of the assistants will 
come to you.  If at any time during the experiment you have a question, please raise your hand and an assistant will 
come to you.  If there at no questions at this time please put the sample Record Sheet in your envelope.    
 
At this point we will begin the experiment.  You are reminded that you must remain silent during the experiment.  At 
the end of the experiment you will be paid your earnings in cash.  If there are no questions, you may begin period 1 by 
filling out the Reporting Sheet for period 1.  When you are finished, turn it over and place it on the corner of your desk.      
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The following instructions correspond to the exclusion treatment (T2) of our experiment. 
  
 
NEW INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 DEAR PARTICIPANT! At this point game’s instructions change a little. These changes are related to the 
profits from the Group Account once the technology is acquired. Please pay attention to these changes. 
 
From now on, if in a given period the group collects 60 tokens and the technology is acquired, there are some benefits 
that are equally assigned to the five group members. These benefits are assigned no matter how many tokens each 
member assigned. Those benefits represent the improvement in environmental quality due to the use of the cleaner 
technology. However, the benefits associated to more recovery of gold will be only received by those who share the 
cost of the new technology.  
 
As before, if the total number of tokens in the group account is lower than the Group Account Requirement (60 tokens), 
then the alternative technology cannot be acquired and the group gains nothing from the Account Group during that 
period. The tokens that you have assigned to the Account Group you are automatically placed on your Private Account. 
 
If the total number of tokens assigned to the Group Account equals 60 then the technology is acquired and the group 
receives 80 tokens from the Group Account; i.e., each member is given 16 tokens from the Group Account, which 
represents the gains due to improved environmental quality. 
 
Additionally, if the technology is acquired and you deposited tokens in the Group Account, you can enjoy the profits of 
more gold recovery in beneficiation process, receiving 8 additional tokens. The total benefits from the Group Account 
during that period would be 24 tokens. However, if you do not contribute to the Group Account and the technology is 
acquired, you just receive the 16 tokens which correspond to the benefits that each member gets from the Group 
Account.  
 
Just as before, if total allocation of your group is larger the Group Account Requirement (60 tokens), extra tokens are 
not returned to the members of the group. 
 
For the calculation of the earnings from the Group Account henceforth we will use Payoff Table 2, which we deliver in 
this moment. In exchange we ask you to return the table that you utilized since the beginning of the game. 
 
To make these changes clearer here there are two examples.  
 
 
Hypothetical Example 4:   
 
 
 
   REPORTING SHEET 
 
  Subject No:            Room No.:           
 
      Period No.:     4      
  
 
 
 
  Your Allocation Choices 
 
  number of   number of 
  tokens to    16     + tokens to    9       =  25 tokens 
  Group   Private 
  Account   Account 
 
 
 
Assume you allocate 16 tokens to the Group Account and 9 tokens to your Private Account. Assume the group’s total 
allocation to the Group Account is 69 tokens, implying that the other four group members allocated a total of 52 tokens. 
Therefore, you receive 24 tokens from the Group Account; 16 tokens because of the provision of the technology and 8 
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more because the technology is acquired and you shared the cost of that acquisition. You also earn 9 tokens from your 
Private Account. Your total earnings for the period and add 33 (see Payoff Table 2):  
 
 
 
 
 My allocation to the 
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Hypothetical Example 5:   
 
Assume you allocate 0 tokens to the Group Account and 25 tokens to your Private Account. Assume also that the 
group’s total allocation to the Group Account is 62 tokens. 
 
In this case you receive 16 tokens from the Group Account because the technology could be acquired, but you do not 
receive any additional token because you did not contribute to the acquisition. 
 
From your Private Account you earn the 25 tokens you have assigned to this account. By adding the profits from the 
Private Account and the Group Account you get a total earning of 41 tokens. You can check this result in Payoff Table 
2.   
 
 
 
 My allocation to the 
Group Account 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Guideline Provided to the External Advisor in the Treatments with Co-management  
 
 
The following guideline adhered to the instructions of Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado (2010). 
  
 
We thank you for having accepted the invitation to participate in the economic experimental games we are performing 
with artisanal gold miners from Segovia and Remedios. The purpose of this experiment is to analyze the behavior of 
these miners in the management of the production process of gold  in the region of Northeastern Antioquia. 
 
This experiment is a different way in which you and mining communities can participate in a study that is related to the 
gold recovery process in Segovia and Remedios.  
 
This experiment recreates a situation in which a group of five people, who are small-scale gold miners in their daily life, 
make decisions similar to real ones about recovering gold. 
 
You have been chosen to participate in the experiment because of your experience working with communities on 
environmental-education issues and sustainable techniques. You will participate in one of the rules that we have 
designed for the game. The rule is called co-management and groups of five participants will be playing it. Co-
management rule consists of the following: at the beginning of the second stage, and for five (5) minutes, you will have 
the opportunity of having an open talk with group members. During the talk you will try to convince individuals that the 
best decision for the group (in terms of benefits) and for the whole region (in terms of environmental conditions) is to 
contribute to the Group Account in order acquire the technology that reduces the use of mercury in the gold 
beneficiation process. This decision jointly will allow better environmental and health conditions, and more recovery of 
gold, which in turn will benefit each of them through ensuring better living and economic conditions. 
 
In this experiment, the technology that we are considering is continuous mills and methods of gravimetric concentration 
such mesa alemana and canalones.  
 
In addition to this basic information you can give them information that you consider relevant about why they should 
reduce the use of mercury in the gold beneficiation process. The group of five will listen to your talk and then they will 
have five additional minutes to have an internal and confidential talk about the information you have provided to them 
about the game, the payoffs, ways of playing, similarities between the game and real world and about the relevance of 
better environmental conditions. During their confidential talk you will not be allowed to stay with players. You and the 
group will be allowed to have a discussion and a question and answer period. 
 
In subsequent periods you will have the opportunity to talk one (1) minute with members of each group, then of which 
participants can talk to each other up to one (1) minute confidentially (without your presence). 
 
Please note that during the talks you will not be allowed to impose your role as representative of the Global Mercury 
Project, not make promises or threats, since the purpose of this rule is to examine political strategies or alternative 
management rules in the area, based on communication between authorities, developers and communities, and within 
communities. 
 
The idea of this rule is that you, as a member of the Global Mercury Project, responsible for providing environmental 
and technical education, provide information about the importance of having a good environmental quality, in 
particular, a mercury-free environment. Individuals will then make decisions according to the information and their 
internal discussion. 
 
For academic purposes, the talk between you and the group will be recorded. Notice that all the information that you 
give during the game will be treated as strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes only. 
 
78 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
-- 
Chipping in for a cleaner technology across 
subject pools: evidence from a framed threshold 
public good game with students and miners 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the external validity of a framed threshold public good game with features of a 
public good dilemma that is faced by artisanal gold miners in developing countries. By using the same 
experimental design we analyze whether the decisions made by university students in this context-
enriched situation converge to what miners do in the same framed experiment. This work contrasts with 
previous literature in which the comparison between lab and field has considered context-free situations. 
The results show behavioral convergences between students and miners in three treatments, and 
divergence in one treatment. In terms of the achievement of efficient outcomes, the performance of 
university students was better than miners. Similarly to previous literature, these results show that the 
external validity of lab experiments must be taken cautiously. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the behavioral differences between university students and artisanal gold 
miners in Colombia in a framed field experiment. In this analysis we use a threshold public good 
game that is framed according to the public-good dilemma faced by artisanal gold miners in 
many developing countries (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013a). The social dilemma is characterized 
by the conflict between the individual’s interest in using a polluting and cheaper technique in the 
gold recovery process, and the social interest on acquiring a cleaner production technology. One 
way of coping with this dilemma is by establishing an association where miners can raise the 
financial capital required to buy a cleaner technology. To this end we test the effect of three 
institutional designs on the rate of technology adoption and compare the results with a control 
treatment where the threshold public good game is implemented.  We ran the experiment with 
both, university students and with miners in the field. With this analysis we explore to what 
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extent the effects of different treatments coincide across two different subject pools. The aim of 
this analysis is to contribute to the debate of the external validity of laboratory experiments. 
 
One of the main assumptions of experimental economics is that the behavioral patterns observed 
in the laboratory are likely to be observed in real life as long as certain ceteris paribus conditions 
hold. However, the so-called general principle of induction (Friedman and Sunder, 1994), 
parallelism precept (Smith, 1976, 1982), or external validity (Guala, 2005) has been subject of 
debate since the early stages of experimental economics. For instance, in the 1990s, P. Bohm was 
one of the first scholars calling attention of the differences that there might be between laboratory 
experiments and experiments in the field (Dufwenberg and Harrison, 2008). 
 
Some scholars defend the idea that the main purpose of any experiment is to test a theory, model 
or conjecture (Smith, 1982; Plott, 1991), rather than to reproduce a real-world system. If a theory 
is meant to describe or explain certain regularities of a real-world system, and an economic 
experiment does not succeed in rejecting the propositions of that theory, then we should expect 
that the theory provides causal relationships that explain that reality (Bardsley et al., 2010). 
Nonetheless, the mere fact that a theory (model) is refuted in the laboratory does not mean that 
the theory is entirely wrong but that a test of its applicability in a certain domain failed (Guala, 
2005).  
 
Opposite, there are skeptics scholars about the external validity of experimental economics, who 
have indeed used the features of universality or completeness claimed by some economic 
experimenters to express their concerns about laboratory experimentation in economics (Guala, 
2005). In general, it has been argued that human actions are context dependent and are defined 
partly in relation to other phenomena and partly by people’s perceptions of those relationships. 
Under this perspective, the “same conditions, same effect” argument for external validity, or the 
ceteris paribus assumption, might not seem appropriate (Bardsley et al., 2010). 
 
The evidence with regard to this debate is not conclusive (Guala, 2005). For instance, 
experimental economics has proven to be useful in the correct design of mechanisms for the 
allocation of telecommunication licenses (Guala, 2005). The accurate matching between the price 
trajectory in laboratory experiments and the bidding trajectory observed in license auctions is, 
according to Guala (2005), a clear example that when certain conditions hold, the data-generating 
processes both in the experiment and the real-world ought to be the same. Likewise, Kagel (1995) 
in the analysis of auction markets, and Fehr and Gächter (2008) in their study on wage markets, 
found not only a correspondence between laboratory and field data, but also that theory 
predictions are confirmed by that data.  
 
In contrast, results reported by Carpenter et al. (2005) and Carlsson et al. (2012) indicate 
differences in the offers that students and workers made in ultimatum and dictator games. 
Carpenter et al. (2005) point out that those differences are driven by the social framing of 
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participants, and suggest that the external validity of lab experiments should be taken cautiously. 
Similarly, Anderson et al. (2012) performed a study of other-regarding preferences across subject 
pools; they found large differences between college students and non-student adult subjects.  
 
The external validity of public goods experiments conducted either in the lab or in the field has 
been also questioned. Laury and Holt (2008) and Voors et al. (2012), for instance, found 
respectively that the behavior shown by players in a laboratory experiment and in field 
experiment is weakly correlated with actual behavior in a real (natural) public good dilemma 
situation. These authors cast doubt on the external validity of economic experiments and point 
out the need of doing further research to gather more evidence on the external validity of 
decisions made in context-free situations. 
 
In this paper, we conduct a framed threshold public good game in order to analyze the behavioral 
differences between lab and field experiments. Besides including the characteristics of an 
artefactual experiment, in the framed experiment an abstract context is substituted by a field 
context (Harrison and List, 2004). In our experiment, we modify the abstract environment of a 
context-free threshold public good game (TPGG) and consider a framework which is given by 
the purchase of a technology that cannot be individually afforded. With the acquisition of the 
technology, participants get rewards that represent reductions of mercury pollution resulting from 
the process of recovering gold in artisanal mining, and also the growth in productivity during this 
process.  
 
Smith (1979) argues that the embellishment of instructions with well-intentioned attempts of 
gaining realism in an experiment may not be convenient.  This would change the sources of 
valuation in the experiment from just one, the monetary reward, to several ones. As Murphy and 
Cardenas (2004) point out, some experimentalists suggest that experiments should not be framed 
in any particular context to avoid that this influences results; but there is no consensus on this. 
We might say that in the real-world the decisions people make are motivated by several sources 
of valuation all working at the same time. Or recalling Bardsley et al.’s (2010) idea, human 
actions are context dependent and defined partly in relation to other phenomena.  
 
We contribute to this debate of the external validity of laboratory experiments by examining 
whether the decisions that university students and miners make in a context-enriched situation 
match up. This is done by comparing the decisions made by university students and artisanal gold 
miners in the framed economic experiment. Our work contrasts with previous literature in which 
the comparison between lab and field has considered context-free situations (see, e.g., Carpenter 
et al., 2005; Laury and Holt, 2008; Carlsson et al., 2012). Moreover, in order to offer more 
insights into the problem of external validity, we also compare our results with previous TPGGs 
conducted in the lab. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the experimental 
design and the mechanisms we tested in the experiment. Then, in Section 3 we report the 
experimental results and in Section 4 we focus our discussion on the external validity of our lab 
experiments. In general, we find behavioral convergences and divergences between students and 
miners. In Section 5 we conclude. 
 
2. Experimental Design1 
 
The experiment conducted in the lab and the field was framed according to the social dilemma 
faced by artisanal gold miners in many developing countries (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013a). In 
this economic sector, a widespread practice employed to recover gold is to amalgamate gold 
using mercury. The outcome of the entire process is mercury pollution, as well as posing a health 
risk to the communities living in zones where this activity is carried out (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 
2013a).  
  
One way of coping with this public good dilemma is by switching to technologies that are not 
only cleaner but also more productive than the amalgamation technique using mercury. However, 
the cost of this technology might be beyond the budget of a single miner. As an option, miners 
could join efforts by making individual contributions to a common fund in order to raise the 
minimum financial capital required to buy the technology. But given that there is not rivalry in 
the positive externalities derived from the adopted technology, and that it is not possible to 
exclude people from these public benefits, some individuals might be tempted to free ride.  
 
In this context, one of the institutional arrangements that might foster collective action, and that 
are assessed in our experiments, is the intervention of a non-coercive external party that provides 
either technical assistance or any other kind of guidance in the process of switching to alternative 
technologies. This kind of intervention, namely co-management, might be needed for miners to 
get organized under an association scheme by which miners can raise the financial capital 
necessary to acquire and maintain better technologies (CDS, 2004; Chaparro, 2003; Saldarriaga-
Isaza et al., 2013a).  
 
In addition to co-management, we assessed the effect of an institutional arrangement in which 
those miners who do not contribute to the acquisition of the technology are excluded from using 
the technology and therefore from obtaining additional profits due to more productivity in the 
gold recovery process. It is expected that under the threat of exclusion the free-riding rate 
declines by pushing original strong free-riders (i.e., those contributing nothing) to contribute at 
least one token.   
 
                                                          
1
 A complete description of the economic experiment can be found in Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b). 
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All subjects were exposed to the same experimental protocol. By keeping the difference between 
the laboratory and field experiments to a minimum (Carlsson et al., 2012), we can make clear 
comparisons of the behavior of students and miners. The instructions of our framed experiment 
adhered to the basic language of the instructions developed by Isaac et al. (1984) (see instructions 
in Appendix A of Chapter 3). These instructions have been commonly utilized in other multi-
period laboratory experiments of public goods with provision point (Croson and Marks, 2000, 
2001; Marks and Croson, 1998, 1999; Cadsby et al., 2008).  
 
Each period, players participating in the experiment were asked to decide between allocating ci 
tokens of an initial endowment (E) to a common fund in order to buy a new technology of cost T, 
and keeping E – ci in his private account.
2
 The latter represents the private consumption of the 
subject in the experiment. In this multi-period game, each player was randomly assigned in a 
five-person group. In each round, the payoff the individual received (Ui) was computed according 
to the equation: 
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In equation (4.1), R is the benefit of an improved environmental quality, and ρ represents the 
profits for more productivity in the gold recovery process. To represent a public-good dilemma 
situation, we assume that E<T<n.E. The parameterization of the game was as follows: E=25, 
T=60, n=5, R=16, =8. According to equation (4.1), each individual cannot increase his benefits 
in the game unless the technology is acquired. In the case of exclusion,  = 8 only if ci > 0, and  
= 0 otherwise.  
 
Following Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado (2010), in the co-management treatment every group 
had the opportunity to talk up to five minutes with an external advisor. In this treatment, players 
continued being paid according to equation (4.1).  The task of the advisor was to persuade miners 
to invest in the new technology, with the aim of reducing the emissions of mercury and avoiding 
the harmful effects of mercury pollution. Afterward, the group had five minutes to converse 
among themselves without the presence of the advisor. For each successive period of the game, 
the external advisor was given one minute to talk with the group, following which, group 
members had one minute to talk.  
 
                                                          
2
 The equipment introduced in the framework of the experiment was referred to continuous mills and methods of 
gravimetric concentration. These technologies have been promoted among miners and processing facilities, and are 
recognized for being cleaner and more productive than traditional techniques such as mercury amalgamation or ball 
mills. 
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In the field, the external advisor in the co-management treatment was a representative of the 
Global Mercury Project, who had been working in the zone for several years supporting the 
introduction of alternative technologies for gold recovery. In the experiments with university 
students, the advisory task was done by a professor of engineering at the National University of 
Colombia. In the last case, it was difficult to be certain about the presence of the representative of 
the Global Mercury Project in the sessions done in the university facilities with students.  
 
The experiment was performed in two stages; the first stage consisted of 8 periods in which 
participants played the base case according to equation (4.1). Then, depending on the session they 
had been cited to, in the 9 periods of the stage 2 the groups played one of four possible treatments 
(see Table 4.1). 
 
        Table 4.1. Summary of Experimental Design  
 Co-management 
E
x
cl
u
si
o
n
  No Yes 
No Base case (T1) Treatment 3 (T3) 
Yes Treatment 2 (T2) Treatment 4 (T4) 
 
 
At the end of each period, each participant was privately informed in a slip of paper about total 
group contributions and of his payoff according to those contributions. This was done to avoid 
any bias that might arise from several groups in the same session being able to compare their 
contributions. As part of the set of instructions we provided all the participants with pay-off 
tables. The provision of the pay-off table aimed to minimize subject’s transaction costs by 
facilitating the accounting process. These tables informed marginal and total pay-offs for 
different levels of contributions and availability of the alternative technology (example of a pay-
off table is provided in Appendix C).  
 
In each session of the lab (field) we randomly formed up to five (four) groups of five members 
each. In each five-person group every member knew the size of the group. All the individual 
decisions were private and confidential, and were made anonymously. To facilitate and ensure 
understanding of the game, three hypothetical examples were provided and subjects were allowed 
to play three training periods (without payoff).  
 
We additionally gathered some information that provides insights about the decisions made by 
subjects in the experiment. At the end of each session, and before the payment was done, we 
asked every player to fill out a survey. In this survey we gathered some socioeconomic and 
demographic information, as well as information on some personality traits: risk, trust, empathy 
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and self-control.
3
 With the data we collected about these personality traits, we can make 
correlations between subjects’ behavior in the experiment and the behavior that they claim to 
have in their real lives. 
 
Payments to participants in the experiment were done individually and privately. In order to 
ensure anonymity, every participant was identified with a number that was handed out in a slip of 
paper at the beginning of the experiment. To collect his payment, at the end of the session, the 
player should give back the slip, individually, receiving in exchange a sealed envelope with his 
payment. The value of each token was calculated taking into account participants’ average 
opportunity cost of time, and the maximum and minimum amount of tokens each participant 
could gain in the session. For miners and students each token was converted into 72 and 32 
Colombian pesos, respectively.
4
 
 
2.1 Subject pools   
 
The experiments with students were conducted in October 2012 at the National University of 
Colombia, at the city of Medellín. This is a public university with approximately 10000 students 
in its campus at Medellín. The students for the experiment were recruited via an e-mail that was 
sent to students of economics and engineering, with an invitation to participate in an experiment. 
Those students who were interested in participating had to fill out an online form with contact 
information, as well as to select the sessions they were available to participate in. Participants 
were then contacted via e-mail with specific information about the single session they were 
selected for. A total of 185 students were recruited and allocated to one of the eight sessions we 
ran for this lab experiment. 
 
For the field experiment, we made a public call to artisanal gold miners from the municipalities 
of Segovia (37500 inhabitants) and Remedios (23500 inhabitants), in the Northeastern region of 
Antioquia, Colombia. For this call we invited miners to participate in the experiments via flyers 
distributed in mines and processing plants and messages transmitted from a local radio station. 
For this process we always counted on active support of mining leaders and existing miners 
associations. Provided that only 35 miners could be recruited with this call, we implemented an 
additional strategy: to run sessions directly in some of the mines. A total of eighty-five subjects 
could be finally recruited from the mining population living in these two municipalities. The 
experimental sessions in the field were run between the 23
rd
 of November and the 5
th
 of 
December of 2012. Table 4.2 reports the number of players by treatment in both subject pools. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 A description of how these variables were measured is found in Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b). 
4
 The exchange rate at the time of the experiments was approximately 1US$ equals 1815 Colombian pesos. 
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Table 4.2. Number of players by treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Results 
 
In Table 4.3, we present the socioeconomic characteristics of participants in the experiments.
5
 As 
expected, on average students are younger than miners, and their level of education is much 
higher than what is found in mining communities. Even though miners do not get high earnings 
from their activity (between 1 and 2 minimum wages), the average income of participants in the 
field experiment is higher than what students reported. In the last case, this is not a strange result 
provided that many of these students come from low income households and depend on parents 
for money and living expenses. Interestingly, these two populations appear to be quite similar in 
their levels of empathy, self-control, trust (on others), and attitudes toward risk.   
 
Table 4.3. Socioeconomic characteristics by populations. 
Variable Students Miners Difference 
Socioeconomic Variables 
Age (years) 21.6 32.39 10.68
*** 
Education
a 
(mean) 7 3.59 -3.41
***
 
Income (mean)
 
1.81 3.42 2.32
***
 
Female (fraction) 0.34 0.11 -0.23
***
 
    
Attitudinal variables  
Risk (mean) 6.88 6.58 -0.3 
Trust (mean) 0.36 0.39 0.03 
Empathy (mean) 3.6 3.45 -0.15 
Self-control (mean) 2.73 2.6 -0.13 
a Education is measured in levels depending whether primary, secondary, technical or college 
education had been completed or not.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, 
using the MWW test. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows average group contributions in the treatments across the whole game. The 
oscillating pattern of threshold public good games (Croson and Marks, 2000) can be also 
observed in our experiments. In general, this oscillation occurs around the efficient Nash 
equilibrium outcome of the game (60 tokens). This general outcome is more visible in the base 
                                                          
5
 In our comparisons we follow the standard procedure of testing the null hypothesis of equality versus a hypothesis 
of strict inequality.  We conducted a t-test of difference in means as well as the Wilcoxon -Mann-Whitney (MWW) 
Z-test. Both tests coincided with each other in their results. In this paper we only present the results for the MWW 
test. 
Treatment  Students Miners 
Baseline (T1) 50 10 
Exclusion (T2) 45 30 
Co-management (T3) 45 20 
Exclusion & Co-management (T4) 45 25 
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case of the experiment; i.e, in T1 and periods 1 to 8 of T2, T3 and T4. From this result, we may 
argue that players from both subject pools tacitly try to coordinate their actions in order to reach 
the threshold and buy the technology. In this sense, the threshold can be interpreted as what 
Schelling (1960) called a “focal point.”  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Average group contributions in treatments per period. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Example of individual contributions in co-managament (T3). 
 
 
An interesting result can be observed in the co-management treatment (T3). From periods 9 to 17, 
once players can communicate each other and with the external advisor, the oscillating pattern is 
less evident, and even for students this pattern disappears. In this treatment (T3) students do not 
only continue trying to coordinate their actions but also to achieve the Pareto-efficient outcome in 
which everyone fairly contributes 12 tokens. This is evident by looking at Figure 4.2 which 
shows an example of individual contributions in a chosen group of miners and one of students. 
Miners, in turn, also try to coordinate their decisions but their total contributions tend to be above 
the efficient Nash equilibrium outcome.  
 
By and large, by comparing charts of Figure 4.1 we detect that miners made contributions that are 
greater than contributions made by students. From Table 4.4 we confirm that miners on average 
contribute more than students in all treatments (p-value<0.001). This difference in contributions 
may account for the larger proportion of successful contributions (Σi ≥ T) that in general miners 
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achieved (see Table 4.5). Under co-management (T3), both miners and students try to coordinate 
their actions in order to reach the efficient outcome of collecting 60 tokens (see Table 4.5). This 
coordination leads to provision rates close to 100% in the case of students. Miners, meanwhile, 
only succeeded in achieving the efficient Nash equilibrium of contributing exactly 60 tokens half 
of the time.   
 
Table 4.4. Average and mean standard deviations of individual contributions for each treatment. 
 Average Contribution Standard Deviation  
Treatment  Students Miners Difference Students Miners Difference 
Baseline 11.84 13.34 1.48
*** 
1.93 2.71 0.78
*** 
Exclusion 11.68 13.52 1.84
*** 
1.73 2.02 0.29 
Co-manag. 11.97 12.67 0.7
*** 
0.59 1.37 0.79
*** 
Exclu. & Co-manag.  12.03 13.04 1.01
*** 
1.43 3.17 2.05
*** 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.5. Proportion of successful and efficient provisions. 
  Successful Provisions (%) Efficient Nash Equilibria (%) 
 Treatment  Students Miners Difference Students Miners Difference 
S
ta
g
e 
1
 
(P
er
io
d
 1
 t
o
 8
) Baseline 53.75 57.14 3.39 16.2 0 -16.2 
Exclusion 50 85 35
*** 
5.6 0 -5.6 
Co-manag. 62.5 82.1 19.6
* 
22.2 7.1 -15.1 
Exclu. & Co-manag.  52.8 86.7 33.9
*** 
9.7 2.9 -6.8 
S
ta
g
e 
2
 
(P
er
io
d
 9
 t
o
 1
2
) Baseline 55 75 20
* 
29.4 5 -24.4 
Exclusion 55.6 78.9 23.3
* 
19.8 3.3 -16.4 
Co-manag. 95.1 92.5 -2.5 91.4 52.5 -38.9
* 
Exclu. & Co-manag.  95.1 69 -26.1
** 
76.5 0 -76.5
*** 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
From Table 4.6 we can see that the mechanisms we examined in the experiments had an effect on 
the average number of tokens that each individual contributed. For instance, when there is 
exclusion from private benefits, the fact that there is also co-management affects students and 
miners differently (T2-T4, T3-T4). Moreover, if there is no exclusion, co-management has the 
same effect on both subject pools. However, provided that in a TPGG individual (group) 
contributions are close to or oscillating around the threshold or the cost-sharing contribution, a 
test of means as shown in Table 4.6 does not show the whole effect that each treatment has on the 
decisions made by players in the experiment. Therefore, to complement this analysis, we also 
performed an analysis of the standard deviations of contributions. 
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Table 4.6. Test of treatment effects on average individual contributions. 
 
Treatment 
P-value of the MWW test 
T1 – T2 T1 – T3 T2– T4 T3– T4 
S
tu
d
en
ts
 Baseline (T1) 
0.131 0.0044
*** 
0.0045
*** 
0.0275
** Exclusion (T2) 
Co-management (T3) 
T2 & T3 (T4) 
      
M
in
er
s Baseline (T1) 
0.7173 0.0038
*** 
0.4707 0.0735
*
 
Exclusion (T2) 
Co-management (T3) 
T2 & T3 (T4) 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
The agreement students make in co-management is not only efficient but also equitable. In 
general, there is a clear effect of co-management in reducing the variability of individual 
contributions (see Tables 4.4 and 4.7). Notwithstanding players of both subject pools try to agree 
on making fairly contributions of 12 tokens, students get better outcomes in doing so. We 
confirm this result with students’ lower standard deviation of individual contributions per period 
in co-management (see Table 4.4) and the trend of individual contributions shown in the 
examples of Figure 4.2.  
 
When co-management is combined with exclusion (T4), the efficient and sustained outcome that 
players can achieve under co-management (T3) is weakened. On one side, students continue 
having high successful provision rates and frequent efficient outcomes, but with a standard 
deviation that is higher than in T3 (see Tables 4.4 and 4.7). On the other side, in T4 miners failed 
to produce efficient outcomes, successful provisions are even much lower than in T2, and the 
standard deviation of individual contributions is higher than not only in T3 but also in T2 (p-
value<0.0001). Indeed, in T4 miners present the oscillating pattern observed in both the baseline 
and the exclusion treatment (T2).  
 
Table 4.7. Test of treatment effects on standard deviations of contributions. 
 
Treatment 
P-value of the MWW test 
T1 – T2 T1 – T3 T2– T4 T3– T4 
S
tu
d
en
ts
 Baseline (T1) 
0.0000
***
 0.0000
***
 0.0000
***
 0.0012
***
 
Exclusion (T2) 
Co-management (T3) 
T2 & T3 (T4) 
      
M
in
er
s Baseline (T1) 
0.0004
***
 0.0000
*** 
0.0000
***
 0.0000
***
 
Exclusion (T2) 
Co-management (T3) 
T2 & T3 (T4) 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Of this non-parametric analysis we can conclude that there are convergences and divergences in 
the behavioral patterns that miners and students show in the framed economic experiment. In 
order to gain more insights about the external validity of the lab experiment, we now proceed to 
show a parametric analysis in which we consider four sets of variables. Firstly, we include the 
socioeconomic and personality characteristics already described in Table 4.3. Additionally, we 
include three categorical variables (T2, T3, T4) which take the value of one if the player was 
exposed to one of these treatments, and zero otherwise. The parametric analysis also takes into 
account four dynamic variables: the total contributions of the other four members of the group in 
the previous period (Σj≠i, t-1), the difference between group contribution and the threshold in the 
previous period (Differencet-1), interactions among these two variables, and a variable that 
captures the time trend (Trend). In addition to this, we also measured some variables related to 
miners’ knowledge of alternative technologies and perception of the effects of mercury pollution. 
The specification of the estimated behavioral model considers that for the dependent variable 
(individual contributions) we have a panel of data with discrete values. In Table 4.8 we present 
the estimations results of Poisson regressions with random-effects.
6
  
 
In both subject pools socioeconomic and demographic variables do not explain individual 
contributions. Among the set of personality traits only trust in others positively affects the 
contributions students and miners made in the experiment. These results thus support previous 
findings in the literature according to which this trait would increase the subject’s concern for the 
provision of the public good and therefore a rise in voluntary contributions (see, e.g., Czap and 
Czap, 2010; Czap et al., 2010; Kocher et al., 2011). 
 
In these regressions treatment variables are not significant either. However, we should recall that 
in order to enhance to understanding of the effects of these treatments we should also look at the 
effect of these mechanisms on the variability of contributions across the game. In effect, in Table 
4.9 we show that co-management contracts the variability of group contributions in both subject 
pools. It happens in spite of the fact that this variability tends to increase along the game. 
However, in miners the effect of co-management vanishes when the mechanism is combined with 
exclusion, whereas in students the effect of co-management surpasses that of exclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 We also estimated a negative binomial model with random effects and an OLS random effects regression. The 
results of the estimations of the three specifications coincided with each other. The variable education was dropped 
in these estimations because the level of undergraduate education was not measured in the sample of students. 
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Table 4.8. The determinants of individual contributions in the TPGG (Poisson panel model). 
Variable Students Miners Pooled 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Trend -0.002 0.002 -0.009
**
 0.004
 
-0.003
*
 0.002
 
T2 -0.011 0.022 0.069 0.043 0.001 0.021 
T3 0.018 0.023 0.019 0.041 0.009 0.02 
T4 0.029 0.023 0.033 0.043 0.03 0.021 
Σj≠i, t-1 -0.026
***
 0.003
 
-0.019
***
 0.003
 
-0.022
***
 0.002
 
Difference t-1 0.028
***
 0.005
 
-0.0001 0.005 0.015
***
 0.003
 
Σj≠i, t-1 * Difference 
t-1 
-0.0001 0.0001 0.0003
***
 0.0001
 
0.0001
*
 0.0004
 
Age 0.002 0.003 0.0012 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Sex 0.002 0.017 0.037 0.07 0.006 0.02 
Income -0.005 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.0002 0.007 
Risk 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.004 
Trust 0.029
*
 0.017
 
0.081
*
 0.047
 
0.046
***
 0.018
 
Empathy 0.011 0.019 0.002 0.029 -0.002 0.014 
Self-control 0.002 0.017 -0.015 0.035 -0.005 0.15 
Constant 3.63
***
 0.16
 
3.44
***
 0.204
 
3.59
***
 0.012
 
Type (1  student 0 
miner) 
    -0.084
***
 0.027
 
Residence time   0.002 0.04   
Know new tech.   0.106
**
 2.01   
Limitation in access   0.018 0.4   
Have used tech.   -0.108
**
 -2.15   
Participation in 
training 
  0.016 0.33   
Participation is 
useful 
  -0.046 -0.25   
Health effects   -0.137
***
 -3.12   
Mine   0.015 0.3   
N 185 85 270 
Wald chi2(k) 117.12
*** 
88.5
*** 
182.2
*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 4.9. OLS model of treatment effects on standard deviation of ci. 
 Students Miners 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
T2 0.057 0.117 -0.327 0.179
*
 
T3 -2.045 0.108
***
 -1.697 0.216
***
 
T4 -1.269 0.151
***
 0.106 0.207 
Trend 0.028 0.01
***
 0.084 0.016
***
 
Constant 2.52 0.099
***
 3.117 0.213
***
 
Wald chi2(k) 519.64
***
 93.95
***
 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
For the case of linear public goods, Croson (2006) argues that when the sign of the coefficient of 
Σj≠i, t-1 is positive, experimental subjects are reciprocators, whereas a negative sign would indicate 
altruism. For the case of a threshold public good we must bear in mind that subjects wish to reach 
the threshold with the aim of getting the public good provided. Therefore, subjects would 
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consider not only others’ previous contributions but also the difference between total 
contributions and T (Differencet-1). The sign of the coefficient of this interaction term in the case 
of miners is positive and significant. Thus, given a difference between Σt-1 and T, higher 
contributions of other players trigger higher allocations of tokens to the group account. From 
these results we can conclude that miners act as reciprocators, whereas no conclusion can be 
extracted for the sample of students. 
 
In regards to the negative sign of Σj≠i,t-1 for both subject pools, it would be an indication of 
strategic behavior. According to this result, when a player receives information that the rest of the 
group made higher contributions in the previous period, he would contribute less in the ongoing 
period in the expectation that they keep that level of contributions, which should be hopefully 
high enough to reach the threshold.  
   
We also estimated a Poisson panel model with random effects pooling data of both samples. In 
these estimations, also shown in Table 4.8, besides the findings already discussed in the 
parametric analysis, we may confirm the results of the non-parametric analysis. Accordingly, the 
coefficient of the variable Type indicates that, conditional on socioeconomic, attitudinal and 
dynamic variables, players recruited from the college community on average contributed 0.09 
tokens less than miners (p-value=0.002).
7
  
 
4. Discussion 
 
What do our results suggest about the external validity of TPGGs? In our framed experiments the 
behavior of miners and students is similar to previous multi-period context-free TPGGs made in 
the lab. For instance, the oscillating pattern has also been reported by Croson and Marks (2000) 
and Cadsby and Maynes (1999). Moreover, in the baseline of the experiments we obtained 
provision rates that are close to those reported by Croson and Marks (2000) and Cadsby et al. 
(2008). For a net reward that is equal to 12 and a step return of 2, these authors reported 
provision rates that vary between 0.51 and 0.59.
8
 Additionally, similarly to Corson and Marks 
(2000), in our experiments the efficient Nash equilibrium is hardly ever achieved and 
contributions have a tendency to be decreasing over time, particularly in the experiments with 
miners. 
 
In addition to the behavior of both samples in a threshold public good environment, we also 
studied the effect of the application of mechanisms aimed at encouraging collective action: co-
management and exclusion from the private benefits of the alternative technology. The results 
                                                          
7
 In a Poisson regression model the marginal effects are estimated by computing ˆ ˆ.exp( ´ )x  , where ˆ  is the vector 
of estimated parameters (Greene, 2000). 
8
 In our base case the net reward is defined as (R+ρ – T/n), and the step return as (n.(R+ρ)/T). 
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suggest that the effects of these mechanisms depend on the characteristics of subject pool. Co-
management appears to have similar effects on miners and students in terms of the provision of 
the public good and achievement of Pareto-efficient outcomes. However, the effect of this 
institutional arrangement is different when it is combined with an economic incentive such as 
exclusion. While in students the effect of co-management prevails over the effect of exclusion, in 
the sample of miners the effect is completely the opposite and subjects could not agree on the 
best social outcome. 
 
Given the contrasts we have found in the experiments the external validity of lab experiments 
must be taken cautiously. In general, scholars have arrived to the same kind of conclusion for 
diverse environments when comparing lab and field experimental results. Some examples are as 
follows: ultimatum and dictator games (Carpenter et al., 2005; and Carlsson et al.; 2012); social 
dilemmas (Anderson et al., 2012) including common-pool resource dilemmas (Cárdenas, 2009), 
and; wage markets (Fehr and Gächter, 2008).  
 
Another part of the debate of external validity of economic experiments is focused on whether 
subjects behaves in natural field situations as they do in either the lab or in a field experiment. 
For instance, Laury and Holt (2008), Rondeau  and List (2008) and Voors et al (2012) found 
weak correlation between the behavior  people have in experiments with an artificial environment 
that entails a public good dilemma, and field behavior in a naturally occurring public good. A 
common conclusion and recommendation is that experimentalists in economics should be 
cautions when extrapolating their results to explain or predict behavior in the real-world. 
 
Smith’s (1976, 1982) precept of parallelism does not always hold for many reasons. Levitt and 
List (2007) pointed out some of them: presence or absence of moral and ethical considerations, 
the subject pool, the context in which the choice is embedded, the extent to which one’s actions 
are scrutinized by others and the nature of that scrutiny, and the stakes of the game. Overall, one 
the main reason for this divergence is that the conditions we find in the lab are rarely, if ever, the 
same we find in the field.  
 
Carpenter et al. (2005) pointed out that the behavioral differences in their sample of college 
students and workers might be due to the differences in the social framing of these subject pools. 
In our experiments, clearly the social context of both pools is different. On the one hand, 
participants in our lab experiments are typical university students who in most of the cases 
depend on their parents for living expenses and come from different regions of the country. On 
the other hand, miners’ social context is characterized by factors such as conspicuous 
consumption and the stress associated to the current armed conflict present in those zones 
(Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013a).  
 
The level of education does make remarkable difference between these two populations. 
Consequences of this fact may be twofold. Firstly, better computing skills would make free-riders 
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students to better calculate the contribution level that maximizes their individual payoff provided 
others’ contributions. Moreover, the computing skills can lead all subjects to figure out what the 
best outcome for the group is – i.e., the Pareto-efficient outcome that maximizes social welfare–, 
especially once they can share ideas and perceptions about the game. 
 
The familiarity that experimental subjects (miners vs. students) have with the framework of the 
game also impacts the decision-making process in social dilemma situations. For instance, in his 
comparison of students against villagers, Cárdenas (2009) detected a possible nonextraction value 
of standing trees in common forests, which explain the difference in the forest stocks between 
subject pools in a framed common-pool resource experiment. Likewise, in our comparison of 
students versus miners, it is more likely that miners are aware of the harmful effects of mercury 
pollution than what students are. Such difference in the perceptions about mercury pollution 
might explain why miners on average contributed more than students in the acquisition of the 
technology that would eventually cut emissions of this chemical element.  
 
We also collected information on personality traits that have been said to drive decisions in 
public-good dilemma settings: trust in others, risk attitudes, self-control and empathy (see, e.g., 
Czap and Czap, 2010; Czap et al., 2010; Kocher et al., 2011, 2012). We gather this information to 
correlate behavior in the experiment and the behavior that participants claim to have in their real 
lives. Carpenter and Seki (2006), for instance, found the expected correlation between collective 
action in an experiment with fishing communities and variables that measure cooperation 
attitudes and internal and external orientation of the participants 
 
Unexpectedly, even though we found that people from inside and outside the laboratory were 
statistically the same in terms of these traits, such traits did not explained contributions to the 
common fund except trust. In our opinion, this result does not indicate that those traits definitely 
do not affect collective action in the framework of our experiment. Instead, it would be an 
indication of the need of further research about how to measure these variables and their 
correlation with behavior in social dilemmas.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigate the external validity of a threshold public good game that was framed 
taking into account some of the features that are found in the field. This comparison between 
university students and artisanal gold miners in Colombia included the tests of how behavior in 
this framed threshold public good setting is affected by some institutional arrangements: 
exclusion from private benefits and co-management. The contribution to the debate about the 
external validity of experiments done with students is that participants in the field were recruited 
from a subject pool that has never been employed before in the literature of experimental 
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economics. Moreover, we modified the artificial environment and enriched it with information 
concerning the social dilemma faced by many artisanal gold mining communities worldwide.  
 
Both in the lab and the field we obtained results that are in line with previous multi-period 
TPGGs conducted in the laboratory: contributions have both a tendency to be decreasing and an 
oscillating pattern over time. However, we got mixed results in the institutional arrangements we 
tested. On the one hand, the effects were of different magnitude where co-management made 
subjects to coordinate their actions in order to achieve efficient and equitable outcomes. 
Additionally, in both subject pools there were no clear effect of exclusion.  
 
On the other hand, when exclusion and co-management were combined, the effects differed 
between the subject pools: meanwhile students could agree on contributing a number of tokens 
that is a Pareto-efficient and equitable outcome, miners could not.  Regarding the achievement of 
efficient outcomes, university students performed better than miners. To what extent the degree 
of education is an important driver of these differences in performance is a question for future 
research.  
 
An implication of these results is that, and as other authors have suggested, we must have caveats 
when thinking about extrapolating lab results. Moreover, considering students’ better 
performance in the experiment, a policy implication is that efforts focused to improve the 
education levels of artisanal gold mining communities might be required for a better management 
of natural resources.  
 
Further research that examines the differences between lab and field experiments is needed, 
particularly in the analysis of other-regarding preferences and social dilemmas. Levitt and List 
(2007) have already pointed out that such differences might be explained, among others, by how 
one’s actions are scrutinized by others and the nature of that scrutiny. Therefore, in the context of 
the public good dilemma faced by artisanal gold mining communities and the experiment we 
have presented in this paper, one possible branch for future research might be the investigation of 
social norms like, for example, how others in community would treat people who do not 
contribute.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Payoff Table 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
0 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
1 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
2 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
3 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
4 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
5 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
6 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
7 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
8 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
9 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
10 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
11 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
12 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
13 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
14 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
15 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
16 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
17 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
18 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
19 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
20 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
23 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
24 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
27 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
28 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
29 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
30 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
31 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
32 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
33 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
34 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
35 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 24
36 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 24
37 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 26 25 24
38 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 27 26 25 24
39 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 28 27 26 25 24
40 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 29 28 27 26 25 24
41 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
42 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
43 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
44 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
45 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
46 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
47 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
48 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
49 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
50 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
51 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
52 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
53 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
54 25 25 25 25 25 25 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
55 25 25 25 25 25 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
56 25 25 25 25 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
57 25 25 25 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
58 25 25 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
59 25 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
60 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
61 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
62 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
63 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
64 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
65 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
66 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
67 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
68 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
69 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
70 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
71 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
72 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
73 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
74 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
75 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
76 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
77 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
78 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
79 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
80 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
81 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
82 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
83 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
84 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
85 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
86 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
87 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
88 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
89 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
90 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
91 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
92 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
93 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
94 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
95 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
96 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
97 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
98 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
99 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
100 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24
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Chapter 5 
-- 
A behavioral model of collective action in 
artisanal and small-scale gold mining 
 
 
Abstract 
There is a rising global concern about mercury-usage in artisanal and small-scale gold mining because of 
its harmful effects on ecosystems and human health. Associative entrepreneurship has been promoted as a 
way of accessing to alternative techniques to deal with this mercury pollution in artisanal and small-scale 
gold mining. We built a behavioral simulation model to assess the feasibility of associative 
entrepreneurship (collective action) in the context of the public-good dilemma that gold mining 
communities face. The model is constructed based on results from field economic experiments, and 
properly replicates the observed behavioral patterns; thus, it reveals that sustained collective action is 
feasible when miners completely understand the social dilemma they face, but that self-organization is not 
possible. Features such as reciprocity and temptation to free ride partially explain why self-organization 
fails. In such a case, external intervention places a key role to promote programs that improve the 
understanding of the social dilemma faced by artisanal gold miners. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the design and implementation of support policies for communities involved in artisanal and 
small-scale gold mining (ASGM), several scholars have stressed the importance of having a good 
understanding of the social dynamics of these communities (Hentschel et al., 2002; Hilson, 2005, 
2006; Hilson et al., 2007; Sinding, 2005; Spiegel, 2009; Dondeyne et al., 2009). Poor 
performance of some projects aimed at regularizing and providing assistance to ASGM, has been 
said to be in part due to an insufficient understanding of the dynamics of target communities 
(Keita, 2001; Hilson, 2007).  
 
Communities involved in ASGM face a social dilemma that is found in the way gold is 
recovered. In the gold recovery (ore beneficiation) process, a miner usually employs the 
apparently cheapest and traditional available technique –mercury amalgamation– to gain the 
maximum short-run benefit for himself. However, the entire community is worse off than if a 
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cleaner and more productive technology were used. This social dilemma can be classified as a 
public-good dilemma and it concerns the control of pollution resulting from this process. 
 
In a public-good dilemma people find it costly to contribute to the provision of the public good 
and prefer others to pay for its provision instead (Ostrom, 1998). When everybody in the 
community follows this type of strategy, the public good is underprovided or not provided at all, 
while pollution persists. However, the entire community might be better off if everyone 
contributes to the provision of the public good (Ostrom, 1998). In an ASGM context, cleaner 
technologies for gold recovery could be accessed to under an association scheme that involves 
entrepreneurial activities; i.e., through collective action. Nevertheless, some incentives and 
personality traits might hinder the emergence of such pro-social behavior. 
 
A kind of policy aimed at dealing with mercury pollution in ASGM has been the promotion of 
organization of miners with an entrepreneurial criterion (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013a). In 
addition to improve the relationship with the state, associative entrepreneurship would enable 
miners to accumulate the financial capital required to obtain cleaner and more productive 
technologies that are beyond the budget of most miner families (Hentschel et al., 2002; Hinton et 
al., 2003; Hilson and Potter, 2003; CDS, 2004; Ghose and Roy, 2007; Spiegel, 2009). This 
financial capital is difficult to obtain from the financial system, which perceives small-scale 
mining as a risky activity (Chaparro, 2003). This fact, added to the low tendency of miners to 
save money for investing (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013a), make of associative entrepreneurship 
an option for small-scale miners to increase their financial capital. 
 
In an effort to assess the feasibility of associative entrepreneurship and collective action in the 
context of this public-good dilemma, in this paper we propose a behavioral simulation model. 
This approach goes beyond the analysis done so far by some scholars who through visual models 
have integrated, for instance, the most relevant factors that explain poverty-traps in ASGM 
(Heemskerk, 2001, 2005; Hilson and Pardie, 2006; Spiegel, 2009). Even though these models 
represent the core relationships that drive poverty-traps in ASGM (see Figure 5.1), it is still no 
clear from these visual models, for instance, which the attributes that would prevent the use of 
cleaner technologies are, in a way that allows the design of strategies for overcoming resistance 
to technological change.  
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Source: Spiegel, 2009.  Source: Hilson and Pardie, 2006. 
 
 
 
Source: Heemskerk, 2005.  Source: Heemskerk, 2001. 
Figure 5.1. Visual models of poverty trap in ASGM. 
 
 
Modeling has been established as a useful tool in the process of creating scientific explanations of 
how systems work and assessing alternatives to transform these systems (Morecroft, 2007). In 
fact, modeling by simulation has become an important methodology for theory development in 
the literature about organizations and to explain social phenomena (Vázquez et al., 1996; Bowles, 
2004; Davis et al., 2007). The use of simulation has been previously employed in the analysis of 
situations that imply a social dilemma. Using the simulation method System Dynamics, Castillo 
and Saysel (2005) explained behavior of individual decision rules of communities whose 
livelihood depends upon the extraction of common pool fisheries, and where a common-pool 
resource dilemma is implied.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief discussion of the theory 
of collective action and our approach to model individual decision rules of artisanal gold miners, 
considering the aforementioned public-good dilemma. Thereafter, the behavioral simulation 
model and some issues on model validity are presented, followed by the simulation results and 
policy analysis. We use simulation methods to explain the endogenous dynamics underlying 
behavior of individuals involved in ASGM, in situations that involve a public-good dilemma and 
in which collective action is a challenge. In the final section, we conclude with a discussion of 
this model and provide some insights for future work. 
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2. Collective Action and Natural Resources 
 
Extensive fieldwork has established that under some circumstances individuals do voluntary 
organize themselves to, for example, protect natural resources (see, e.g., Ostrom, 2000, 2010; 
Anderies et al., 2011; Cardenas, 2011). Ostrom (1998) pointed out that some of the structural 
variables that affect individual’s decisions in situations involving social dilemmas are the size 
and heterogeneity of the group of participants, discount rates, and the level of information 
available to participants. Besides these variables, face-to-face communication (cheap-talk) is 
another factor that affects the individual attributes that finally shape behavior in a social dilemma 
condition (Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 1998; Anderies et al. 2011). Such individual attributes are 
trust, reciprocity and reputation (Ostrom 1998, 2000), which positively reinforce each other and 
affect the level of cooperation (extraction effort in a common-pool resource, or contributions to a 
public good). Such level of cooperation finally determines the benefits that individuals earn from 
their social interactions (see Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2. The core relationships of collective action. 
Source: Reproduced from Ostrom (1998). 
 
Laboratory experiments of public-goods provide empirical evidence of Ostrom’s theory. For 
instance, Czap and Czap (2010) and Kocher et al. (2011) show that the level of trust in others that 
someone has, may positively determine the concern the subject has for the provision of the public 
good, and therefore his levels of donations to the provision of the public good. Ostrom (2000) 
and Fischbacher et al. (2001) report that certain type of player, a “conditional cooperator,” may 
lead to relatively high levels of contributions in public good games. A conditional cooperator is 
someone who is willing to initiate cooperative action when he estimates others will reciprocate, 
and to repeat these actions as long as a sufficient proportion of the others involved reciprocate 
(Ostrom, 2000). However, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) found that players in a public good 
game are not complete but imperfect conditional cooperators, and this feature is the explanation 
for the contributions to decline in finitely repeated linear public good games. 
 
When conditional cooperators exist and individuals use reciprocity in their decisions, there is “an 
incentive to acquire a reputation for keeping promises and performing actions with short-term 
costs but long-term net benefits” (Ostrom, 1998, p. 12). Additionally, in cases where the relation 
RECIPROCITY 
TRUST 
REPUTATION 
LEVELS OF 
COOPERATION 
NET 
BENEFITS 
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between individuals is recurrent, and they have the opportunity of retaliation of those who defect, 
cooperation is more likely to occur (Bowles, 2004). 
 
In addition to the effect of the structural variables on collective action mentioned by Ostrom 
(1998), a key ingredient for explaining the success or failure of a community in solving a social 
dilemma is the context. Different kind of broader contextual variables such as the resource 
system (Ostrom, 2007), market conditions (Castillo et al., 2011), and historical and ecological 
settings (Prediger et al., 2011) generate differences in the behavioral patterns and decision-
making processes of resource users. 
 
Finally, another driver of decision-making in social dilemmas is the homo-economicus or rational 
profit maximizer from the neoclassical economy. In this regard, Castillo and Saysel (2005) 
pointed out that some aspects of human behavior such as temptation to free-ride and profit 
maximization, are important drivers of individual decision-making in situations involving a 
common-pool resource dilemma.  
 
In the next section we propose a model of individual decision rules of artisanal gold miners, 
which considers the aforementioned aspects of collective action in social dilemmas. The model is 
expected to improve the understating of the societal dynamics of ASGM communities. Although 
there are certainly other mechanisms that would explain the poverty-trap in this sector (see, e.g., 
Hilson and Pardie, 2006), we focus our attention on the social (public-good) dilemma as it relates 
to the technology trap that causes pollution from the gold recovery process to persist. 
 
3. Modeling Approach of Decision Making in ASGM 
 
3.1 System Dynamics Model 
 
We develop a behavioral simulation model in order to improve the understanding of decision-
making in ASGM. These methods allow describing and analyzing how complex social systems 
work (Sterman, 2000; Morecroft, 2007; Davis et al., 2007). The simulation model presented in 
this paper endogenously explains the behavior of ASGM social systems, considering the public-
good dilemma studied and the most relevant aspects of the system. The interaction among these 
elements is captured by feedback (causal) loops diagrams which represent the structure of the 
socio-ecological system (Sterman, 2000).  
 
With simulation, one can represent the tendency that sometimes economic agents have to 
underestimate delays and misperceive certain nonlinearities (Sterman, 1989; Moxnes, 2004). For 
the public-good dilemma observed in ASGM, these nonlinearities can be found in aspects such as 
the relationship between group’s trustworthiness and willingness to cooperate (Castillo and 
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Saysel, 2005). Also, there might be other instances of these nonlinearities such as in the 
productivity (extraction per unit of effort) for a given technology, the dynamics of the resource 
itself and the scarcity perception of it. Additionally, in issues such as investment decisions or the 
perception of the unhealthy effects of pollution, the temporal difference between cause and effect 
can be huge (Hilson, 2006). Such delays lead to make decisions that do not consider these effects, 
or that consider them but when it is too late. Overall, these misperceptions lead to decisions that 
imply mismanagement of natural resources (Moxnes, 2004).  
 
In order to consider the complexity underlying most socio-ecological systems, we first think of 
such systems as a dynamic system in which personal, social, economic, political and natural 
components are constantly interacting (Dudley, 2008). The model structure of our analysis is 
based on the core relationships of collective action proposed in Ostrom’s (1998) theory of 
collective action, some of the main features of a model proposed by Castillo and Saysel (2005), 
and on the outcomes of an economic experiment conducted both in the lab (with university 
students) and the field (with small-scale gold miners) between October and November of 2012.  
 
The economic experiment supports the construction of the model, which considers an ASGM 
framework where a cleaner and more productive technology for the gold recovery process could 
be accessed to under a scheme of associative entrepreneurship. The essential condition that 
governs this kind of association is the contribution to a common fund in order to raise the 
minimum financial capital to cover the cost of the technology. However, a subject might be 
tempted to free-ride; i.e., not to contribute but to enjoy the benefits of both a better environmental 
quality and the higher efficiency of the new technology in the recovery process. Under the 
conditions of non-exclusion and non-rivalry in the positive externalities derived from the adopted 
technology, a threshold public good game was carried out. In the game, players must raise a 
minimum amount of tokens (T) to cover the cost of the alternative technology. 
 
In the baseline of the experiment, each of the 5 participants of a group had to choose which part 
of his endowment (E) of 25 tokens to contribute to a group account. This endowment was 
assigned at the beginning of each of the 17 periods of the game. If T (60 tokens) was not reached 
in the round, the individual’s payoff was his own endowment. However, when the summation of 
group’s contributions was equal to or greater than T, everyone in the group received a reward of 
24 tokens which represents the benefits of both an improved environmental quality and higher 
productivity; benefits that are not excludable in this base case.
1
 
 
Considering this public-good dilemma, Figure 5.3 illustrates the causal structure or dynamic 
hypothesis of the model. The feedback loop diagram shows the cause-and-effect relations 
between the variables that explain behavior in the public-good dilemma we study. In this figure, 
                                                          
1
 We invite the reader to see Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b, 2013c) for a complete description of the economic 
experiment. 
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the arrows indicate the causal connection between pairs of variables. When the arrow has a 
positive (negative) sign, it means that a change in the variable in which the link starts, generates a 
change in the same (opposite) direction in the other variable (ceteris paribus). Small parallel lines 
in the diagram denote delays. The dynamic hypothesis consists of four causal loops, three 
reinforcing loops or positive feedbacks (denoted with R1, R2 and R3 in the center of the loop), 
and one balancing loop or negative feedback (denoted with B in the center of the loop).
2
 Each of 
these loops is described below. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.  Dynamic hypothesis of the behavioral model for ASGM.  
 
 
In the reciprocity loop (R1), we follow Ostrom (1998, p. 14) who defines reciprocity as the 
“norms individuals learn from socialization and life’s experiences.” In this loop, individual’s 
contribution (ci) increases group’s contribution (Σi), which positively affects group’s 
cooperation. The latter is defined as the total amount of donations in the group minus the 
symmetric free-riding equilibrium which in this game is to contribute zero tokens (Cadsby and 
Maynes, 1999). In other words, the higher the amount of contributions to the common fund, the 
more the group cooperates. Additionally, group’s reputation to cooperate is affected by past 
actions (contributions) of the group. This variable is modeled as a stock or state, and it is 
formulated considering others’ contributions (Σj≠i) in the past and a normal (average) level of 
contribution of others which in this case is assumed to be an equitable donation of tokens:   
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 for  i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5      (5.1) 
 
                                                          
2
 See Sterman (2000) for a further explanation. 
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The level of trust the individual has on the group is clearly altered by group’s reputation taking 
into account past decisions. This variable –trust– accumulates past group’s reputation for 
cooperation as follows: 
 
0
0
[ ’  ]
t
jt strust group s reputation ds trust    (5.2) 
 
This level of trust finally affects the individual’s willingness to cooperate (contribute) in a 
positive way. This relationship between trust and willingness to cooperate is represented as a 
nonlinear formulation in Figure 5.4.
3
 In this formulation, we assume that when the levels of trust 
are high, the player reciprocates by increasing contributions to the common fund. As trust 
decreases, player’s contributions decrease. In this nonlinear formulation, the player is assumed to 
be highly responsive to inferior levels of trust but this response slows down as trust moves 
toward its maximum possible value. Moreover, player’s willingness to cooperate saturates at 
certain levels for minimum and maximum levels of trust. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Graph Functions for Calculation of Individual Contribution. 
 
Figure 5.3 also portrays a free-riding loop (B). In this balancing loop, the player takes into 
account how the difference between group’s contribution and the threshold (T) has been. This 
difference is perceived by the player with a time delay; i.e., it corresponds to the information the 
                                                          
3
 Models in System Dynamics involve the use of nonlinear functions that are usually specified analytically by using 
table or graph functions. This kind of functions specifies the relationship between values of the independent and the 
dependent variables. See Sterman (2000) for further explanation.    
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player receives in the current period on how this difference in the previous period was. If this 
information indicates that the difference was positive, the player has the incentive of free riding 
on others by decreasing his contribution in the current decision period. Nonetheless, when total 
contributions drop below the threshold, the temptation disappears and individual’s payoff is just 
his endowment. In such a case, the player would be encouraged to contribute to reach the 
threshold and obtain benefits from the group account. In the model, the difference between 
group’s contribution and T is normalized taking into account the possible maximum values this 
difference can take according to this equation (Σi – T)/T. This relationship between temptation to 
free ride and this difference is modeled as a graph (table) function that is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
We also take into consideration that the homo-economicus from the neoclassical economy is 
present in this decision-making process. This profit maximizing behavior is represented in the 
reinforcing loop R2 in Figure 5.3. According to this loop, the individual compares the average 
earned payoff from the previous period to the maximum payoff he could earn in a single period 
(49 tokens). This is modeled with a function that represents the effect of this reasoning on 
individual contributions, which is represented in Figure 5.4. In this function, when the average 
earned payoff is about the minimum that can be earned, the player would be willing to contribute 
more. Under this situation, contributing more would increase the chance of reaching the threshold 
and therefore of obtaining profits from the group account. However, as the ratio of average 
perceived payoff to the maximum payoff rises, the effect disappears and the player would 
contribute approximately the same level of tokens in the next period of the game.  
 
As time goes by, it is also expected that each player learns about the dilemma in which he is 
involved. In the awareness loop, the player gains awareness of the public-good dilemma for 
higher values of the ratio of perceived relative contributions and the perceived relative payoff: 
 
  
∑  
⁄
      
         ⁄
      (5.3) 
 
When this ratio takes high values (close to 0.6), the player recognizes that by contributing few 
tokens relative to what others players contribute (ci/Σi) is not being profitable enough; i.e., Payoff 
⁄ Max.Payoff is low. This perception causes the individual to increase the contribution to the 
common fund. The social dilemma awareness, however, is better distinguished when the 
difference between the perceived payoff and the maximum payoff is wide (i.e., when the ratio is 
lower than 0.7). The learning effect decreases at an accelerated rate as the perceived payoff gets 
closer to the maximum possible payoff. 
 
In summary, the decision for an association scheme that enables miners to obtain better 
technologies to overcome their public-good dilemma depends on several factors. The 
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contribution decision is modeled for five representative players who make private decisions. This 
decision for the individual i is formulated as follows:  
 
Contributioni = Reference contribution Willingness to Cooperatei  
                  Temptation to Free Ridei  Profit Maximizing Effecti  
                  / Social Dilemma Awarenessi     (5.4) 
 
Most of these factors are nonlinear functions represented in Figure 5.4. The reference 
contribution in equation (5.4) is a parameter that was set at 12. This is the intermediate value 
between complete selfish donation level (0 tokens) and the maximum level the individual may 
donate (25 tokens). 
 
3.2 Validation of the Model
4
 
 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box and Draper, 1987, p. 424). In general, we 
cannot expect that a single system dynamics model replicates reality; however, models and their 
simplifications are useful to learn about how complex dynamic systems work (Sterman, 2000). In 
general, the validation of a system dynamics model is referred to the validity of both structure 
and behavior (Barlas, 1996; Qudrat-Ullah and Seong, 2010). In system dynamics, model validity 
is essentially seen as a building confidence process (Forrester and Senge, 1980) that involves a 
“variety of tests to assess the quality of both the model and the model building process” 
(Morecroft, 2007, p. 377). Besides tests for model structure, tests of model behavior are 
commonly applied to assess the adequacy of the behavior generated by the structure of the model 
(Forrester and Senge, 1980; Morecroft, 2007). In this sub-section we present and discuss the 
results of the tests we applied to our behavioral model. 
 
3.2.1 Tests of model structure 
  
Some of the tests mostly employed in structural validation are discussed in Forrester and Senge 
(1980) and Sterman (2000). A brief description of these tests is presented in Table 5.1. 
 
In regards to the boundary adequacy and structure verification tests, the major variables of the 
causal loop (see Figure 5.3) are endogenously generated by the model: individual and group 
contributions, trust, and individual payoffs. This structure adheres to the theory of collective 
action of Ostrom (1998) already described in section 2, which is also supported by the results of 
the economic experiments reported in Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b, 2013c). Accordingly, in 
those experimental results the statistical significance of dynamic variables in explaining 
individual contributions leads to conclude that participants in the experiment reciprocated. 
                                                          
4
 The model in Powersim Studio
TM
 and its complete description are available upon request. 
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Moreover, in the experiments, trust in others positively affected the contributions subjects made 
to the common fund. 
 
 Table 5.1. Tests for model structure validation. 
Test Description 
Boundary adequacy: 
This test asks whether the model includes all the relevant 
concepts for addressing the problem. 
Structure verification: 
Model structure must be consistent with the knowledge we 
have about the real system. 
Parameter confirmation: 
Parameters must have a meaning or a counterpart in the real 
world. 
Dimensional consistency: 
All equations in the model must be dimensionally consistent, 
and this dimensionality must correspond to the real system. 
Extreme conditions: 
This test entails assigning extreme values to selected 
parameters, and assessing the plausibility of model-generated 
behavior against what it is theoretically anticipated. 
Sensitivity analysis: 
Sensitivity of results to changes in the assumptions about how 
people make decisions. 
Source: The author based on Forrester and Senge (1980), Sterman (2000) and Morecroft (2007). 
 
Dimensional consistency was directly tested using the tool available in the software Powersim 
Studio
TM
. There is no numerical data to verify the value of the parameters employed in the 
model. Instead, the parameters and functions of the model were calibrated taking into account the 
experimental results reported in Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b, 2013c).  
 
To test the model response to extreme conditions, we first look at how the model behaves under 
extreme conditions of initial levels of trust. On the one hand, the most likely behavior for very 
low initial levels of trust is that players will try to follow the inefficient Nash strategy and make 
contributions near to zero tokens. In fact, Figure 5.5 shows that when the players initially distrust 
others they put very few tokens in the group account. As the game goes on, players learn about 
the dilemma and try to increase their contributions to the common fund, but the provision point is 
never reached. On the other hand, when players fully trust in the actions of each of the group 
members, contributions start high, although not at its maximum. In a threshold public good game, 
group contributions beyond the provision point are welfare reducing (Marks and Croson, 1998). 
Therefore, contributions are not expected to be much higher than certain level, which in this case 
is the efficient cost-sharing contribution of 12 tokens which maximizes social welfare. Other 
behavioral driving forces such as profit maximization would prevent players from wasting their 
available resources, making them to provide donations collectively acceptable.  
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Figure 5.5. Extreme conditions test for the initial value of trust. 
 
The results of the simulation model can be sensible to the assumptions about the way people 
make decisions (Sterman, 2000) or react to certain impulses. These assumptions are modeled as 
graph functions described in sub-section 3.1. Such relationships that are likely influential on the 
behavioral patterns are willingness to cooperate and temptation to free ride (Castillo and Saysel, 
2005). Here we present a sensitivity analysis of the model to changes in the shape of these two 
graph functions.  
 
In Figure A.1 of the Appendix D we show how the results of the model change for different 
possibilities of the functional forms that define the willingness to cooperate and different initial 
values of trust. When the willingness to cooperate is low and players require high levels of trust 
to cooperate (Castillo and Saysel, 2005), the system is not able to reach an appropriate level of 
individual donations that leads to the provision of the public good. This happens even when the 
initial level of trust is high. In contrast, players are always prone to contribute enough tokens 
when the willingness to cooperate is high, even when players have a low initial level of trust. In 
this case, individual contributions tend to increase since the beginning and stabilize in the final 
rounds in values close to the cost-sharing equilibrium (12 tokens). 
 
Assuming a moderate function of willingness to cooperate, the system moves toward an 
inefficient equilibrium of individual contributions. Conversely, in the common case, i.e., for the 
graph function showed in Figure 5.4 (sub-section 3.1), neither the cost-sharing equilibrium nor 
the provision point are always reached, although it is more likely to be reached when players start 
the game with high trust. In general, the behavior of the model in this sensitivity analysis is as 
expected.  
 
Some individuals can resist the temptation to free ride while others cannot (Skatova and 
Ferguson, 2013). These behavioral individual differences affect the opportunistic behavior 
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players have, and hence the results of the game. For instance, let us assume that one of the 
players (Player A) strongly resists the temptation of free riding on others (the temptation to free 
ride function is concave), while the other four players are given a common temptation to free ride 
function (see Figure A.2 the Appendix D). In this case, player A would donate more tokens than 
his partners from the very beginning. The rest of the players reciprocate this behavior and at the 
final rounds of the game the threshold is always reached and the public good provided. In another 
scenario, where player A is characterized with a high temptation of free ride, the contributions of 
this player are quite low throughout. Other players’ contributions keep close to the cost-sharing 
donation. However, their cooperative efforts are eroded by the elevated opportunistic behavior of 
player A, and the public good is hardly ever provided. 
 
3.2.2 Tests of model behavior  
 
The aim of testing model behavior is to assess the fit of simulation to observed data (Morecroft, 
2007). In this section, we discuss the model behavior compared to the average behavior of miners 
and students in the framed economic experiments reported in Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013c). 
Firstly, there is an oscillating pattern around the efficient Nash outcome equilibrium (60 tokens), 
usually observed in other threshold public good games (Croson and Marks, 2000); it can be 
detected in the baseline of the framed experiments undertaken with miners and students. 
However, the amplitude of the oscillation of group contributions in students is different to the 
behavioral pattern observed in the experiments with miners. Figure 5.6 portrays those differences.  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Average group contributions in the baseline of the framed  
experiments with miners and students. 
 
 
To reproduce the behavioral patterns coming from the experiments, we modified the following 
characteristics of each player in the model: initial levels of trust and temptation to free-ride, and 
the functional forms of willingness to cooperate, temptation to free ride and profit maximization. 
Table 5.2 shows the characteristics of each player in both groups (students and miners). Figure 
5.7 portrays the best fit between the simulations and average group contributions in the control 
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treatment of the economic experiments. The general impression from these results is that students 
act more like homo-economicus (profit maximizers) than miners and try to adjust their 
contributions to the efficient contribution level. 
 
Table 5.2. Characteristics of students and miners in the simulation. 
Player Initial level 
of trust 
Initial level 
of free-riding 
Willingness to 
cooperate 
Temptation to 
free ride 
Profit 
maximization 
Students      
A Medium High Common Low Common 
B Medium Medium High Low Common 
C Low Low Low Low Common 
D High Medium Medium Common Common 
E Medium  Medium Common Common Common 
      
Miners      
A High High High Medium
a 
Low
b
 
B Medium Medium Common Common Low 
C Medium High Common Common Low 
D Medium Medium Common Common Low 
E Medium High Common Common Low 
a Inverse sigmoid function. 
b Convex function. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Comparison of model behavior and average group contributions  
in the control treatment of the economic experiments. 
 
4. Policy Analysis 
 
An important step for building confidence in a system dynamics model is the policy analysis and 
design (Barlas, 1996; Morecroft, 2007). This analysis is aimed to simulate and assess the 
response of the real system to a policy that has been tried, or to create new strategies to improve 
the performance of the real system (Forrester and Senge, 1980; Barlas, 1996; Sterman, 2000; 
Morecroft, 2007).  
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The data gathered in the economic experiments both with miners and university students show 
that individuals do not succeed in self-establishing a sustained collective action (see Figure 5.6). 
Along the base case of the experiment, players can afford the cost of the technology, but this 
happens only sporadically; the rates of successful provisions for both subjects pools are slightly 
above 50% (see Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013c). In a real world situation, contributions to the 
common fund are required not only to buy the equipment but also to maintain it. Therefore, 
strategies to improve these performance patterns are required. To have individuals whose 
commitment to provide enough funds to the association is not permanent could have a deterrent 
effect on group’s contributions.  
 
In the last two decades, external organizations have presented technical mining alternatives 
(Veiga, 1997; Chouinard and Veiga, 2008) and persuaded artisanal gold miners to organize 
themselves into associative entrepreneurship. This scheme would help miners to enable them to 
accumulate the financial capital required to obtain cleaner and more productive technologies 
(Ghose and Roy, 2007; Spiegel, 2009). 
 
Under this this policy context, one of the institutional arrangements that were examined in the 
economic experiments developed by Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b) was co-management. 
Conceptually, this mechanism is understood as the interaction between internal communication 
among community members and an external non-coercive party. The role of the external party 
was to persuade miners to invest in the new technology, with the aim of reducing the emissions 
of mercury and avoiding the harmful effects of mercury pollution. In addition to this persuasion, 
each five-person group had five minutes to converse among themselves. The average results of 
this treatment both in miners and students are shown in Figure 5.8. In this figure, the first eight 
periods correspond to the baseline; thereafter, when players communicate and interact with the 
external advisor, we observe that they try to coordinate their actions in order to reach the efficient 
outcome (60 tokens). Moreover, players tend to be more closely to the cost-sharing equilibrium 
by contributing 12 tokens. See for instance Figure 5.8 which portrays individual average 
decisions of students and miners in one of the sessions where the co-management treatment was 
applied.  
 
 
Figure 5.8. Average behavior in the co-management treatment of miners and students. 
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The kind of behavior observed under this treatment is explained by the awareness of the dilemma 
loop from Figure 5.3. Communication among group members and external advisor triggers 
commitment and trust inside the group, and additionally make players to get more aware of the 
public-good dilemma. During the experiments, for instance, Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b) 
observed that one or two miners within the group played the role of leaders. These leaders 
pointed out the features of the social dilemma and suggested the way of dealing with it.  
 
To simulate the effect of this institutional arrangement on contributions as the set-up of the 
experiment, we introduced a graph function in the awareness loop that starts having effects from 
period 9. The function accelerates the rate at which each individual gets aware of the public-good 
dilemma. As shown in Figure 5.9, the effect of co-management is especially high when the ratio 
of relative contribution to relative payoff is low. In other words, when an individual himself does 
not perceive the dilemma, communication with an external party and with other group members 
triggers individual’s awareness of the dilemma. The general behavioral pattern obtained from the 
simulation model under this treatment is portrayed in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Effect of co-management of awareness of the social dilemma. 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Model behavior for co-management treatment. 
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Spiegel (2009) points out the links that between technological development, environmental health 
awareness and trust-building in ASGM there is. From the sensitivity analysis in subsection 3.2.1, 
we see that high initial levels of trust lead to cooperation no matter the cooperative trait the 
subject has (see Figure A.1 in Appendix D). Moreover, simulations (subsection 3.2.2) show that 
the experimental results are partially explained by medium or low levels of trusts that individuals 
have at the beginning of the game (see Table 5.2). Therefore, from a policy viewpoint, it is 
important to improve the channels of communication in these communities. Better 
communication leads to strengthen the levels of trust, commitment and social capital which, 
according to Zeffane et al. (2011), are key elements within any organization. More trust and 
commitment, combined with the support of external agencies that increase education and provide 
technical assistance, guide ASGM communities to improve the gold recovery process what in the 
long-run may translate into more well-being. 
 
Finally, another mechanism that was tested in the experiments of Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013b) 
is the exclusion from the private benefits that a miner may obtain from the alternative technology 
if the miner does not contribute to the purchase of the technology. These private benefits 
correspond to the higher efficiency or more productivity in the gold recovery process if the 
alternative technology is obtained and used. This kind of economic incentive did not have any 
effect on the behavior miners showed in the experiment. However, by doing some simulations we 
can discern a certain design of the economic incentive in order to make it effective in terms of the 
objectives of the policy.  
 
In the exclusion treatment of the experiment, the level of minimum contribution for not being 
excluded was chosen to be simply above zero. These results change if we consider a tougher 
minimum individual contribution in this exclusion case; e.g., a donation level that is at least as 
high as the cost-sharing contribution of 12 tokens. If we keep the characteristics of miners that 
were shown in Table 5.2, the simulation results show that by making this coercive requirement 
after period 8, contributions tend to increase such that almost in all the second stage of the game 
the threshold is reached although with total contributions that are welfare-decreasing (above 60), 
as shown in Figure 5.11. We should note that we did not obtain a significant effect when we 
increased the amount of the private benefits. Therefore, there is room for further research about 
the role of economic incentives in cooperation in ASGM.  
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Figure 5.11. Simulation of the effect of a tougher economic incentive. 
 
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on Ostrom’s (1998) theory of collective action in social dilemmas, in this paper I propose 
a behavioral simulation model to explain why communities engaged in ASGM often fail to 
establish a sustained association in the gold recovery process. Features such as reciprocity and 
temptation to free ride partially explain why this failure. Nonetheless, my simulations reveal that 
sustained collective action is feasible when miners increase their understanding of the social 
dilemma where they are involved. The better understanding can be gained, for instance, with 
education campaigns and interventions that foster social capital through the improvement of the 
channels of communication. 
 
Previous literature has proved the usefulness of simulation methods in the study of issues that 
involves decision making about environmental problems (Decker, 1994; Grant and Thompson, 
1997). This literature includes models developed to analyze the management of natural resources 
that entails social dilemmas (Castillo and Saysel, 2005; Touza et al., 2013), and indeed to support 
the design of policies focused on ASGM (Andriamasinoro and Angel, 2012). Likewise Castillo 
and Saysel’s (2005) approach, in this paper we constructed a model with a structure based on 
Ostrom’s (1998) causal theory of collective action, and supported we experimental data from the 
lab and the field. This approach takes into account some of the features of the local community 
and its environment, what according to Hilson (2007) and Speigel (2009) is a need for the 
analysis of issues concerning ASGM. 
 
We intend to contribute to the understanding of social dilemmas faced by users of natural 
resources. For the specific case of ASGM, our paper goes beyond the analysis done so far with 
visual models done by scholars such as Heemskerk (2001, 2005), Hilson and Pardie (2006) and 
Spiegel (2009). Through a simulation model, we explored how an institutional arrangement 
influences associative entrepreneurship among artisanal gold miners that improves the well-being 
of these communities.  
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The design of effective policies to address environmental problems requires setting up 
interventions that considers the peculiarities of each problem, as well as the kind of pro-
environmental behavior that policy makers desire to induce (Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012). In 
fact, for situations in which individuals must cope with a social dilemma, several scholars have 
highlighted the positive effects that face-to-face communication on collective action has (see for 
instance Ledyard, 1995; and Ostrom, 2010). Nonetheless, weak communication channels may 
actually prevent self-organization or collective action, which emerges as a solution to those social 
dilemmas. In those cases, ASGM being one of them, external intervention is needed. For the 
specific case of ASGM, we show that external parties (governments, NGOs, etc.) have a key role 
by promoting programs that improve the understanding of the social dilemma miners have. Also 
important is to set up strategies (e.g. education programs) to improve social capital and 
strengthen the skills that are required to attain an everlasting association.  
 
Lokhorst et al. (2013) pointed out the effectiveness of different commitment-making strategies in 
altering environmental behavior. Nonetheless, these authors admit the ignorance that in the 
literature exists about the mechanisms by which it may happen. From our behavioral model, 
however, we argue that by making people more aware of the social dilemma, external 
interventions could lead miners to commit themselves to socially responsible mining practices. 
Economic incentives that alter the private benefits the individuals earn from the recovery process 
also work in this direction. 
 
We observe the importance of education and capacitation. In the economic experiments 
university students performed better than miners. In general, students achieved more efficient 
outcomes than miners did (see Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013c). From simulation results, we argue 
that a possible explanation of this behavioral discrepancy is found in the differences of education 
levels. Better skills make the individual to better understand particular situations, of the game in 
this case, and estimate the consequences of their actions considering also others’ actions.  
 
Finally, in this paper I showed the usefulness that simulation models can have in the design and 
support of policies targeted at natural resource-based communities, which serve to add to the 
existing literature (see, e.g., Castillo and Saysel, 2005; Andriamasinoro and Angel, 2012). In 
ASGM, further applications could be in the analysis of other aspects that explain or mechanisms 
to address poverty-trap in this sector. Besides the technology trap that has been analyzed in this 
paper, other social and economic components that call for analysis are the decisions that entail 
low levels of education and savings. Moreover, simulation methods and experimental economics 
are potential tools to be jointly employed in the design of mechanisms, including economic 
incentives, to overcome mercury pollution and change certain behavioral patterns that are 
welfare-reducing in ASGM.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
Function Individual Contributions 
 
High Willingness to Cooperate 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Willingness to Cooperate 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium Willingness to Cooperate 
 
 
 
 
 
Common Willingness to Cooperate 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.Sensitivity analysis of willingness to cooperate function and trust. 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Trust in them
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Trust in them
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Trust in them
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Trust in them
122 
 
Function Individual Contributions 
Concave function 
 
Convex function 
 
 
Individual Contributions 
 
 
Individual Contributions 
 
Group Contributions 
 
Group Contributions 
 
 
Figure A.2. Sensitivity analysis of temptation to free ride function. 
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